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Japan is enigmatic for migration scholars. The country will lose a quarter of its 
population in 40 years with the elderly ratio climbing to nearly 40%, remaining one of 
the most aging economies. Nevertheless, it still retains the lowest share of migrants in 
the labour market among OECD members. It seems no grand design for the future 
generation is shared by policymakers or citizens: how should the country open up a 
practical prospect under this hard reality?  
 
This research addresses the enigma through the optics of highly skilled migration 
which has been one of the pivotal agendas of the recent policy development in Japan. 
In attempting to fuel the economy, the Japanese government has lately devoted 
themselves to attracting highly skilled migrants (HSMs). One of the implemented 
policies is a points-based system; however, it has failed to deliver the expectation at 
the outset. With this policy failure in mind, this study aims to fill the important research 
gaps on HSMs in Japan: the mechanism of skilled migration and its interplay with 
policies. In other words, what makes HSMs decide to work in Japan and how the public 
policies influence their decisions. The study centres on these micro-macro interplays. 
 
For this, the dissertation is structured to explore the labyrinth made up of three 
mazes—societal, labour and policy dimensions that HSMs in Japan face. Based on 
the qualitative inquiry, the study will unfold the dynamism of the mazes through the 
perception of HSMs and migration experts. In so doing, the research offers new 
insights to academic arguments by producing concepts such as ‘coerced 
harmonisation’ and ‘no choice democracy’, whose implications are not limited to skilled 
migration but cover the overall migration agendas. Throughout, the discussion will 
present how the lessons drawn from Japan can contribute to addressing the pressing 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Labyrinth 
 
“And this also,” said Marlow suddenly,  
“has been one of the dark places of the earth.” 
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness1 
 
With many advanced industrial countries facing the challenges of demography in this 
age of economic globalisation, migration policies are among the most important factors 
in terms of revitalising the economy and stabilising society. Japan cannot be the 
exceptional case albeit it has traditionally been labelled as a closed country to 
immigrants: Japan will lose a quarter of its population—30 million people—over the 
next four decades (2016-2055) with the percentage of the elderly rising from 27.3 to 
38.0%, still one of the highest levels in the world (Cabinet Ministry, 2017). OECD (2017: 
33) calls for a more admissionist migration policy for “future economic prosperity and 
the well-being of its people”, especially considering the share of migrants in the 
Japanese labour market is the lowest (1.6%) among the OECD members.  
 
Above all, attracting highly skilled migrants (HSMs) is key for not only Japan but other 
economies (Beechler and Woodward, 2009; Cerna and Chou, 2014; International 
Organisation of Employers, 2014), bringing about severe competition to acquire and 
retain HSMs (Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; Harvey, 2014). Given this situation, scores 
of states reform their migration policies to attract the best and the brightest (Skeldon, 
2009; OECD, 2013). For example, the United Kingdom (UK) launched the Points-
based system (PBS) for HSMs in 2008 and the EU introduced the Blue Card system 
in 2012, which allows global talent from outside the EU to move within it with fewer 
restrictions. Turning our eyes to Asia, Singapore established strategic policies to 
acquire HSMs in the late 1980s. Japan also started the Points-Based Preferential 
Immigration Treatment for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals (hereafter PBS) in 
2012. 
 
Policies in advanced industrial countries, however, often swing between proactive and 
negative (Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). A good example of this is contemporary Europe 
where political parties appealing to decrease the number of immigrants garner a lot of 
support, reflecting the migration backlash (OECD, 2016). This trend may also emerge 
in Japan. Arguably, unless migration policies are scrutinised objectively and empirically, 
policy discussions risk ending up as merely emotional and highly loaded arguments. 
This is most likely to result in policy failures (Castles, 2004; Spencer, 2011). To avoid 
                                            
1 Conrad (1902: 3) 
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such confusion, it is imperative to critically appraise the migration mechanism and 
reveal the reasons for policy failures based on evidence: this is what this research 
pursues. 
 
1.1 Research aims 
This research aims to identify how Japan should address the issues confronting HSMs 
while the country faces the unprecedented challenges of severe global competition 
and a rapidly ageing and declining population. It particularly fills the important research 
gaps on HSMs in Japan: the mechanism of skilled migration and its interplay with 
policies. In other words, what makes HSMs decide to work in Japan and how the public 
policies influence the decision. The study centres on these micro-macro interplays. 
 
Given the severe global economic competition as well as shrinking population, policy 
makers and the business community have long insisted that more HSMs are crucially 
needed to revitalise Japan (Liberal Democratic Party, 2008; Keidanren, 2004, 2008, 
2015).  
 
Against this background, the Japanese government has continued policy debates to 
attract HSMs for the last decade. In 2008 when the UK introduced PBS, the Japanese 
government set up Kodo jinzai ukeire suishin kaigi (The Council for the Promotion of 
Acceptance of Highly Skilled Professionals) headed by the then Chief Cabinet 
Secretary to discuss necessary policies to attract HSMs; its report “Gaikoku kodo jinzai 
ukeire seisaku no honkakuteki tenkai wo (Call for proactive policies to attract highly 
skilled migrants)” referred to European policies focusing on HSMs, especially outlining 
the UK’s PBS, and accentuated the necessity to introduce a similar system in Japan 
(Kodo jinzai ukeire suishin kaigi, 2009). This proposal brought Japan the PBS 
introduced in 2012; however, the number of HSMs using the new system was only 434 
for the first 11 months (May 2012-April 2013)—it accounted for merely 0.2 % of all the 
HSMs in Japan (Oishi, 2014), far below the initial expectation of the government 
(Immigration Bureau, 2015). Consequently, the policy needed reforming (Dai 6ji 
Shutsunyukoku kanri seisaku kondankai gaikokujin ukeire seido kento bunkakai 
[Working Group on Policies to Accept Immigrants, the Sixth Council of Immigration 
Policies], 2013).  
 
This example perspicuously indicates that study on the migratory mechanism of HSMs 
has been limited—in terms of what induces them to migrate and how the policies can 
address this. The research gap has led to policy failures in Japanese migration policies. 
This study thus centres on why Japan has failed to attract HSMs and why its policies 
3 
 
have not functioned well. Ultimately, how should the policies be improved to increase 
the number of HSMs? This is the labyrinth to be thoroughly explored in this dissertation. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
The overarching research question to decipher the labyrinth is “what are the 
significant agencies and actors attracting highly skilled migrants in Japan?” For 
this interrogation, the study explored the perception of HSMs and the policy making 
process of migration governance in Japan. The inquiry especially focuses on three 
dimensions, namely, migrants’ social life, labour issues (micro/meso), and migration 
governance in Japan (macro) through the following research questions (RQ): 
 
RQ1 (Backgrounds of HSMs in Japan):  
What are the motivations for HSMs to work in Japan? Are there any distinctive 
differences in motivations or trajectories among migrants from different 
countries/regions?  
RQ2 (Policies and social issues):  
 What factors may prevent HSMs from living in Japan? Specifically, how do 
public policies or social issues affect the life of HSMs? 
RQ3 (Labour Issues): 
 What kind of problems do HSMs face in their workplace? How do they evaluate 
the distinctive Japanese employment relations?  
RQ4 (Attraction of working in Japan):  
 Are there any distinctive advantages that attract HSMs?  
RQ5 (Migration governance):  
 How are migration policies designed in Japan? What issues are underlying in 
the policy making process to update policies?  
 
In answering the above five questions, this research mainly adopted qualitative 
methods with 45 semi-structured interviews (26 HSMs in Japan and 19 policy experts), 
supplemented by a reading of policy texts, and relying on an inductive and in-depth 
approach to unveil the labyrinth. The empirical analysis was also complemented with 
secondary statistical data and the extant literature on highly skilled migration. 
 
1.3 Justification for the intellectual investigation 
There is a host of literature and reports describing the necessity of attracting HSMs 
and three main reasons are given: economic growth, labour shortages, and the 
demographic challenges in host countries (Castles et al., 2014; European Commission, 
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2009; International Organisation of Employers, 2014). This is also a shared 
understanding of the Japanese government, urging themselves to design policies to 
attract HSMs (Immigration Bureau, 2015); however, the research conducted on highly 
skilled migration in Japan has been insufficient (Holbrow, 2017) not to mention the 
overall migration policies (Sato, 2017). Subsequently, there are four reasons why the 
topic is worth investigating.  
 
First, a new dimension on highly skilled migration is emerging. Attracting HSMs has 
recently been one of the pivotal economic strategies for Japan; the Japanese 
government has centred the strategic policy for HSMs on its nationwide economic 
growth plan as one of the measures to revive the Japanese economy (Japanese 
government, 2015). The Japanese business community has also called for policy 
measures to increase the number of HSMs to promote innovation; in other words, to 
enhance productivity and international industrial competitiveness so that Japan can 
move out from the sluggish economy to the new growth stage (Keidanren 2015). In 
addition, Transnational Corporations (TNCs) such as Toyota and Honda have started 
to promote non-Japanese executives from their overseas subsidiaries. This novel trend 
also resonates with early-career HSMs as the new-graduates are increasingly 
recruited by Japanese corporations (Keidanren, 2018). This is another form of 
personnel strategy to gather the best and brightest regardless of nationality aiming to 
enhance their competitiveness in the fierce global competition. These views also 
suggest that HSMs are conducive to reviving the Japanese economy from 
accumulating capital and increasing the labour force (Japanese government, 2015; 
Oishi, 2014). On this account, it is justifiable to say that contributing to this discussion 
is valuable in considering the new role of highly skilled labour in Japan, where relatively 
fewer migrants have worked (Hollifield et al., 2014). 
 
Second, and more significantly, this discussion should be first and foremost evidence-
based. Despite these economic advantages, there are some views questioning the 
need for foreign talents. For instance, the Japanese Trade Union Confederation, 
Rengo, articulates that the government must improve employment environments for 
Japanese nationals who have difficulties in finding stable jobs such as graduates 
unemployed, permanent part-timers, elderly and female workers before filling the job 
vacancies by migrant workers (Rengo, 2004). This view still affects the policy design 
as can be seen in a report of the government’s council taking note of the sceptical 
opinions against emphasising the significance of HSMs, saying “the policy should be 
evaluated on the basis of how much innovation and employment were created by 
HSMs residing in Japan rather than how many HSMs came to Japan” (Dai 6ji 
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Shutsunyukoku kanri seisaku kondankai gaikokujin ukeire seido kento bunkakai, 2013: 
3). It reflects the scarcity of empirical data explaining how HSMs can contribute to 
Japan not only economically but also socially with the extant literature insufficient to 
persuade these sceptical views. Bridging the research gap is indispensable to reframe 
the debate on HSMs. 
 
Third, based on the evidence, it is necessary to address policy failures. Although the 
Japanese government attempted to create PBS to increase the number of HSMs, the 
new policy did not function well. This calls for more research into policy failure (Oishi, 
2012, 2014). The government takes a position that they accept HSMs proactively but 
do not rely on unskilled foreign labour (Immigration Bureau, 2015); however, the reality 
is that Japan has not been successful even in attracting HSMs that the current policies 
focus on. While there are opinions that Japan needs to consider opening its border to 
unskilled foreigners for demographic reasons (Chung, 2010), it is far-reaching to 
examine the causes of the current policy failures and offer the perspective of better 
migration policies before discussing opening its doors to unskilled labour. In this sense, 
highly skilled migration can be a crucial milestone for the future migration debates. 
 
Last, the topic of HSMs in Japan has been under-researched (Tsukasaki, 2008) 
although it could give important implications on research in other countries. The 
scholarly debate on Japan’s migration issues has mainly revolved around ethnicity and 
diaspora (such as Korean and Brazilian migrants), community level social cohesion 
and interns/technical training programme (see for example, Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004 
or Aiden, 2011); research into highly skilled migration has been very limited (Holbrow 
and Nagayoshi, 2017) even though it is regarded as one of the principal policies to 
revitalise society and the economy (Keidanren. 2015).  
 
Japan is the third largest economy in the world with cutting edge technologies and 
innovative products/services (World Economic Forum, 2017). The country has 
remained a surprisingly small magnet for HSMs (Oishi, 2012). Addressing this labyrinth 
will offer another illuminative case or variation of migration, from where we may be able 
to find lessons and constructive solutions in dealing with pressing migration matters 
(Hollifield, 1992; Massey et al, 1993;). 
 
1.4 Theoretical framework 
As endorsed by a myriad of migration scholars (King, 2012a; Castles et al., 2014; 
Findlay and Cranston, 2015; Vertovec, 2017), this study has chosen an 
interdisciplinary approach stretching across geography, sociology, political science, 
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anthropology and economics. Nevertheless, each discipline still tends to be associated 
with preferred central questions and methods (Brettel and Hollifield, 2015) with 
sociologists focusing on migrant identities and geographers on space, place and time. 
Also with scale levels, the topic of highly skilled migration has distinctive approaches 
by each discipline; micro-meso driven geography (e.g. Koser and Salt, 1997; 
Beaverstock, 2002) and sociology (e.g. Leonard, 2008; Ryan, 2015) with the contrast 
of more macro driven political sciences (e.g. Betts and Cerna, 2011; Cerna and Chou, 
2014). For example, human geographers were successful in unpacking socio-
economic spatial patterns of HSMs (e.g. Salt, 1988; Findlay et al., 1996; Beaverstock, 
2005; Millar and Salt, 2008); however, it was still confined within the classical optics of 
place-based determinants (van Riemsdijk and Wang, 2017), thus lacking macro 
implications such as presenting policy recommendations. This study therefore 
attempts to bridge the micro-macro divide in the skilled migration debate by presenting 
a bigger picture emanating from policy implications.  
 
The research is specifically framed by three theories, namely, (1) transnational elite 
geographies, (2) Japanese employment relations, and (3) Kasumigaseki bureaucracy. 
RQ 1&2 will be drawn on transnational elite geographies (Salt, 1983, 1988; Findlay et 
al., 1996; Beaverstock, 2002, 2005) framing HSMs’ motivations, institutional 
mechanism and socialisation as the process to produce transnational elites. This 
theory unravels the mobility patterns especially through the TNCs, whose institutional 
mechanism have played an important role in shaping the flow of HSMs (Cormode, 
1994; Millar and Salt, 2008; Beaverstock et al., 2009). The role of TNCs in mobility is 
also important for Japan as its capital city, Tokyo, has been one of the business hubs 
in the world (Sassen, 2001). On the other hand, this research will also discuss the other 
types of HSMs, who are not intracompany transferees of the TNCs to fill the gaps of 
transnational elite geographies. 
 
With regard to labour issues relating to RQ 3&4, Japanese employment relations 
(Tsukasaki, 2008; Oishi, 2012) are also used as a conceptual lens to discover whether 
there are any Japanese specificities affecting the migratory decision of HSMs and its 
wider implications to the worldwide migration debate. In addressing migration 
governance predicated on RQ 5, Kasumigaseki Bureaucracy (Johnson, 1982; 
Imamura, 2006) frames the research to examine how policy failures were shaped by 




1.5 Definition of important terminologies 
Terminologies matter. Especially, empirical research should be always predicated on 
precise terms, giving no room for arbitrary analysis—this is one of the preconditions 
for epistemology. Nevertheless, researchers and practitioners do not share definitions 
of technical terms in the migration field as IOM (2011: 5) articulates:  
 
(D)efinitions in this field are often vague, controversial or contradictory. 
There is an absence of universally accepted definitions…; the result is that 
the usage of migration terms varies from country to country. Further, even 
within a country, terms can vary as to the meaning or implication. 
Definitions…may vary according to a given perspective or approach. 
 
Much of migration scholarship—whether a book or peer-reviewed journal—omits the 
definitions on which they predicate on; one of the few exceptions is Spencer (2011). 
Besides, some of the extant literature clearly misunderstands legal terms such as the 
differences between visa and status of residence (or leave to enter/remain in the UK). 
This also embodies one of the good examples showing the academic fields of migration 
are fragmented into sociology, geography, law and so forth albeit it should have an 
interdisciplinary approach. This section therefore introduces some of the important 
terminologies explaining their limitations and how this dissertation deals with them. As 
there is no universal definition of terminologies, much effort to converge the differences 
has been specifically paid by intergovernmental bodies such as the United Nations 
(UN), IOM and OECD, whose cross-border missions require communal terms2: the 
definitions used in this dissertation are also drawn from these works with specific 
adjustment for Japanese cases. 
 
1.5.1 Migration/Migrants 
Migration is termed “(t)he movement of a person or a group of persons, either across 
an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing 
any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes” (IOM, 
2011: 62). As this implies, migration covers all sorts of human movement unlike 
immigration which holds a connotation of longer relocation (Spencer, 2011). The UN 
                                            
2 Nonetheless, these organizations do not necessarily share the definitions precisely as discussed later. More 
interestingly, the preferred ‘approach’ of terminologies is evidently different; for example, UN (1998) and OECD 
(2016) tend to use ‘foreigners’ whilst IOM (2011) prefers ‘non-nationals’ instead of foreigners. OECD (2016) 
foregrounds the term ‘integration’ while IOM (2011) describes ‘inclusion’ more favourably than ‘integration’. The 
different ‘approach’ may reflect the different goals and functions of the organizations: economic driven OECD 
and migration driven IOM. 
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(1998) defines an international migrant as “any person who changes his or her country 
of usual residence” so it does not include “(t)emporary travel abroad for purposes of 
recreation, holiday, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage” (UN, 1998: 9). 
Then, international migration can be broken down into two categories: 
 
(1) Short-term migration—relocation “for a period of at least 3 months but less 
than a year (12 months)” (UN, 1998: 10); 
(2) Long-term migration—relocation “for a period of at least a year” (UN, 1998: 
10); 
 
Although the UN (1998) abandoned the definition of ‘immigration’ (instead they 
adopted short-term or long-term migration), IOM (2011: 49) defines immigration as “a 
process by which non-nationals move into a country for the purpose of settlement”. 
Thus, immigration can be regarded as a part of long-term migration that the UN (1998) 
predicates. Accordingly, emigration is “the act of departing or exiting from one State 
with a view to settling another” (IOM, 2011: 32). Although most scholarship in migration 
is centred on immigration rather than emigration (Gamlen, 2012), this label makes 
more sense to academics or Immigration Authority than migrants themselves who have 
both aspects as immigrants and emigrants. Furthermore, immigration does not 
necessarily point to settlement. For instance, OECD articulates that the definition of 
immigrants varies among countries and this is why their data are drawn from the two 
sets of different definitions: “foreign residents (European countries, Japan and Korea)” 
and “foreign-born (settlement countries, i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the 
United States)” (OECD, 2016: 363). Moreover, immigrant length of stay depends on 
the countries of the data source and is not limited to settlement (OECD, 2016).  
 
In fact, in the settlement countries, a migrant is sometimes given a permanent 
residency at the point of arrival, but the other countries—the clear majority of the 
nation-states— require the minimum length of residency for settlement: for instance, 
the UK government requires a 5-year-residency together with a language and 
citizenship test. It is consequently impossible for migrants to be an ‘immigrant’ at the 
outset of their migration. Japan generally requires 10-year-residency albeit there are 
no forms of test. Under the circumstances, it is hard to prove whether the migrants 
move “into a country for the purpose of settlement”. It is thus natural to consider 
migration as a process which may involve settlement in the future. Figure 1-1 classifies 





The highlighted boxes refer to the ‘migration’ in this study.      Source: the author 
 
 
This study adopts ‘long-term migration without settlement’ and ‘immigration’ as a 
meaning of migration. Subsequently, ‘immigration’ can be used interchangeably with 
migration. In this sense, highly skilled migrants can be put as highly skilled immigrants 
although the former is the more common usage in the literature (e.g. Iredale, 2001; 
Beaverstock, 2005; Scott, 2006; Oishi, 2012; Findlay and Cranston, 2015) as endorsed 
in this dissertation. The definition of ‘highly skilled’ will be further discussed and fixed 
in Chapter 2&3. In the skilled migration literature, ‘long-term migration without 
settlement’ is deeply associated with transient skilled migration (Appleyard, 1991, 
Beaverstock and Boardwell, 2000), which suggests the relocation of “a period of more 
than 1 year abroad” (Findlay, 1988: 402). This relocation can be repeated over the 
periods across the globe (Beaverstock, 1994). 
 
When it comes to ‘immigration control’ or ‘immigration management’, the word 
immigration has the wider meaning not limited to settlement but indicating border 
control. It signifies “States’ regulation of the entry and departure of persons to and from 
its territory” (IOM, 2011: 15). Immigration Authority (Immigration Bureau in Japan) is 
the governmental body controlling the overall migration regardless of nationalities or 
length of stay. 
 
Finally, with regard to the terminology of migrant/immigrant, it should be noted that the 
Japanese government has a unique parlance and definition, “mid-to-long term resident” 




















Figure 1-1 Classification of migration 
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should register their residential address with the local municipality. It will be clearly 
mentioned when this definition is specifically used in lieu of migrant. 
 
1.5.2 Highly skilled migrants 
The definition of highly skilled migrants is as hazy as ‘migrants’ (Koser and Salt, 1997; 
Scott, 2006). Whilst International Organisations such as the UN, OECD and IOM also 
admit “there is no internationally agreed definition” (IOM, 2011: 46), it is their general 
understanding that one of the main criteria is university degree (UN, 2005; Chaloff and 
Lemaitre, 2009; IOM, 2011). Nonetheless, OECD indicates other elements including 
occupation types (or qualifications) and wage as other significant factors as these 
multi-criteria are the standard to evaluate ‘skills’ in OECD economies (Chaloff and 
Lemaitre, 2009). 
 
OECD claims that one of the issues in only using the tertiary education criterion is 
overqualification where those with tertiary education take up a job which does not need 
the level of education (Chaloff and Lemaitre, 2009). As an example, it is known that 
Japanese-Brazilians tend to engage with an unskilled job (such as simple assembling) 
in Japan even though they used to work in more intellectually demanding professions 
(such as teacher) in their home country (Kitagawa and Tanno, 2016). Although a 
university degree is one of the quasi-requirements for a professional visa, Japan also 
takes a multi-faceted approach to screen the HSMs (Chapter 2 and 3 will further 
discuss this point). Apart from the legal definition, this research will also shed light on 
how the concept of ‘highly skilled’ (and low skilled) is bounded by gender and images, 
accentuating the necessity to eliminate the stigma: the details will be set out in the 
findings (Chapter 5). 
 
1.5.3 Visa 
Immigration status is not just a crucial factor in determining an individual’s 
relation to the state, its resources and legal system, the labour market and 
other structures. It is an important catalyst in the formation of social capital 
and a potential barrier to the formation of cross-cutting socio-economic and 
ethnic ties. (Vertovec, 2007: 1040) 
 
It is generally understood that ‘visa’ represents ‘immigration status’. Nevertheless, the 




An endorsement…that indicates that the authority, at the time of issuance, 
believes the holder to fall within a category of non-nationals who can enter, 
leave or transit the state under the State’s law. A visa establishes the criteria 
of admission into a State. 
 
This is a precise description on visa. Many migration scholars seem to confuse visa 
with residence or work permit3 but visa is just an ‘indication’ that the person fulfils the 
conditions to enter a State “at the time of issuance”. Thus, the final decision of 
admission is given by the Immigration Authority upon arrival. Migrants do not 
legitimately stay in a State on the basis of visa but the ‘permit’ given upon arrival; the 
authentic proof of the migration status is not a visa but the permit4. This permit is called 
‘status of residence’ in Japan and ‘leave to enter/remain’ in the UK—this will be further 
explained in Chapter 3. 
 
Having said that, the aim of this dissertation is not to offer a detailed account of legal 
prescriptions; therefore, it is not always necessary to adhere to the formal and technical 
legal terms. In fact, a myriad of literature (e.g. Oishi 2012) use visa instead of status of 
residence. An experienced immigration consultant also indicates even legal experts 
intentionally use the term visa instead of status of residence so as to facilitate the 
understanding of the clients (Funabiki, 2017). For this reason, this dissertation uses 
visa in lieu of status of residence even though the meanings are different5. 
 
1.5.4 Western/Asian 
The concept of Western and Asian is one of the key clues in deciphering the labyrinth 
in this dissertation since the findings will be predicated on the distinctive perceptions 
between the Westerner and Asian (c.f. RQ1). However, the definitions are not always 
crystal clear as a wealth of literature uses the terms without defining them clearly (e.g. 
Ho, 2007; Findlay et al., 2015; Holbrow, 2017; Harvey and Beaverstock, 2017; Liu-
Farrer and Yeoh, 2018). 
 
One of the possible definitions is geographical classifications which define Western as 
Europe and North America (Turnbull et al., 2010; Liu-Farrer, 2017). This research also 
                                            
3 For example, Conradson and Latham (2005a) confuse visa with leave to enter/remain. 
4 For instance, foreign tourist can be waived of visa (e.g. UK tourists travelling to Japan, or vice versa). However, 
they can never be exempted entry ‘permit’ given upon the arrival (unless there is a free-movement agreement). 
This explains how visa and ‘permit’ are different. However, the exceptional case is Australia. They converged 
permit with visa, so all the non-nationals should obtain visa to enter Australia. This is why the UK or Japanese 
citizen, who is normally waived of visa for a short visit to OECD countries, needs to register with Australia’s 
ETAS (Electronic Travel Authority) in visiting there for holiday or business; ETAS is in reality electronic visa. 
5 Nonetheless, Chapter 3 makes a distinction between the terms since it is devoted to explaining legal frameworks. 
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encompasses Australia and New Zealand in the Western states although they are 
geographically situated in the Asia Pacific. This is because their language (English), 
culture, society, economic and political systems (including business practices) have 
been vastly influenced and shaped by the Western norms. In addition, from the 
migration perspectives, Australia and New Zealand are grouped as settlement 
countries (OECD, 2016) together with the USA and Canada, which are defined as the 
representative West. Nonetheless, the author admits it is controversial to change or 
add to definitions according to the convenience of research. This point will be finally 
evaluated in the Conclusion Chapter. 
 
Asia can also be defined geographically as the UN (2013) does. Asia is, however, quite 
diversified in terms of economic development, political regime, demography and other 
social dimensions, which consequently make the generalisation extremely difficult 
(Asis et al., 2010; Castles, et al., 2014; Liu-Farrer and Yeoh, 2018). Therefore, this 
research does not attempt to generalise the ‘Asian’ as a whole; instead, it specifically 
focuses on the majority of Asian HSMs in Japan (i.e. HSMs from China, Korea, India, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and so forth: c.f. Chapter 3). 
 
In showing statistical data in Chapter 3, the geographical definitions of Europe, North 
America and Asia were drawn from the Immigration Bureau; its coverage is listed in 
Appendix 3 for the sake of reference. Across the dissertation (except for Chapter 3), 
mainland China (People’s Republic of China) is simply referred to as China. Hong Kong 
can be separately described where it is indicated so. Similarly, South Korea (Republic 
of Korea) is referred to as Korea. 
 
1.5.5 Migration policies 
There are two types of migration policies: (1) border control (i.e. immigration 
management) and (2) all the relevant policies relating to the life of migrants 
encompassing labour issues and social cohesion (see also Spencer, 2011). While the 
former is governed by the Immigration Authority, the latter concept embodies the wider 
policy coordination across the government based on “whole-of-government 
approaches” (Castles, 2004: 223). Evidently, the role of states at play in the migration 
mechanism stretches across multi-ministries such as labour conditions, welfare, 
housing, education and these factors dynamically interact with others. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine all the relevant policies surrounding the life of migrants; this 
dissertation discusses both immigration control and wider-related policies. That said, 
the study primarily focuses on the recent immigration management, subsequently 
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teasing out what problems underlie the Japanese policy making process. Then, the 
study expands its analysis to broadly-scoped policies.  
 
1.6 Dissertation outline  
This dissertation is structured to explore the labyrinth made up of three mazes—
societal, labour and policy dimensions that HSMs in Japan face. These mazes are in 
fact intricately convoluted. The dissertation will unfold the dynamism of the mazes in 
line with the intellectual puzzles, specific research questions and theoretical lenses. 
Chapter 2, 3 & 4 provide the basic arguments on extant literature, research problems 
and methods. Based on the foundation, Chapter 5, 6 and 7 answer the research 
questions, unfolding the labyrinth. Chapter 8 finally discusses the implication of the 
findings, manifesting how the study potentially contributes to academic debate. The 
thrusts of each chapter are as follows. 
 
Chapter 2 (Theoretical Framework) reviews the extant literature across disciplines. It 
first discusses who HSMs are, subsequently elucidating that the definition is moveable 
and nuanced, changing with use and context. Then, the causal mechanism of 
migration is considered with a contrast of two theories: transnational elite geographies 
and middling mobility. Transnational elite geographies, mainly developed by the UK 
geographers (Salt, 1983, 1988; Findlay et al., 1996; Beaverstock, 2002, 2005), posit 
career advancement, improving life and business strategies, as the powerful 
determinants for transnational elite mobility, whilst middling mobility (Conradson and 
Latham, 2005a, Scott, 2006; Ryan, 2015) emphasises migrants’ lifestyle and non-
economic factors. The rest of the chapter focuses on Japanese employment relations 
(Tsukasaki, 2008; Oishi, 2012) such as lifetime employment and seniority salary, 
followed by more macro policy issues on migration governance. 
 
Chapter 3 (Research Background) maps out the contextual background of the labyrinth. 
It specifically poses intellectual puzzles that research questions are predicated on. First, 
even though the Japanese government launched the PBS to attract HSMs, why did 
the ground-breaking policy not bring the expected outcome at the outset? Second, the 
longitudinal statistical portrayals of HSMs in Japan will reveal an intriguing enigma: 
although the overall number of HSMs has almost doubled for the last decade driven 
by the drastic increase of Asian HSMs, the number of Western HSMs has been 
constantly below the level of a decade ago. Notwithstanding that Japan has enjoyed 
robust economic growth since 2012—leading to the historical labour shortage (OECD, 
2017)—, it has failed to raise the number of Western HSMs. How can this ‘contradiction’ 
be explained within the framework of migration theory? This will constitute a key 
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intellectual puzzle to explore the labyrinth. Besides, the chapter benchmarks the 
Japanese policies on skilled migration with other Asian advanced industrial economies 
and discusses its implications. 
 
Chapter 4 (Methodologies and Methods) provides methodological examinations to 
unveil the labyrinth. Empirically, this study adopts qualitative methods due to its 
inductive and in-depth nature; the chapter formulates the qualitative methods—textual 
context and semi-structured interviews— and explains how the data were analysed. It 
especially discusses both strengths and weaknesses of the methods and presents the 
novelties of data collection to overcome the limitations, followed by challenges in the 
analytical and writing process. Especially, the author realised how his positionality 
potentially affect the data in the interviews involving insider-outsider encounters. This 
made the researcher reflect on the interplays between the own identities and research 
outcome. Based on the reflexivity, a fundamental question ‘what is a good interview?’ 
will be eventually addressed. 
 
Then, the dissertation goes on to the core of labyrinth. 
 
Chapter 5 (Findings 1: Society) verifies antithetical trajectories between Asian and 
Western HSMs, policy issues and societal obstacles that HSMs encounter in Japan. 
Initially, the background motivation of HSMs will be shown through the two emblematic 
yet contrastive vignettes to address RQ1. Moving on to RQ2, it will uncover a new 
issue on immigration control (e.g. unproductive process in renewing the visa and the 
strict conditions for permanent residency) together with ‘invisible’ HSMs that the 
existing research has not thrown light on. This will elucidate how the Japanese policies 
are incompatible with the life-course of HSMs. With societal problems, the educational 
system is examined to illuminate how the lack of diversity affects HSMs and their 
children. Last, this chapter will foreground the importance to promote diversity and 
incorporate life-course dimensions into migration policies.  
 
Chapter 6 (Findings 2: Labour) amplifies Findings 1 further to career-making and 
workplace collegiality to critically tease out the barriers preventing HSMs from working 
in Japan to address RQ3. The findings first outline the distinctive employment relations 
in Japan, showing not only lifetime employment and seniority salary which the extant 
literature (e.g. Tsukasaki, 2008; Oishi, 2012, 2014) suggests but also unique recruiting 
practices (Shinsotsusaiyo) and collegiate relations affecting migrant careers. 
Consequently, the findings will conceptualise ‘coerced harmonisation’, which 
establishes how people are implicitly required to be Japanized (behave like Japanese) 
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to perform the expectations of the host society. Nonetheless, the collective voices of 
HSMs call for a more balanced view on Japanese employment relations, pointing to its 
distinctive advantages of community-oriented business practices—this relates to RQ4. 
The chapter ultimately discusses how Japanese employment relations can be 
improved whilst keeping the distinctive advantages. 
 
After examining micro/meso issues (i.e. societal and labour dimensions), the analytical 
lens is shifted to macro governance to elucidate the maze of the policy making process. 
 
Chapter 7 (Findings 3: Migration Governance) investigates RQ5 through the two key 
actors in migration governance, bureaucrats and politicians, subsequently revealing 
how the two groups of policymakers have dodged the fundamental reforms and built 
up ‘cut-and-paste’ migration regimes to gloss over the flaws. A more serious problem 
this chapter unearths is that the voters do not have any valid policy choices since 
political parties—whether centre-right or centre-left—do not make the effort to establish 
a uniformed consensus on migration within their party. This leads to the ‘no choice 
democracy’ that this dissertation coins. The chapter eventually examines how the 
issues underlying migration governance can be addressed by a ‘vertical negotiation’ 
scheme. 
 
Chapter 8 (Conclusion) weaves out the different levels of findings (micro/meso/macro) 
into a comprehensive picture to overlook the unfolded labyrinth. For this sake, the 
chapter outlines the three communal themes across the findings chapters, which are 
substantially at play in attracting HSMs: stigmatisation, diversity and public policies. 
The newly conceptualised findings such as ‘coerced harmonisation’ and ‘no choice 
democracy’ will be also situated within the themes. Finally, the chapter aims to provide 
a constructive answer to a crucial proposition which is not limited to highly skilled 
migration but related to the overall migration research agenda: who are migration 
policies for? In this final discussion, the author reminds and reaffirms that the migration 
policies should also be designed for the future generation, removing the psychological 
border of ‘self’ and ‘others’.  
 




A quick note: Dissertation at a glance 
 
Overarching research question: What are the significant agencies and actors 
attracting highly skilled migrants (HSMs) in Japan? 
 
Specific research questions (RQ): 
RQ1 (Backgrounds of HSMs in Japan):  
What are motivations for HSMs to work in Japan? Are there any distinctive 
differences in motivations or trajectories among migrants from different 
countries/regions? 
RQ2 (Policies and social issues):  
 What factors may prevent HSMs from living in Japan? Specifically, how do 
public policies or societal issues affect the life of HSMs? 
RQ3 (Labour Issues): 
 What kind of problems do HSMs face in their workplace? How do they 
evaluate the distinctive Japanese employment relations?  
RQ4 (Attraction of working in Japan):  
 Are there any distinctive advantages that attract HSMs?  
RQ5 (Migration governance):  
 How are migration policies designed in Japan? What issues are underlying 
the policy making process to update policies? 
 
Theoretical framework: 
1. Transnational elite geographies (Salt, 1983, 1988; Findlay et al., 1996; 
Beaverstock, 2002, 2005) 
2. Japanese employment relations (Tsukasaki, 2008; Oishi, 2012) 
3. Kasumigaseki bureaucracy (Johnson, 1982; Imamura, 2006) 
 
Methods: Qualitative inquiry based on a reading of policy documents which 




























Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework 
 
(U)nderstanding of the migration process… 
must be linked to an analysis of the way  
policy formation takes place in states. 
(Castles, 2004: 223) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This theoretical framework chapter examines the concepts of highly skilled migration 
and its policies. On the whole, it is composed of three parts through which the analytical 
optics are fixed: (1) introductory framework scrutinising the definition, (2) migration 
mechanism spanning classical migration-generating theories to contemporary 
developments specific to skilled migration, supplemented by case studies conducted 
in Japan, and (3) migration governance delineating the role of the states and policy 
making actors. 
 
The first part of this chapter underpins the interdisciplinary approach of the research 
inquiry followed by the definition of HSMs. As scholars have not reached a consensus 
on who HSMs are (Koser and Salt, 1997), this section illuminates the overall arguments 
on the definition picking up a few representative classifications and its limits. It also 
describes how the definitions depend on the contexts of research (e.g. business 
management, social practices or gender) leading to the political and economic 
meaning of accepting HSMs. 
 
The next part is the backbone of this chapter, encapsulating the causal mechanism of 
migration which has long been researched and developed cross disciplinarily. The 
literature suggests there is no one determining cause of migration and there exist 
different views which have shaped the discussion of the causal mechanism (Brettell 
and Hollifield, 2015; Castles et al., 2014). In this part, classical and modern models on 
the migration mechanism are discussed followed by two sets of theories—
transnational elite geographies and middling mobility—focusing on HSMs. Then, the 
Japanese specific case studies are provided. 
 
Finally, it turns to the macro level inquiry pinpointing policy failures and migration 
governance. It shows the concept of gap hypothesis explaining why migration polices 
cannot fulfil the expectations. The last section addresses the relations between 




2.2 Interdisciplinary approach: theoretical underpinning 
Although there is a wealth of literature calling for interdisciplinary perspectives of 
migration research (Urry, 2007; King, 2012a; Lenoel, 2014; Vertovec, 2017), migration 
basically has long been researched and associated with the preferred central 
questions and methods of each discipline (Castles, 2007; Favell et al., 2007; Brettel 
and Hollifield, 2015) as indicated in the following table. 
 
Table 2-1 Some examples of paradigm research in each discipline 
Disciplinary Central theme Paradigm question 
Sociology Identities Who are you? 
Anthropology Social practices How do they (we) behave? 
Geography Space, place, time Where, how long and why do you move? 
Political science Policy making What makes policy work? 
Economics  Monetary  What is the economic impact? 
Law Jurisdiction How can law sort out migratory issues? 
This is a simplified version. Brettel and Hollifield (2015) raise more cases. 
Source: the author 
 
As seen from the table, a social scientist in each discipline generally holds a (slightly) 
different research theme and questions, hence having conditioned their academic 
approach. For example, a sociologist tends to observe micro/meso phenomenon in 
family, community and workplace, especially in Japanese migration research. 
Meanwhile, Favell et al. (2007) problematise macro sociology; among others, the 
structural logic of Sassen (2001) and Castells (1989) lacks micro ethnographical 
observation. In other words, sociologists hold a wide discrepancy in theoretical 
approaches, where the ‘bridge’ is non-existent. A political scientist otherwise inclines 
to create plausible but not surprising policy recommendations with theory-for-theory 
approach. In skilled migration literature (as shown later), UK geographers reveal 
mobility patterns and they have also claimed the need for interdisciplinary approaches 
(e.g. Findlay and Cranston, 2015). Nonetheless, their empirical approaches are still 
within ‘space, place and time’ in geography (Hannam et al., 2006) and lack the 
examination of the policy-making process or economic impact. 
 
The divergences in migration studies are not limited to disciplinary approaches but also 
bring discrepancy between research and practices. Vertovec (2007: 1047) epitomises 
the dissociation of migration research and policy discussions saying, “(s)ocial scientists 
are not very good at translating data and analysing complexities into forms that can 
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have an impact on policies and public practices”. He implies that the extant research 
is not well linked with policy formations since the research does not fill the gap between 
what is happening ‘out here’ (micro) and how policies are shaped ‘out there’ (macro): 
this micro/macro division should be bridged to make a difference in policy making 
debates. In short, it might be a good idea to discuss together the micro (e.g. migration 
mechanism) and macro (e.g. policy making) to present policy proposals. 
 
One of the key contributions this dissertation seeks is to fill the gap through an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework. Besides, it is noticeable that the literature on 
skilled migration has been developed and centred on the Western sphere such as 
Anglo-American states including the USA and UK (including Hong Kong before the 
handover). As Walsh (2014) claims, the scholarly debate should be more balanced 
and widened to share variations and its lessons. With non-Western approaches, this 
dissertation also attempts to ‘decentre’ the extant debates on highly skilled migration 
from Anglo-American dominance in theory and empirics. 
 
2.3 Definition of highly skilled migrants 
There is no single definition on HSMs (Koser and Salt, 1997; Scott, 2006; Ho, 2007). 
Its scope covers the breadth and varieties of migrants with skills depending on the 
contexts of research; for instance, scores of researchers draw attention to the quality 
of occupations or professional position—e.g. creative workers, entrepreneurs, 
certificated accountants, executives, intracompany transfers6—(Florida, 2002, 2005 ; 
Saxenian, 2006; Beaverstock, 1990, 1991; Beaverstock and Broadwell, 2000; 
Beaverstock et al., 2009) to examine economic impacts or business strategies, while 
others insist on a more nuanced and intricate approach to define skills—e.g. ‘soft skills’ 
in human relationships, multi-cultural (and language) competences, good business or 
personal connections—(Ruhs and Anderson, 2010; Liu-Farrer, 2011a; Kofman, 2013) 
to shed light on non-external and difficult-to-measure ‘skill’ factors. Some researchers 
also point to the graduate degree or profound professional careers (Ho, 2007; Iredale, 
2001). In sum, the academic argument on the definition is still inconclusive and 
founded on several approaches. 
 
Among others, literature has tended to cite three academic concepts in defining HSMs: 
transnational capitalist class; twelve-detailed-occupational-classifications; and, 
creative class. Transnational capitalist class (Sklaire, 2001) has four categories: 
                                            
6 Rigidly, ‘intercompany’ (between the companies) transfer is different from ‘intracompany’ (inside the company) 
transfer. However, as the Japanese Immigration Act defines intracompany including the form of intercompany, 




(1) TNC executives and their local affiliates (the corporate fraction); (2) globalising 
bureaucrats and politicians (the state fraction); (3) globalising professionals (the 
technical fraction); (4) merchants and media (the consumerist fraction). 
 
These occupational categories can be further broken down into 12 detailed 
classifications (Salt, 1988, 1997; Koser and Salt, 1997): 
 
(1) corporate transferee; (2) technicians; (3) health, education, and welfare 
professionals; (4) project specialist; (5) consultant specialists; (6) private career and 
training movers; (7) clergy and missionaries; (8) entertainers, athletes and artists; 
(9) investors; (10) academics; (11) military personnel; and (12) the accompanying 
family members. 
  
While the capitalist class is the by-product of globalisation, prominently the expansion 
of international business, scholars in the USA have underlined the entrepreneurship 
and creativity that migrants brought about in progressive cities/regions such as Silicon 
Valley (Saxenian, 2002, 2006; Florida, 2002, 2005, 2007). Those who introduced the 
innovation and become the actors of economic growth of the USA are termed the 
creative class or transnational creative knowledge migrants (Florida, 2002; 2005). The 
creativity is broad in scope stretching from biotechnologies or consumer products (e.g. 
iPod) to arts (e.g. music and film), which can be exported and imbue people abroad 
with American culture and values through ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004). ‘Soft power’ 
constitutes cultural attractiveness (of the nation) “inspiring the dreams and desires of 
others” (Nye, 2004: 8) unlike ‘hard power’ such as military or economic hegemony. 
Florida (2002, 2005) asserts HSMs in the USA are the sources of ‘soft power’ and have 
played significant roles in creating new ideas, technologies, business models, and 
cultures; consequently, their status as HSMs should not be defined as tertiary degrees 
but the creativeness of occupations, which relentlessly spur innovation.  
 
Nonetheless, the traditional occupational categories of HSMs are dominantly male-
orientated such as IT engineers along with the fact that the vast majority of the 
accompanying family of HSMs are female and children (Willis and Yeoh, 2002). 
Kofman (2000) claims the definition of HSMs is largely gender-biased in that it mainly 
revolves around scientific or higher-salaried jobs, and neglects the occupations 
requiring soft skills such as care workers. This argument can be broken down into two 
spheres; namely, the feminisation of labour and the migratory decision of dual-career-
household. The former deals with feminised labour, which is usually associated with 
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low paid and social-status, but requires hard physical work (Kofman, 2000). The latter 
discusses women’s professional careers being usually compromised to accompany 
their ‘highly skilled’ male counterparts (Leonard, 2008). 
 
Synonymous with ‘skill’, the literature also applies the term knowledge or talent 
(Williams, 2006; Beechler and Woodward, 2009). Shachar (2006) points to the global 
“race for talents” which drives the advanced industrial nations reforming their migration 
regimes based on the idea that the talent pool of the country directly shapes the 
economic competitiveness. While Beechler and Woodward (2009) admit the definition 
of talent is still inconclusive, they raise a representative definition referring to 
Chambers et al. (1998) and Michaels et al. (2001):  
 
(T)alent is … “the sum of a person's abilities… his or her intrinsic gifts, skills, 
knowledge, experience, intelligence, judgment, attitude, character and drive. 
It also includes his or her ability to learn and grow” (Michaels et al., 2001: 
xii). For McKinsey, talent refers to “the best and the brightest” and many 
organisations adopted the term to refer to their “A Level” employees who 
rank in the top 10 to 20%. (citation original, Beechler and Woodward, 2009: 
274) 
 
As the citation alludes, the ‘talent’ discourse is closely linked with the human resource 
(HR) management of TNCs (Collings and Mellahi, 2009). Therefore, talent is not the 
only attribution of an individual per se but can be developed and created by an 
organisation (i.e. firm) through their personnel strategies including promotion and 
transfer (Collings and Mellahi, 2009). Nevertheless, Williams (2006) contends this 
organisational driven view on talent since knowledge creation or transfer is widely 
observed with non-elite and non-corporate migrants.  
 
In conclusion, the definition of HSMs is still quite contested with the majority of 
scholarship subscribing to several decisive factors like the quality of occupations 
(including occupational qualifications), professional positions and educational levels. 
In reality, the governments of advanced industrial economies mix the criteria, 
especially educational backgrounds, the types of jobs and positions, and most 
significantly salary (e.g. Tier 2 in the UK, Blue-card in EU, H-1B visa in the USA, Points-
based systems in Australia or Canada). The Japanese government also takes this 
multi-faceted approach. In this sense, it is reasonable to define the HSM as the holder 





There is one more important definition which forms the stance of the Japanese 
government in discussing policies concerning HSMs. Kodo jinzai ukeire suishin kaigi 
[The Council for the Promotion of Acceptance of Highly Skilled Professionals] (2009) 
was commissioned by the then Chief Cabinet Secretary to make proposals to attract 
HSMs and their report defined HSMs as: 
 
(U)nsubstitutable human resources who have a complementary relationship 
with domestic capital and labor and the human resources who are expected 
to bring innovation to the Japanese industries, to promote development of 
specialized/technical labour markets through friendly competition with 
Japanese people and to increase efficiency of the Japanese labor markets. 
(ibid.: 4) 
 
This definition refers to the government’s basic stance (Immigration Bureau, 2017b) 
and also encapsulates the multi-faceted definitions Japan takes. 
 
2.4 Meaning of accepting highly skilled migrants 
2.4.1 War for talent 
The severe global competition to attract HSMs is sometimes called the ‘war for talent’ 
(Beechler and Woodward, 2009; Chambers et al., 1998; Harvey, 2014). There is a host 
of literature and reports describing the necessity to capture HSMs; the background why 
the world faces the ‘war’ can be explained mainly by three reasons: economic growth, 
labour shortages and the demographic challenges in advanced industrial countries 
(Castles et al., 2014; European Commission, 2009; International Organisation of 
Employers, 2014). 
 
As seen from many policies in advanced industrial countries, they have been almost 
forced to devise strategies to attract HSMs to boost the economy (Cerna and Chou, 
2014). Without doubt, HSMs bring enormous economic effects both directly and 
indirectly. First, from the supply side, they add values to the economy where they work, 
and bring innovation which the accepting country had not had (Florida, 2005). As a 
matter of course, the knowledge-based economy is boosted by HSMs (Williams, 2006). 
Aldin et al. (2010) pointed out that when the required level of skills is greater in an 
occupation, the share of migrants working in the occupation becomes higher. Second, 
they earn a handsome salary and spend money to consume products and services in 
the host country. This might bring ripple effects to fuel the economy from the demand 
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side. One thing which should not be missed is that these economic effects not only 
benefit the host countries but also the globally connected society; their tacit knowledge 
can circulate globally through their free movement (Devan and Tewari, 2001; Saxenian, 
2006). 
 
As the economy grows and becomes more knowledge-oriented, the labour market for 
HSMs becomes very tight. International Organisation of Employers (2014: 2) claims 
that “surveys consistently find that chief executives regard having the right talent as 
the most critical factor for their business growth. Human resource specialists tasked 
with meeting enterprise requirements recognise that new solutions will be needed to 
attract, retain, and deploy key talent globally”. Chambers et al. (1998: 1) predicted the 
era of “war for talent” by describing the fact that “big US companies are finding it difficult 
to attract and retain good people”. 
 
This labour shortage of HSMs is accelerated by the demographic challenges advanced 
industrial countries confront. Many OECD countries suffer from a decreasing 
population and ageing society (OECD, 2014), which bring serious issues: a decreasing 
workforce and endangered sustainability of society such as social security system. 
Castles et al. (2014: 319) attribute the current competition for HSMs to the 
demographic challenges in advanced industrial countries to some extent and expect 
that these countries will also depend on “low-skilled workers to build their houses, run 
their services and look after the elderly” by the middle of the 21st century. This means 
the “war for talent” may expand its scope due to demographic changes. 
 
2.4.2 Economic impacts on the host society 
The researchers have sought to prove empirically how much the wages in the domestic 
labour market will be increased or decreased by accepting immigrants (Nakamura et 
al., 2009; Clark and Drinkwater, 2013). According to classical economic theory, if a 
country accepts an additional worker, the wage paid would decrease to some extent, 
insomuch as the labour shortage is alleviated. 
 
Borjas (2003) shows that the wage of unskilled native-born USA nationals decreased 
as a result of accepting immigrant workers. On the other hand, Dustmann et al. (2005) 
claim that the decrease of wage in the domestic UK labour market is so small that it 
would not affect the indigenous working population. This contradictory viewpoint would 
come from the different conditions of the labour market: the USA has fewer restrictions 
on the dismissal of employees and has a more flexible labour market compared to that 
of the UK. More interestingly, their empirical analysis indicates that the wages of the 
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higher salaried group increased due to immigrant labour participation. Dustmann et al. 
(2013) explain that immigrants are likely to engage with jobs which belong to lower 
salaried group and they normally do not compete with the higher salaried group; hence, 
the inflow of immigrants causes a decrease in wages at the lower salaried end and 
incurs an increase at the higher salaried end of the labour market. In short, it can be 
explained that lower skilled immigrants complement higher skilled native workers. 
 
In Japan’s empirical case, Nakamura et al. (2009) corroborate that the inflow of foreign 
labour increases the wage and employment of Japanese high school graduates7, and 
has no significant effects on the labour market of Japanese workers with a tertiary 
degree. This is because the business sectors employing foreign labour tend to belong 
to the less productive industries requiring manual labour forces (e.g. simple 
assemblies) and if the foreign labour fulfils the vacancies, their business will gain more 
profits due to scale-economy. This is why the employers can hire more Japanese 
workers of high school graduates with higher salaries (i.e. low-skilled workers) with the 
aides of foreign labour inflow. It signifies the labour market of manual workers is tight8 
and foreign labour can help alleviate it, thereby creating more business opportunities 
for Japanese employers and employees. 
 
To sum up, surveys generally show that immigrants make contributions to the labour 
market in host countries, whereas the impacts vary according to the sectors, skills, 
educational backgrounds, professional types and so forth. Bach (2011, 283) claims 
that “the overwhelming majority of studies do not point to the negative effects of 
immigration on wages and employment in the long run and there remains a high level 
of consensus amongst government, employers and unions that immigration has been 
beneficial”. However, it is insufficient to look at only wages to discuss the economic 
impacts of migration, for immigrants also contribute to the local economy by consuming 
products, and offering new technologies/ideas that would benefit the workplace. This 
‘dynamism’ should be also taken into consideration in examining the impacts of the 
inflow of HSMs: accordingly, this research will unpack the hidden and intricate aspect 
through non-numerical qualitative data. 
 
                                            
7 The monthly salary of high school graduates aged 18 surged by JPY 2,370 in 2006 in the municipal areas more 
foreign labour inflowed (ibid.: 84). 
8 It is worth noting that their survey was conducted around 2006 when the Japanese economy grew robust. Yet, 
after 2008, a worldwide depression caused the lay-offs of migrants in Japan (Kitagawa and Tanno, 2016). 
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2.5 Causal mechanism of migration 
This section briefly overviews the classical theories of the migration mechanism, which 
are useful in explaining how the skilled migration literature constructed the arguments 
to identify the mobility patterns. In short, the scholarly works on HSMs are founded and 
grounded on these classical theories. Especially, this study is framed within 
transnational elite geographies, which has been developed through the following 
selected theories. The section finally discusses the implications on skilled migration. 
 
2.5.1 Push pull model 
The classical model to explain why both internal and international migration occurs is 
the push pull model, still influencing much of migration scholarship across disciplines. 
The simple model predicates that migrants examine advantages and disadvantages 
(including costs such as distance and institutional barriers) at the same time, and if 
advantages outweigh disadvantages, they decide to migrate. Lee (1966) broke down 
the determining factors into the two sets of gravity: push and pull. Push factors are, for 
example, overpopulation, economic disadvantages, human rights infringement, and 
political instability, which may promote emigration to wealthier countries (King, 2012a). 
In contrast, pull factors are, in many cases, demand for labour, economic opportunities, 
and political freedom in the host country, which draw immigrants from less developed 
countries (Passaris, 1989). In short, push factors are produced in the sending society 
while pull factors stem from the host society. Lee (1966) claims the factors are not 
limited to economic determinants but also include personal or family choices. This 
model is so simple and clear-cut in explaining motivation of migration that much 
literature incorporates it to identify factors of (labour) demand and supply generated in 
receiving and sending countries respectively (King, 2012b). This study also employs 
the model to clarify the motivations of HSMs. 
 
Push pull is, however, not a theory but merely a model describing possible factors as 
a mere list (de Haas, 2010). It has been criticised that it is obscure on which factors 
influence more, and is insufficient for clarifying the mechanism of migration in detail, 
specifically in the era of globalisation which makes migration more complicated and 
the background of migrants more diversified. For instance, the driving motivation of 
HSMs may be different from that of asylum seekers protected on humanitarian grounds. 
Therefore, more detailed analysis examining significant causes and expected outcome 




2.5.2 Neoclassical theory 
In order to specify significant factors of migration, Lewis (1954), Todaro (1969) and 
Borjas (1990, 2011) developed neoclassical theory through economic analysis 
centring on the labour market. The most determinant factor is wage differences 
between countries: labour moves from low wage countries to higher wage countries if 
the costs to migrate are lower than the expected benefit. 
 
In this theory, the complete market and rational decisions of migrants are key. 
Therefore, no asymmetric information which results in market failure exists; this simply 
means migrants have enough information on expected earnings and costs including 
the risk of unemployment. Under this assumption, labour inflow will continue until the 
gap of wages between countries is minimised to the extent that costs to migrate 
outweigh the benefit. This is the point of equilibrium where nations of the two countries 
enjoy almost equal wages. 
 
This theory is mainly supported by neoclassical economists who posit the efficacy of 
the market mechanism. In reality, there is no guarantee that migrants can have all the 
necessary information to decide to migrate (Massey et al., 1993; Spencer, 2011). 
Therefore, it is unclear whether the equilibrium can be reached. 
 
Nonetheless, neoclassical theory has some important implications on the mechanism 
of HSMs. From the viewpoint of human capital theory, HSMs or potential HSMs seek 
to enhance their skills and develop their career by having a job abroad (Sjaastad, 1962; 
Bauer and Zimmermann, 1998). In this sense, migration is one of the means to 
increase human capital as well as education for prospective migrants. If the lifetime 
benefit—including benefit by accumulating human capital throughout a lifetime—is 
more than the cost to move, then they will migrate. Bauer and Zimmermann (1998) 
point out that this is the reason why HSMs and the younger generation tend to be more 
mobile than other groups. This human capital can be also called migration capital which 
embodies the positive side of migration since it is gained through social and cultural 
capital in the process of mobility (Urry, 2007). On the other hand, the structural theory 
outlines the negative side of migration. 
 
2.5.3 Structural theory 
Neoclassical theory cannot explain some kinds of migration such as forced migration. 
In addition, it assumes that the equilibrium of the labour market will contribute to 
reducing the poverty gap across the globe despite the fact that the inequality among 
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states has been widened (Harvey, 2006). Structural theory is in a position to criticise 
the traditional equilibrium model by foregrounding the structural constraints and market 
failure. It can be described that neoclassical theory is based on the ideal philosophy 
that advanced industrial countries are likely to hold; on the contrary, structural theory 
tends to focus on the perspective from developed countries, inter alia, the rural area 
where capitalism and globalisation eventually create forced or semi-forced migration 
to the wealthier area. In this context, migrants are not confined to cross-border but 
include domestic migrants; for instance, many Chinese people migrate from inland to 
coastal provinces within the country due to regional inequality (Gries et al., 2015). To 
sum up, capitalism leads to exploitation of migrant labour with the likelihood that global 
inequality would be further enhanced. There are several interlocking approaches to 
explain the structural causes. 
 
World system theory (Wallerstein, 1974, 1983, 1984) indicates that technological 
development in agriculture accelerates concentration of land and capital in rural areas 
to the detriment of traditional peasants’ livelihoods. This drives rural peasants out of 
farming and results in sending them to the urban labour market where they are 
exploited as cheap labour. Wallerstein (1984: 80) analysed that the peripheral areas 
“have always been integrated in a large division of labour”, which is colonised by the 
epicentre of capitalism. Structural theory applies this process of capitalism to 
transnational migration: deprived ‘south’ states become labour sources for rich ‘north’ 
states.  
 
The 1970s witnessed both the global recession and the surge of foreign direct 
investment from advanced industrial countries to newly industrialising economies. 
TNCs dispatch a large number of expatriates to the invested areas to manage the local 
business. New international division of labour (Frobel et al., 1980) shows the 
corporate restructuring process whereby these firms closed down some factories and 
relocated them to less developed countries if the following three preconditions are 
fulfilled in the relocated area: cheap labour, the production process that requires 
minimal levels of skill, and decent export facilities. Here, the movement of capital and 
labour is closely tied; foreign direct investment results in the transfer of managerial and 
professional personnel from advanced industrial countries. The economic and 
geopolitical changes drive the global relocation of production (Harvey, 1989) and widen 
the inequality gap among states/regions (Harvey, 1990). 
 
In the 1980s, the tendency of advanced economies shifting from manufacturing into 
service industries became even clearer. Among others, financial and IT sectors grew 
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rapidly. The communal feature of the expanding industries was they were further 
invigorated by and predicated on global networks, thereby networking several 
significant world cities. The theory of global city revealed how the accelerated 
globalisation created the new form of imperialism by concentrating economic capital in 
a limited number of global cities such as New York, London and Tokyo (Sassen, 1988, 
2001; Castells, 1989). These rich cities hold an enormous population of highly salaried 
people—they are sometimes HSMs—and this also creates labour demand for low 
skilled jobs like drivers, domestic servants, and workers in hospitality industries in order 
to fulfil the demands of the rich people. Native people living in these global cities tend 
to “resist taking low-paying jobs at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, creating 
strong demands for immigrants” (Massey et al., 1993: 447). Similar to this argument, 
dual labour market theory (Piore, 1979) posits that migration is not determined by 
push factors but pull factors. In this theory, the labour market in receiving countries is 
divided into two tiers: one is the primary market for the upper class, and the other is 
the secondary market for the lower class. Migrants are drawn to the secondary labour 
market to take up jobs the native population would shun. Such a demand for low paid 
migrant labour is created by employers in receiving countries. Here, TNCs and 
recruiting agencies often play an important role in mobilising migrants. 
 
It should be noted that migrants make a rational decision to maximise their merits in 
some of these structural theories but this brings different consequences to the 
assumption of neoclassical theory. These structural theories were developed into a 
mechanism explaining intracompany transfer by UK geographers (Salt, 1988; Salt and 
Findlay, 1989; Beaverstock, 1991), which is discussed next.  
 
Some researchers focused on collective mechanism rather than assuming individual 
rational decisions (Stark, 1991; Taylor and Wyatt, 1996; Taylor, 1999; Nakamuro, 
2010; Lenoel, 2014). This regards migration as risk sharing behaviour in the family. In 
countries where the social security system is not sufficient, some family members will 
be dispatched as migrants to support the life of other family members so that all the 
family can sustain or improve the standard of living. In this case, migration functions 
as social security because remittances can help families maintain their life even if the 
sending countries experience serious economic downturn. This view takes a different 
stance compared with other structural theories in that it does not deny the positive side 
of migration through the mechanism of remittances and social security. In addition, it 
posits the voluntary decision of migrants and their family. Nonetheless, the discussion 
sometimes entails issues of brain drain and exploitation of migrants as negative 
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consequences. Furthermore, the lack of social security in sending countries accounts 
for emigration. 
 
2.5.4 Limitation of the dichotomy in neoclassical/structural theories 
As shown, neoclassical and structural theories take different positions to explain 
determinants of migration. The former insists that migration is on a voluntary basis and 
wage differences play the decisive role. Migrants can also benefit from migration 
capital gained through the mobility (Urry, 2007). On the contrary, the latter claims that 
migration is driven by structural forces created by capitalism and results in exploitation 
of migrant labour. 
 
It is unrealistic to assume that all migration is voluntarily based and induced by 
individual rational decision with expected income, as well as driven by political and 
economic constraints as a consequence of market failure. The important thing to bear 
in mind is that migration is so diversified that one theory cannot explain all the 
phenomena and it can be explained through multiple frameworks depending on 
conditions of the sending and receiving countries (Castles, 2007; Massey, 1990; 
Spencer, 2011, Teitelbaum, 2008). Therefore, it is productive to consider which theory 
fits which cases.  
 
In this sense, neoclassical theories are more likely to show the determinants of HSMs 
who normally enjoy high remuneration and are prepared to circulate to gain better 
positions. On the other hand, structural theories have less explanatory power of highly 
skilled migration, for it cannot explain migrants perusing human capital accumulation 
by moving among wealthy states. However, it should be noted that the neoclassical 
model has not sufficiently revealed determinants of HSMs at the micro level except for 
providing the model of cost-benefit and human capital. For example, various surveys 
propose new theories such as transnationalism and transitional theories to explain 
complicated international mobility (Castles, 2007; Spencer, 2011). Further examination 
focusing on HSMs has been conducted through exploring micro/meso level 
determinants.  
 
2.6 Transnational elite geographies  
2.6.1 Knowledge mobility and organisational network 
The meso level mechanism of highly skilled migration has been developed principally 
by UK geographers as transnational elite geographies. They tried to locate the 
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patterns of mobility especially looking at TNCs which were exposed to rapid and sheer 
globalisation in the 1980s when the study began. Unlike structural theorists who 
criticised migration as the mechanism of ‘inequality mobility’ driven by global capitalism, 
the UK geographers approved migration as knowledge mobility (Williams, 2008) in the 
global network. Furthermore, they linked migration with TNCs’ management strategies 
to negotiate international competition. Therefore, the principal focus of the study is 
transnational elites rather than independent migrants, whereas the optical framework 
has since the middle-2000s gradually incorporated the wider HSMs (e.g. Harvey, 
2008)9. The knowledge mobility was observed through two concepts: lubrication and 
migration channels.  
 
2.6.2 Lubrication 
Salt (1983, 1988) pointed out that furtherance of career such as promotion and 
acquisition of experience/skills is an important motivation for HSMs compared with less 
skilled workers. Although he admitted that the individual motivation depends on the 
characteristics of jobs (like engineer or doctor), he showed that (1) transferability of 
skills gained through migration to the next available job, (2) vacancy of position, (3) 
migrants’ aspiration especially for career advancement, (4) job satisfaction, and (5) 
general improvement of life would be critical factors. 
 
In particular, when looking at managerial and professional workers, the large 
organisations (i.e. TNCs) play a significant role in shaping migrants’ decision since 
these organisations offer their expatriates “stick (damage to career prospects by not 
going)” and “carrot (monetary and/or career advantages accruing)” (Salt, 1983: 648).  
Employees will decide whether they move to another country or not on their own 
calculation based on these negative and positive factors, but the large organisations 
have developed compensation packages such as enough allowance and support by 
relocation agencies so that their employees are inclined to accept the offer. These 
packages, which operate as means to induce employees to be transferred, are known 
as ‘lubrication’ (Salt and Findlay, 1989). Beaverstock (1990) also indicates career 
advancement, personal development and financial gains as three core factors of 
individual decisions along with the importance of lubrication. 
 
This concept closely resonates with talent management (Beechler and Woodward, 
2009; Collings and Mellahi, 2009) which attempts to maximise a firm’s talent pool via 
HR management. In short, intracompany transfer constitutes a major measure for 
                                            
9 Middle class and independent migrants will be discussed in a later section as middling mobility.  
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talent management. It also shares the basic concept of new international division of 
labour (Froebel et al., 1980) in that the globalisation results in the relocation of firms’ 
activities to developing countries; however, the outcome of the relocation is different 
from what Froebel et al. (1980) insisted because the relocation brings positive impacts 
such as social and economic innovation to the host countries (Salt, 1988; Salt and 
Findlay, 1989). 
 
2.6.3 Migration channels and firms’ personnel practices 
Migration channels describe systems that guide potential migrants to relocate their 
base of work (Findlay, 1990; Findlay and Garrick, 1990; Beaverstock, 1990; Findlay 
and Li, 1998). Migration channels for HSMs occur in several forms including 
intracompany transfer, international recruitment agencies, institutional exchange (e.g. 
academic scholar exchange programme), and family/friends networks 10 . Through 
these channels, potential migrants obtain information and resources to find work and 
facilitate their life in destination countries. Channels taken by migrants depend on the 
nature of jobs, country of destination, and purposes of migration. For example, Findlay 
et al. (1996) showed that the intracompany transfer plays an important role for 
migration for expatriate engineers—mostly western males—coming to Hong Kong and 
the channel through families and friends is not a significant reason for them. In contrast, 
one in five engineers born in Hong Kong have found their first employment abroad 
through kinship ties. Kanjanapan (1995) showed that Asian immigrants working for the 
health care sector in the US tend to rely on family channels while Asian engineers and 
computer scientists gained professional visas rather than family reunification. 
 
Apart from individual decisions, firms’ business strategies are identified as a significant 
agency for deciding the pattern of migration (Cormode, 1994; Millar and Salt, 2008; 
Beaverstock et al., 2009; Salt and Wood, 2011). There are various forms of mobility 
such as short-term assignment, longer term or permanent assignment, business travel, 
commuting, using recruitment agencies, secondment to/from business partners, and 
telecommunication (video conference and telework). Firms’ decision on which mobility 
pattern to take is mediated by the characteristics of markets or clients, financial position 
(e.g. joint venture or not), labour market conditions, corporate culture (ethnocentric or 
polycentric), quality of local infrastructure (Cormode, 1994; Millar and Salt, 2008). 
 
                                            
10 Obviously, studying abroad is an important migration channel of (potential) HSMs (Ho, 2007; Oishi, 2012; 
Ryan, 2015); however, it was not assumed as a major migration channel since the transnational elite geographies 
focused on elite corporate members, despite the fact that Allan Findlay, the founding scholar of migration channels, 
was also a leading academic in international student mobility. 
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Furthermore, elite mobility is expected to convey tacit and codified knowledge to 
manage the even more complicated and transnational business (Beaverstock and 
Broadwell, 2000). As world economies become more networked and service-based 
(as opposed to simple manufacturing assembly), firms’ competitive edge is 
distinguished by the transnational network and tacit knowledge. For this, forging and 
keeping the network (not only business but also private) becomes an important mission 
for the dispatched HSMs, thereby they are engaged with socialisation in so-called 
transnational social spaces like expatriate clubs, children’s school, or pubs 
(Beaverstock, 2002, 2005). Thus, transnational elite geographies are predicated on 
the corporate strategies and the importance of foreign direct investment which can be 
agencies of intracompany transfer rather than the individual decision of migrants in 
order to explain the mechanism and daily practices of HSMs. 
 
Whilst socialisation is a ‘must’ for transnational elites for their career or business 
opportunities (Beaverstock, 2002, 2005), Harvey (2008) raises six determinants that 
make HSMs forge compatriot networks. He posits that HSMs join the networks more 
eagerly when (1) they are exposed to fewer indigenous local communities, (2) they are 
more transient, (3) the size of the expatriate population is smaller, (4) the local 
expatriate community is more homogeneous, (5) cultural differences are wider 
between the locals and HSMs, and (6) the annual expatriate flow is larger. Especially, 
cultural differences are deemed an important agency in inducing HSMs to build their 
compatriot network and stabilise their life abroad (Breton, 1964, Saxenian, 2006; 
Harvey and Beaverstock, 2017). 
 
2.6.4 Limitation of transnational elite geographies 
These views, however, do not cover the overall analysis of HSMs, for they only (or 
mostly) look at intracompany transfer or secondment (Kofman, 2000). First, the 
migrants depicted in transnational elite geographies are so homogeneous (male, white, 
privileged, transient, and heteronomous) that they cannot explain the wider scope of 
HSMs such as freelancer, female professionals or settlers to name only a few. Second, 
although it looks at firms’ business practices, the coverage of the researched business 
sectors is so narrow that it mainly revolves around the finance, IT and manufacturing 
sectors where intracompany transfers are primarily employed as personnel strategies, 
consequently excluding other sectors such as education, health, government and 
hospitality sectors (Salt and Wood, 2011). In sum, the theory is only confined within 




Indeed, intracompany transfer makes up a part of highly skilled migration, but it 
represents only 6 % of all the HSMs working in Japan in 2016 (e-stat, 2017). It signifies 
the necessity to incorporate independent HSMs—they are also called independent 
work migrants (Ho, 2007), free-moving professionals (Favell, 2008), free-movers (Scott, 
2006), or private career movers (Koser and Salt, 1997). The self-initiated expatriation 
cannot be explained within the concept, which posits heteronomous and homogeneous 
elites (Favell et al., 2007). In addition, transnational elite geographies do not locate any 
barriers in migration policies (e.g. Beaverstock, 2002, 2005); in other words, their focus 
has not included the role of government which this dissertation aims to argue. 
 
2.7 Middling mobility 
2.7.1 Everyday practices of the middle class 
Transnational elite geographies focus on ‘external’ (i.e. organisational management 
and career/remuneration motivations) rather than ‘internal’ agencies (i.e. lifestyle, 
family, affinity, personal choices, identities). Especially, scholars of gender/family 
studies (e.g. Kofman, 2000; Bailey and Boyle, 2007), identities (e.g. Walsh, 2014; Ryan, 
2015) and cultural geography (e.g. Scott, 2006; Blunt, 2007) call for more research into 
the soft side of skilled migrants: how migration process affects gender equalities, 
shapes identities, and interplays with personal networks. They proposed to shift the 
research focus from “transnationalism from above” to “transnationalism from below” 
(Willis and Yeoh, 2002: 554) to comprehend the internal and transitional migration 
mechanism with a human face (Favell et al., 2007). The concept of middling 
mobility 11  thus emerged as the counter-argument to the theory focusing on 
intracompany transfer. 
 
Most of the HSMs are not elite by nature; they have made efforts to develop their 
expertise through education and professional career before becoming HSMs. In this 
sense, highly skilled migration entails the upward mobility of the social class. Some 
researchers claim migration should be deemed as the life development process (Ho, 
2007; Ryan, 2015) to become a global talent like human capital theory posits; therefore, 
the scope of HSMs should be widened to observe the transitional process for deeper 
understanding of producing HSMs (Conradson and Latham, 2005a; Scott, 2006). 
                                            
11 The two terms, transnational elite geographies and middling mobility, were coined in this dissertation to outline 
their different focuses. It should be noted that there are some scholarly works (e.g. Favell, 2008) which cannot be 
easily categorized. These works often include both intracompany transfers and independent migrants without 
clearly distinguishing them. This indicates that the dichotomy, intracompany or independent, is only one of the 
focuses in the skilled migration literature.  
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Generally speaking, middling mobility is distinctive from transnational elite geographies 
in that it centres on: 
⚫ middle class (as opposed to privileged elite); 
⚫ gender, race, ethnicity (as opposed to homogeneous dominant elite); 
⚫ independent migrants (as opposed to intracompany transfer; however 
sometimes their accompanying partner can be researched); 
⚫ lived experiences; 
⚫ in many cases, emplacement (settlement). 
 
Above all, the analytical lens of middling mobility is everyday practices (Conradson and 
Latham, 2005b; Blunt, 2007) through which identities and friendship have been 
observed to reveal the migration mechanism. 
 
2.7.2 Identities and social bonds 
Unlike transnational elite geographies which clarified the organisational agencies, the 
middling mobility attempted to illuminate how migrants negotiate their identities within 
transnational contexts. Especially, research has been conducted with UK emigrants 
who have gone through (occasionally painstaking) local embeddedness. 
 
For example, Scott (2006, 2007) focused on UK migrants in Paris showing several 
variations of skilled migrants (e.g. expatriates, graduate lifestyle migrants, bohemians 
and so forth) and clarified their distinctive lifestyles: expatriates with family tend to 
socialise with local UK compatriots in children’s schools or British associations while 
bohemians—culturally attracted non-economic migrants—criticise British inner-circles 
and prefer cosmopolitan communities to be embedded locally. It has also been 
indicated that the UK migrants with French partners were more integrated into local 
society; the vast majority of these migrants were female, who were more ready to 
“compromise their own social networks and professional and cultural identities than 
men” (Scott, 2006: 1121). These variations of “lived experiences” (Findlay and 
Cranston, 2015: 25; van Riemsdijk and Wang, 2017: 6) covering different types of 
skilled migrants and their dependents (Kofman, 2000, 2004; Hardill, 2002) have 
illuminated how identities—class, gender, race, ethnicity, professional background—
interact with migrants’ bonds with compatriots and local populations such as UK 
migrants in China (Willis and Yeoh, 2002; Yeoh and Willis, 2005), in Hong Kong 
(Leonard, 2008, 2010) and in Gulf Cooperation Council states (Walsh, 2006, 2014). 
 
Middling mobility also emphasises the friendship-migration nexus. Whilst transnational 
geographies employ the term ‘network’ which often constitutes business networks for 
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migrants, middling mobility prefers the usage of ‘friendship’ which represents more 
personal and non-economic ties. The independent migrants take greater store on 
friendship in deciding migration (Conradson and Latham, 2005a) than intracompany 
transferees whose transfer is mediated by the employers. More importantly, the 
friendship ties can snowball attracting friends’ friends, subsequently forging new circles 
(Conradson and Latham, 2005a). These migration generating-cum-sustaining 
networks include not only homophily (Leszczensky, 2013) but also various forms such 
as occupational solidarity (Ryan, 2015) and ethnicities (Ho, 2007; Yamashiro, 2015). 
Presenting the agencies of various friendship bonds is one of the distinctive academic 
contributions middling mobility has made by contrasting transnational elite geographies 
with elite professional networks. 
 
2.7.3 Limitation of middling mobility 
Middling mobility was successful in that it indicated the wide varieties of skilled 
migrants whose decisions and identities were intricately made through the 
accumulation of mobility capital—which may lift some of them to HSMs. Nonetheless, 
it entailed intrinsic limitations. 
 
Because of its nature covering wide ranges of ‘skilled migrants’, their definitions 
become quite ambiguous, therefore are not shared among researchers. Middling 
mobility regards everyday practices of the ‘middle class’; however, social class can 
take any form such as lineage, educational and professional background, knowledge, 
wealth, housing area/type and in some countries ethnicity, race, gender and religion. 
For example, some research includes contested ‘skilled migrants’ such as a British bar 
tender in Paris (Scott, 2007) and Singaporean graduate student or working holiday 
maker in London (Ho, 2007). Middling mobility often leaves the definitions of ‘skilled 
migrants’ in limbo and constructs the arguments only by distinguishing intracompany 
transferees. However, even an intracompany transferee can belong to the ‘middle 
class’ depending on the definitions and they also hold everyday practices (Beaverstock, 
2005) shaping identities and friendship which should not be ignored. Ironically, 
although middling mobility rejects the one-sided view criticising transnational elite 
geographies, they were also bounded by their positionality: one more example showing 
their limitation is the implicit short-sightedness of ‘Britishness’. 
 
2.7.4 Analytical implications 
This section brings a slightly different aspect to attention compared to the usual 
theoretical framework. The central argument is the ‘critical’ approach in terminology. 
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As already shown in Chapter 1, the author insisted the terminology and its definition 
should be clear enough and coherent. At the same time, it needs critical examination 
because the use of terminology that a researcher chooses embodies the limitation of 
the research. Put simply, a researcher sometimes employs inappropriate term(s) 
because of their blindness to the connotations. This encouraged the author to carefully 
examine the terminology through the writing-up process. Also, it tells us how 
challenging critical research is. One of the good examples is the term ‘Britishness’ that 
middling mobility often uses. 
 
Middling mobility has been mainly developed by UK researchers and centred on 
identities; in other words, they steadily looked upon how ‘Britishness’ (Yeoh and Willis, 
2005; Scott, 2006; Walsh, 2014) is produced and sustained overseas. Britishness is, 
however, a quite contested term. Even though their analytical lens is broadly-defined 
with various middlings, their focus has constantly been whiteness (Walsh, 2014). For 
example, the typical ‘Britishness’ in the research is associated with drinking alcohol or 
going to the pub (Willis and Yeoh, 2002; Yeoh and Willis, 2005; Scott, 2006), which 
the Muslim or some Asian UK nationals do not do due to ethnic and/or religious 
reasons. 
 
A more contested feature is their unconscious usage of the term ‘Britishness’ which 
neglects some minorities. Oxford dictionary (Turnbull et al., 2010: 184) defines: 
 
Britain—The island containing England, Scotland and Wales; 
British—Connected with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, or the people who live there. 
 
As is clear from the definition, when it comes to British, it suddenly includes Northern 
Ireland. This usage is also seen in the UK government official documents (the UK 
government, 2017) and middling mobility uses ‘Britishness’ in this definition without 
critically examining the controversial terminology. It should be noted including Northern 
Irish in British/Britishness is contested, for 34% of the Northern Irish identify 
themselves strongly as Irish, with this ratio rising to 77% for Catholics (NILT, 2015)12. 
  
                                            
12 The NILT (Northern Ireland Life and Times) survey is jointly conducted by Queen's University Belfast and 




Table 2-2 Perceived self-identities of people in Northern Ireland (%) 
Irish not British 25 
More Irish than British 9 
Equally Irish and British 16 
More British than Irish 17 
British not Irish 26 
Other description - (please specify) 7 
Don't know 1 
 
Source: NILT (2015) 
 
 
Table 2-3 Perceived self-identities: results by religions (%) 
 Catholic Protestant No religion 
Irish not British 59 0 10 
More Irish than British 18 1 8 
Equally Irish and British 14 17 18 
More British than Irish 3 30 21 
British not Irish 1 48 28 
Other description - (please specify) 6 3 10 
Don't know 0 1 4 
Source: NILT (2015) 
 
Walsh (2014: 15) rejects transnational elite geographies, saying “everyday discourses 
of privileged elites are not normal ways of thinking about the world, but contested 
practices of claiming a particular position in it”, while frequently employing 
British/Britishness without critically examining the terminology that is only 
acknowledged by the ‘elite’ majority in Northern Ireland. It is paradoxical considering 
she cited a narrative “I’m British, but not English” made by ‘British’ Indians feeling 
uncomfortable in the ‘whiteness British’ community in Dubai (Walsh, 2014: 12). She 
criticised how the ‘British community’ is conditioned within whiteness; nonetheless, she 
is blinded with the contested term ‘Britishness’. Through this example, I do not intend 
to condemn her works or middling mobility but to show an example that the research 
for ‘minority’ is extremely challenging when the researcher is belonging to the 
‘majority13’: all the researchers have limitations in their social views conditioning their 
research—no one has a truly non-biased perspective. 
 
                                            
13 As identities are multi-faceted, everyone can be both majority and minority. For example, Walsh (2014: 12) 
claimed she was a minority in her fieldwork “as a young, single, unmarried, low-income woman” but she was a 
majority as ‘British’ (presumably of non-Northern-Irish). 
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Therefore, it is important to clarify some contested terms and limitations as outlined in 
the introduction chapter in this dissertation as well as attempt to use neutral 
expressions, for instance, UK rather than British, and irregular migrants rather than 
illegal migrants. Still, I am well aware that I can never be 100% critical; however, it is 
also significant that the researchers acknowledge it consciously and leave possibilities 
for another view. 
 
2.7.5 Methodological implications 
One more academic underpinning drawn from the middling mobility together with 
transnational elite geographies is methodologies. Although they researched social 
networks and friendship through (mostly) qualitative methods, their sampling relies on 
snowballing (e.g. Beaverstock, 2002, 2005; Scott, 2006, 2007; Ho, 2007; Leonard, 
2008; Harvey, 2008; Ryan, 2015) or even no recruiting process (e.g. Yeoh and Willis, 
2005; Walsh, 2014). While snowballing should not be denounced in itself, if the 
research aims to delineate social networks, snowballing is a risky method: it may limit 
the informants to only like-minded people. 
 
For instance, if a researcher only uses the network of sociable group, the findings may 
be biased to emphasise the lively community. For the same reason, a gatekeeper 
should be carefully chosen because if the gatekeeper is from a mutual support society 
(e.g. a pious religious group or ethnocentric club), their network may be tighter than 
the other cohorts. This point will be further discussed and challenged in the 
methodological chapter to bring attention to methodological (especially sampling) 
considerations as the limits of the current theory. 
 
In conclusion, transnational elite geographies and middling mobility ‘critically’ inspire 
this research not only theoretically but also as analytical and methodological 
benchmarks. In terms of critical research, the terminology is thoroughly examined and 
chosen so that the research does not overlook the connotations. With regard to 
methodologies, this research seeks to clarify the recruiting process and avoid 
snowballing to ensure validity. The research design will be detailed in the next chapter. 
 
2.8 Japan’s case 
2.8.1 Japanese employment relations 
Regarding the reasons why Japan has been a small magnet for HSMs, Iguchi (2007) 
claims that the main reason is a paucity of foreign direct investment (FDI), that also 
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has been the principal migratory agency for the structural theory and transnational elite 
geographies. It is true that the level of FDI to Japan is far less than that of other OECD 
countries with the figure of $ 3,646 in Japan, $ 37,187 in the UK, $ 230,768 in the US 
(net flow in 2013, million US dollar) (JETRO, 2015). However, it would not be the only 
reason because FDI usually brings in not independent migrants but intracompany 
transferees and most employment created by FDI is domestic (i.e. local employment 
as opposed to migrants). This dissertation pays more attention to Japanese firms and 
independent migrants to illuminate the factors that intracompany transfers cannot 
explain. In this sense, it is necessary to consider why the Japanese employers are not 
successful in recruiting HSMs.  
 
While scholarly works on HSMs in Japan to date are quite limited (Holbrow and 
Nagayoshi, 2016), the few exceptional surveys indicate the distinctive Japanese 
employment relations—called Nihontekikoyo in Japanese—affect the career-making 
of HSMs (Tsukasaki, 2008; Oishi, 2012). It should be noted that Japanese employment 
relations are usually applicable to the large firms and their ‘regular’ employees—who 
are directly employed on a permanent contract and full time—(Hisamoto, 2008). It 
means they are in the primary labour market posited in structural theory, inter alia, dual 
labour market and global city. 
 
On the other hand, people who work in the secondary market are in a precarious 
condition—working on a part time or contractual basis—and the majority of them have 
been female, or the young cohort (Genda, 2001)—collectively called the ‘lost 
generation’ (Izuhara, 2015) as they entered the labour market in the decades’-long 
recession from the 1990s to 2000s14. Japan’s migration scholars have tended to focus 
on the secondary market as their interests were Japanese-Brazilians or technical 
trainees employed in the sector (Liu-Farrer, 2017). Therefore, it has not been fully 
examined how the primary market— in other words, Japanese employment relations—
influences the migratory decision of HSMs. 
 
Japanese employment relations can be characterised as (1) lifetime employment, (2) 
the seniority system, and (3) enterprise unionism15 (Crump, 2003; Hisamoto, 2008; 
                                            
14In fact, from 2004 to 2008, Japan enjoyed the longest economic growth in its post-war history; however, although 
the macro economy was boosted, the employment conditions in terms of recruiting ‘regular’ employees and pay 
did not improve proportionally. This is why the period is called the ‘lost two-decades’ and its’ young cohort in 
20’s is called the ‘lost generation’. 
15 Each Japanese labour union negotiates with the employer individually without relying on the industrial union. 
Opposed to industrial (vertical) union, it is called enterprise unionism (Tsuru and Rebitzer, 1995). As this research 
does not aim to focus on the organisation of labour union, other elements (i.e. lifetime employment and the 
seniority system) are principally discussed henceforth. 
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Hashimoto, 2017), of which lifetime employment and the seniority system directly 
shape HSMs’ career-making. Lifetime employment can be framed as a long-term 
‘alliance’ between employer and employees rather than a mere tenure contract (Ono, 
2010; Hashimoto, 2017). An employer pledges to protect the employment until the 
employees reach the retirement age (normally 60-65 year-old). Even if the company’s 
performance is worsened, the employer tries to eschew lay-off and takes various 
possible measures to keep offering employment opportunities to stabilise the economic 
conditions of employees such as job rotation, transfer and secondment (Wiltshire, 
1995). Whilst the biggest role of the executives of Anglo-American firms is maximising 
the company’s stock value, Japanese employers are prone to believe their role is first 
and foremost to protect the employment and those who could not achieve it are 
deemed an incapable businessperson (Hisamoto, 2008). This implicit commitment to 
the employees is conceptually termed psychological contract (Nitta, 2008). 
 
As it is a ‘contract’, it also binds the counterpart—employees. Instead of being secure 
in the job, the employees should compromise on the ‘limited freedom’ of a professional 
career. Unlike Anglo-American systems where the job posting is the norm in acquiring 
a new position, Japanese employees are heteronomous in that they are given job 
rotation by their employer (Tsuru, 2016). Since the posting is not open or competition-
based, there are few job descriptions or external labour markets for career-driven 
professionals; subsequently, autonomous HSMs find it difficult to enhance their 
professional career (Tsukasaki, 2008).  
 
The seniority system is intricately interlocked with lifetime employment. Under the 
scheme, the salary increases proportionally with age or duration of employment. 
Because the employer expects their employees to work long-term, the salary system 
is designed so that the employees can benefit more when they stay with the company 
longer. This makes the young employees’ salary relatively low (Tsuru, 2016) and 
working in Japan unattractive for the younger HSMs (Oishi, 20012).  
 
Tsukasaki (2008) also suggests that Japanese business practices such as 
‘sujiwotosu’16 are so different from Anglo-American that it cannot be applicable to 
another country. In short, Japan is too unique for transnational elites to hone their 
                                            
16 Sujiwotosu (筋を通す) originally meant ‘to be consistent’. It sometimes refers to being uncompromised to 
honour the words. In Anglo-American practical culture, when it is necessary, it can be acceptable to be flexible 
without being consistent. However, people who would like to ‘sujiwotosu’ maintain their position under attack 
even if a situation has changed. The concept of psychological contract (sticking to protecting the employment) 
mentioned earlier can be an example of ‘sujiwotosu’ because the employer is psychologically obsessed with 
keeping employment even when their business is stuck. 
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expertise in terms of business practices and language. She termed it ‘Japanese trap’, 
which makes HSMs—especially intracompany transferees—Japanese specialists and 
confined them only within Japanese related business. The Japanese trap partly 
explains the reasons why the HSMs via intracompany transfer would eschew career 
building in Japan. Working in Japan, thus, would not enhance the professional career 
for people who would like to migrate globally pursuing better professions. 
 
In conclusion, the uniqueness of Japanese employment relations impedes HSMs from 
choosing Japan as their professional base. This is why international students find 
Japan unattractive for work but an appealing place in which to live (METI, 2016). 
Career making, however, is only one of the migratory factors. As shown in middling 
mobility, skilled migrants are also attracted by lifestyle or non-economic factors a world 
city can offer. Oishi (2012) also supports this view, insisting “the vast majority of the 
respondents valued quality of life, not remuneration, as a priority in their lives” (Oishi, 
2012: 1093): this is a counter argument against neoclassical theories. It is, therefore, 
necessary to examine both the obstacles and attraction to live/work in Tokyo. 
 
2.8.2 Societal factors 
Although some academics and Japan’s official stance deny the homogeneity of Japan 
(Kim and Oh, 2011; Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004), the past scholarly works indicate that 
Japan’s policies of social cohesion or multiculturalism have far lagged behind other 
advanced countries (Iguchi, 2007). Among others, discrimination stemming from 
homogeneity and insular nature affects the life of HSMs (Hall, 1998; Arudou, 2015). 
For instance, some quantitative surveys report Asian migrants are more discriminated 
than the western (Ando, 2004; Holbrow, 2017). This may suggest that the ways in 
which Japanese society is uneven in welcoming foreigners depend on race, ethnicity 
and nationality. However, the perception of being discriminated significantly differs 
even among Asian individuals; the economic conditions and length of stay are 
negatively correlated with the experience of discrimination (Yamazaki, 1993) and Asian 
migrants with close Japanese friends are more likely to regard ‘negative incidents’ as 
mere cultural differences rather than discrimination compared to those who do not 
have a close Japanese friend (Huang, 2010; Yamazaki et al., 1997). Nonetheless, 
these surveys do not target HSMs. 
 
For HSMs, Hall (1998) points to ‘cartel of minds’ in Japanese intellectual society and 
criticises the closed nature in legal circles, journalism, and universities as examples. 
However, the discussion is anecdotal and lacks an empirical nature. Besides, what is 
problematic in these debates is limited perspectives bound by Anglo-American (or 
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reputedly called ‘global’) standards; if it is not in line with the Anglo-American view, 
then it is regarded as parochial. For example, the seniority system of Confucian values 
may not be common in meritocracy and ‘liberal’ American culture. Then, the 
distinctiveness of Asian culture compared to Anglo-American may be exaggerated and 
sometimes developed into the claim of discrimination. In short, these debates likely 
conclude that Japan should be Americanised17 as claimed by Hall (1998) and Arudou 
(2015). 
 
Apart from discrimination, family issues for HSMs such as monolingual education and 
spousal difficulties in social cohesion can be raised. As this is rather a social than policy 
issue, Oishi (2012) pointed to the limits of immigration policies to attract HSMs. Indeed, 
these factors seem to be plausible, but the research does not shed light on public 
policies. Then one question comes up; do public policies have limitations in attracting 
HSMs? 
 
It is true that social issues affect the life of HSMs; however, migration policies can 
equally play an important role in attracting HSMs. As evidence, Japanese business 
sectors have continued to present policy proposals on migration policies (European 
Business Council in Japan and European [EU] Chamber of Commerce in Japan, 2014; 
American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, 2014; Keidanren, 2004, 2008, 2015). 
Therefore, it would be justifiable to say that there are still research gaps in explaining 
determinants of HSMs regarding why the current migration policies do not function in 
Japan and how they could be improved. Addressing this also requires a macro 
perspective: migration governance. 
 
2.9 Macro analysis: public policies and migration 
2.9.1 Policy failures in attracting highly skilled migrants 
In the global competition among advanced industrial countries for the best and 
brightest, the policies implemented to date at national level have had mixed success 
and there is a research gap in explaining why some policies do not work. Along with 
micro/meso migratory mechanism, this dissertation also analyses the macro 
dimension: the migration governance and policy failures. 
                                            
17 To be clear, the author is aware that it is risky to discuss whether Japan is westernised or not. It can be argued 
that Japan may adopt aspects of a foreign culture without losing its own identity. For example, Japanese people 
use the lunar calendar much less widely than Chinese or Korean ethnics. Hence, Japan does not celebrate the lunar 
New Year, which is a sing of westernisation. The cultural position of Japan is one of the keys to unravel the 
intellectual puzzles in this research. Whether Japan is westernised or not will be discussed in detail with original 




Doomernik et al. (2009) propose four factors: sluggish economic dynamism, fewer 
employment opportunities, under-funded universities, and less tolerant society that act 
as structural barriers in Europe compared with North America. They also manifested 
that some countries have problems in public relations (i.e. disseminating good images) 
while “Canada has been remarkably successful in projecting a positive image of its 
immigration system and practice to the world” (Doomernik et al., 2009: 19). Thus, a 
national/regional image such as being liberal, progressive and creative plays an 
important role in attracting HSMs (Nye, 2004; Florida, 2005, 2008; Beaverstock, 2005; 
Harvey and Groutsis, 2015; Harvey and Beaverstock, 2017).  
 
Cerna and Chou (2014) examine the EU’s Scientific Visa and Blue Card system and 
discuss the complexities in reaching agreement among EU member states. Through 
the negotiation process in the EU, the systems introduced strict measures in host-
organisations recruiting HSMs, family reunification, the definition of HSMs, wage level, 
and migrant’s rights: “the Scientific Visa acquired more stringent measures…while the 
Blue Card was made even more restrictive” (Cerna and Chou, 2014: 89), thus these 
systems were designed insufficiently. However, these studies are not based on 
empirical research. As Oishi (2012) suggests, insufficient empirical studies have been 
conducted to explore the reasons for the policy failures. 
 
2.9.2 Migration governance 
The research into migration governance has attempted to unearth how immigration 
control and its governance ineffectively worked although it mainly focused on irregular 
or low-skilled migrants, whose inflows are the main targets of immigration control. 
Especially, there has been a wide gap between immigration policy and the 
consequences: for example, even if a state takes stringent measures to regulate the 
number of immigrants, the inflow becomes even greater—known as the gap 
hypothesis (Castles, 2007; Hollifield et al., 2015). 
 
Literature suggests the following three factors that degrade the efficacy of migration 
policies, thereby leading to policy failures (Castles, 2004; Cornelius and Tsuda; 2004): 
(1) the flow of labour supply cannot be controlled easily due to the institutionalised 
network (e.g. social capital and network theory, migration industry) ;(2) globalisation 
inevitably perpetuates or even strengthens human mobility regardless of the direction 
of policies (e.g. world system and global city theory, new international division of 
labour); (3) there are inherent flaws in the policy making process. Compared to the 
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other two factors, there is much less study on the policy making process (Massey, 
1990; Portes, 1997). 
 
One of the limited works is clientelist policies, according to which political decision is 
heavily contingent on a handful of vocal lobbies (e.g. agricultural or construction 
sectors) motivated by their own interests (Freeman, 1995, 2002). While clientelist 
policies are purely driven by economic interests and strong pull factors, other scholars 
take a different view incorporating the idea of civil society that confers rights on 
migrants, subsequently making it increasingly difficult for nation states to regulate their 
mobility (Hollifield, 2004, 2008; Shipper, 2008). The two models make an important 
suggestion that the state itself should be an indispensable analytical unit to observe 
policy failures and its variation will offer useful implications for better migration policies 
(Hollifield 1992, 2008). It is thus the aim of this paper to clarify Japan’s case to 
contribute to the further analysis of the variations. 
 
2.9.3 Actors in the policy making process 
The policy making process in Japan has been widely studied by both Japanese and 
non-Japanese academics. However, the research principally revolves around 
economic policies (Johnson, 1982; Calder, 1993; Mabuchi, 1994; Carpenter, 2003) 
and migration governance has usually been examined from the local governments or 
its relation to states (see Sellek, 2001; Aiden 2011). Meanwhile, Bartram (2000, 2004, 
2005) presents an original analytical approach in comparing Japan’s migration 
governance with that of Israel. He articulates that Japan’s bureaucracy which took a 
leading role in the policy making process around the 1970s functioned effectively and 
this is the reason Japan could keep the flow of migrants significantly low level, saying 
“the bureaucrats generally concerned themselves less with the profitability of particular 
companies and more with the long-term trajectory of the economy” (Bartram, 2000: 24). 
 
While it is true that the decision making is still widely governed by bureaucrats rather 
than politicians—this is one of the distinctive features of Japan’s migration governance 
(Cornelius and Tsuda, 2008) —, it is questionable whether the bureaucracy works well 
in the 21st century given the fact that lots of conflicts in migration appear (Mori, 1997, 
Sellek, 2001). With regard to bureaucratic barriers in migration governance, multi-
layered governance and the compartmentalised central government have been 
condemned (Yamawaki, 2002; Mizukami, 2012); however, it has not been revealed 
empirically how the policies are made and what kinds of issues there are exactly. 
Notwithstanding that this is fundamental information to analyse the policy making 
process in Japan, the past scholarly works on migration have omitted or failed to 
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explain these very basic ‘invariables’ or actors with empirical data. One of the possible 
concepts probing the actors is Japan’s distinctive elite civil services—Kasumigaseki 
bureaucrats. This research applies the concept to illuminate the policy making process 
and its barriers. 
 
2.9.4 Kasumigaseki bureaucrats: the key actors of policy making process 
According to the concept of Kasumigaseki bureaucracy, key actors in the policy making 
process of the central government are the lifetime-employed elite civil service, who are 
metaphorically and collectively called ‘Kasumigaseki’, named after the location of their 
offices (like No 10 for the British Prime Ministers). For instance, when a politician says 
‘Kasumigaseki is hard on that policy’, it suggests the civil service is reluctant to change 
the policy. They are also often referred to as bureaucrats (Kanryo) which originally 
means “an official working in an organisation or a government department, especially 
one who follows the rules of the department strictly” (Turnbull et al., 2010: 196).  
 
To explain the Japanese bureaucrat, there are several English terms applied by 
English-writing researchers. Colignong and Usui (2003: 29) describe them as “high-
ranking civil servants” while Koh (1989: 1) calls them “administrative elite”. Although 
the terms may vary, the definition of a bureaucrat is clear in the existing academic work 
(Mabuchi, 1994, 2010; Soga, 2016): they are a civil servant who is (1) life-time 
employed, (2) elite, (3) working for the central government—hence, the local 
government is not usually within the scope. With regard to the definition of elite, it is 
due to the specific recruiting process. There are three examinations taken by 
candidates who would like to be a national civil servant and the bureaucrat normally 
passes the top tier (Tier 1) of the recruiting examinations while other non-elite civil 
servants take the less challenging examinations (Tier 2 and 3). As the entrance (i.e. 
recruiting examination) is segregated by the other cohorts, the career path is 
differentiated accordingly. The bureaucrat is normally promoted to manager in their 
late 30’s despite the fact that most of the other cohorts (Tier 2 and 3) remain non-
managers even when they retire at the age of 60. Thus, a bureaucrat’s career path is 
systematically designed to be an elite (Mabuchi, 2010). This Japanese elite 
bureaucratic system can be juxtaposed with that of France (Colignong and Usui, 2003) 
as France also has an institutionalised elite nurturing framework of Ecole National 
d’Administration where the young elites who passed strenuous examinations study and 




Source: the author 
 
Not only is the clout of Kasumigaseki a well-known feature in systematic bureaucracy 
but also on public policies (Johnson, 1982; Imamura, 2006). Even though they are not 
elected, they are the main actors in both administration and legislation (Muramatsu, 
1994; Nishio, 2001; Soga, 2016). The Japanese Constitution clearly separates the 
state authorities into three spheres, namely, implementation by the government, 
legislation by the parliament and judiciary by the court. The bureaucrat is to be 
engaged with the execution under the Cabinet which governs the administration. Also, 
they are expected to draft legislation by the House members (politicians) who usually 
do not have practical skills to write laws. During the regular Parliament session in 
201718, the number of approved-legislation drafted by the Cabinet—meaning it is 
written by the bureaucrats in each Ministry and then sent by the Cabinet to the 
Parliament—represented 65 whilst that by House members stood at 10 (Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau, 2018). The more notable data is the figure of submitted legislation 
which did not pass the parliament. While six bills submitted by the Cabinet (written by 
bureaucrats) did not pass, 176 bills submitted by the House members were not 
successful (Cabinet Legislation Bureau, 2018)19. This attests to the dominant power of 
administrative government—primarily the Cabinet but actually bureaucrats—in law-
making.  
 
                                            
18 20 January-18 June, 2017 
19 It should be noted that Japan adopts Parliamentary Cabinet System which confers great authority including 
drafting bills to the Cabinet. As the bills can also be submitted by the opposition parties, it is logical that the 
Cabinet bills supported by the ruling parties enjoy higher success rate. However, the data of legislation offered 
here still shows the clout by the bureaucrat because it proves the fact that the majority of laws are drafted by them 
not lawmakers (politicians). 




Needless to say, immigration bills should be approved by the Parliament and 
implemented by the government to make them work. Considering the fact that the 
bureaucrats influence both legislation and administration, there is a need to clarify the 
migration governance structure by the bureaucrats to address the political and 
administrative problems underlying the migration policies. Nonetheless, its policy 
making process and the role of Kasumigaseki in migration debates have not been 
investigated empirically in academic research, although migration policy has a 
potential power to significantly change Japanese society. Hence, to unfold the labyrinth, 
it is necessary to illuminate this unknown policy making process and locate the inherent 
barriers and possible solutions based on the data.  
 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the interdisciplinary arguments of migratory mechanism 
and migration governance. Nonetheless, it also pointed out that its micro/meso level 
approaches especially on the causal mechanism have been developed mainly by the 
scholars from sociology/geography while the macro debates such as migration policies 
have been initiated by political scientists. Although these academic works occasionally 
interplay—like the case of global city theory and transnational elite 
geographies—,policy discussions and micro analysis have not converged. This is a 
significant gap that this dissertation endeavours to bridge and advance the theories, 
predicating on principally three theoretical foundations: (1) transnational elite 
geographies, (2) Japanese employment relations, and (3) Kasumigaseki bureaucracy. 
This concluding section further clarifies how the extant literature helps identify research 
questions (RQ) and frames the analytical lenses as well as methods. 
 
This research first adopts transnational elite geographies which frame the 
motivations, institutional mechanism, and socialisation of HSMs. Especially, 
transnational elite geographies suggest it is crucial to identify the motivations and 
trajectories (RQ1 of this study) to map out the migratory pattern. Nonetheless, 
transnational elite geographies should be complemented with other theories to 
overcome its limited scope such as the focus of intracompany transfers. Among others, 
this research is also inspired by middling mobility to analyse the independent HSMs 
and their everyday life including the barriers they confront in their social life (RQ2 of 
this study) and workplace. 
 
With regard to labour issues, it will be illuminative to examine how Japanese 
employment relations influence both the career making and everyday-office-
encounters of HSMs (RQ3 of this study). This chapter indicated that the extant 
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literature on skilled migration is mostly confined within the Anglo-American or 
European employment relations whether it is transnational elite geographies or 
middling mobility (e.g. Scott, 2006; Millar and Salt, 2008; Harvey, 2008). In this light, 
RQ3 will subsequently bring a new insight to this debate by showing the distinctive 
Asian case. This dissertation will also deal with how HSMs perceive the attractiveness 
of working and living in Japan (RQ4 of this study) given the literature only revolves 
around the downside (Tsukasaki, 2008; Oishi, 2012). It will be fair to critically appraise 
both the downside and attractiveness to present the solutions to increase the number 
of HSMs. 
 
The above theories, however, not only frame this research conceptually but also 
analytically and methodologically. By analytically, it means the researchers should 
always attempt to be ‘critical’, to be more precise, evaluate pros and cons without being 
one-sided as I explained with the contested terminology ‘Britishness’. Regarding, 
methodology, this research challenges the past scholarly methods capitalising on 
snowballing in corroborating migrants’ social network, which will be detailed in the 
methodological chapter. 
 
With these in mind, this research is drawn on Kasumigaseki bureaucracy to unpack 
the policy making process and its problems in attracting HSMs. This chapter located 
that the role of state has been thoroughly underreported by many scholars of highly 
skilled migration. The case studies conducted in Japan have also underestimated how 
public policies affect HSMs (Oishi, 2012); there is a research gap on why public policies 
do not function well in attracting HSMs. The lack of research indicates the importance 
to unravel the unknown policy making process. Hollifield (1992, 2008) calls for more 
research on the role of state in illuminating migration policy failures. This dissertation, 
thus, examines the main actors in the policy making process, namely, bureaucrats and 




Chapter 3 Research Background 
 
Change before you have to. 20 
Jack Welch 
(Former CEO, General Electric) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this context chapter is three-fold. First, it presents the legal provisions 
of the Japanese immigration system for work and residence of HSMs in the country. A 
newly legislated scheme for HSMs, the PBS (Points-based system), will also be 
discussed to comprehend the policy development on skilled migration. Second, in 
aiming to grasp the overall picture of HSMs, their statistical portrayal will be drawn. 
The data will tell us what they do in Japan, where they originally come from, and how 
the source economies have shifted for the past decade. Contrasting Asian and 
Western migration patterns poses a key puzzle through which this research 
investigates the labyrinth of highly skilled migration. Third, Japanese policies will be 
internationally benchmarked to position Japan within the context of global competition 
for talents: It will reveal how Japan has lagged behind other industrial Asian economies 
in terms of attracting HSMs. Drawn from these backgrounds, the conclusion will 
present core propositions for the empirical analysis. 
 
3.2 Legislation on immigration control of highly skilled migrants in Japan 
3.2.1 Basic idea underpinning immigration control  
Before sketching out Japan’s legislation, this section clarifies how the system of 
immigration control is structured in Japan. To facilitate the understanding of readers, 
the majority of whom are assumed to be UK-based researchers21, the Japanese 
system is described in comparison with that of the UK. In fact, both countries share a 
similar legislation structure and philosophy of immigration control. Japan’s immigration 
policies have not been well understood widely outside Japan because of their 
complicated structure. Showing the similarity of the legislation structure will help the 
reader decipher the labyrinth this dissertation explores. With this in mind, by 
contrasting the legislation between Japan and the UK, this section aims to provide a 
clear-cut overall picture of Japan’s legislation on immigration control. 
 
                                            
20 from Guinn (1997: 225) 
21 This dissertation is written in compliance with the UK university rule, on the premise that the UK-based 
researchers primarily read it. With the readers in mind, this dissertation was structured and compiled throughout. 
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Japan and the UK both established the Immigration Act as primary legislation. The 
formal name of the Act in Japan is Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act 
(hereafter Immigration Act) which dates back to 196622. The UK law is Immigration Act 
1971. In each case, the Act confers on the Minister (or the Secretary of State in the 
UK) the powers to make orders, rules, and so forth, to prescribe more detailed 
conditions and procedures. 
 
Table 3-1 Legislative structure of immigration control in Japan and the UK 
Types of 
legislation 








































e.g. APEC Business 
Travel Card 
e.g. European Union 
legislation 
*APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (regional economic forum in Asia-Pacific) 
Source: Immigration Act (Japan), Immigration Act 1971 (UK), Immigration (Leave to Enter 
and Remain) Order 2000, Immigration Rules: Parts 1 to 14. 
 
Both in Japan and the UK, immigrants must have a visa (its formal name in the UK is 
‘entry clearance’) to enter the country. A visa, however, is just one condition to obtain 
a permit to enter and reside in the country. The Act establishes that an immigrant can 
reside lawfully only by being given a permit from the Immigration Authority. This 
permission is called ‘status of residence’ in Japan and ‘leave to enter (remain)’ in the 
UK. Therefore, having a visa, whether it is valid or not, does not necessarily guarantee 
the lawful status of immigrants because the legal status is solely based on the status 
of residence (or leave to enter/remain in the UK). It is important to examine statistical 
data of the number of immigrants since the statistics of visa do not necessarily 
represent the whole population of the documented immigrants residing in the countries. 
In other words, the number of given ‘status of residence’ in Japan or ‘leave to enter 
                                            
22 This dissertation follows the rule of not labelling the established year with the law when referring to Japanese 
legislation (Sellek, 2001, Sato, 2017). 
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(remain)’ in the UK can only indicate the number of lawful immigrants. The following 
chart encapsulates the differences between visa and status of residence (or leave to 
enter/remain). 
 




 Step 2 
 Immigration control 
  Step 3 
  Lawful status given 
Japan Obtain a visa 
Examined by an 
immigration officer at 
a port of entry 
Given a status of residence 
The UK 
Obtain an entry 
clearance (so-
called visa) 
An entry clearance having 
effect as leave to enter 
(remain) 
Source: Immigration Act (Japan), Immigration Act 1971 (UK) 
 
3.2.2 Legislation in Japan 
In Japan, there are currently 28 classifications23 of status of residence which give 
foreign nationals legal grounds to reside for more than three months24. Those who are 
given a more-than-three-months-residency are called ‘mid-to-long term resident’ 25 
(Immigration Act article 19-3) who need to register with the local municipality. The 
status of residence can be grouped into two types: activities or kinship. 
 
1. Based on ‘activities’ immigrants do in Japan 
It focuses on what immigrants do in Japan. What the immigrants of this 
group can do for their livelihood is prescribed by the specified activities 
permitted by the Minister of Justice. For instance, migrants are vetted 
including who their sponsors (e.g. employers, schools) are when obtaining 
the status of residence, and once it is permitted, they are only allowed to 
do the ‘activities’ (e.g. work, study) under the sponsor. If they would like to 
do activities other than the authorised one, it is necessary to gain further 
permission from Minister of Justice (Article 19 (2))—it is called 
Shikakugaikatsudo permission26 (permission to engage in activity other 
than that permitted under the status of residence previously granted). There 
                                            
23 This number includes a new status of residence ‘Care Worker’ that was enacted from the 1st of September, 2017. 
24 There is one more status of residence ‘Temporary Visitor’ on which foreigners are permitted to stay in Japan 
up to 90 days maximum. The vast majority is tourist (18,291,996 people in 2016) along with business trip 
(1,575,970 ditto), family reunification (535,792 ditto) according to Immigration Bureau (2017b). 
25 Except for those who have the status of residence ‘Diplomat’ or ‘Official’. 
26 Those who have status of residence ‘student’ are only allowed to study, for the authorized ‘activity’ of students 
is studying. However, if they gain the Shikakugaikatsudo permission, they can work part-time up to 28 hours per 
week (they are allowed to work 8 hours per day only during the school vacation in lieu of the weekly limit). If they 
are engaged in research or teaching assistance under contract with the belonging university, they do not need to 
gain permission and the limit does not apply either. 
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are two kinds of activities depending on whether an immigrant intends to 
work or not.  
 
1-1 Activities with intention to work 
1-1-1 Foreign official (Diplomat, Official)  
1-1-2 Highly skilled immigrants (Engineer /Specialist in  
Humanities/International Services, Intracompany Transferee…) 
1-1-3 Technical Intern 
 
1-2 Activities without intention to work  
1-2-1 Activities to learn (Student, Trainee) 
1-2-2 Others (Dependents, Cultural Activities, asylum seekers…) 
 
2. Based on ‘Japanese kinship and permanent residence’ of immigrants. 
Contrasting with the former group (based on ‘activities’), this category 
focuses on what relationship immigrants have with Japan. It does not 
matter what immigrants do; therefore, they have no restrictions in 
professions unlike foreigners residing on the status of residence of 
‘activities’. 
 
2 Japanese kinship and permanent residence 
2-1 Permanent resident, their spouse or child 
2-2 Spouse or child of Japanese national 
2-3 Foreign national of Japanese descent  




3.2.3 Highly skilled migrants and permanent residency 
Generally speaking, HSMs are categorised into 1-1-2 in the above classification 
although the spectrum of this research is more limited as discussed later. It should be 
also noted that some migrants residing in Japan based on Japanese kinship and 
permanent residence can be regarded as HSMs. As the figure is not available from 
statistics, they are the ‘hidden’ population of HSMs the statistical portrayal shown later 
does not capture. For instance, a ‘general’ case is that when an immigrant on ‘activities’ 





The length of required stay is shortened for the Japanese-kinship-based-residents: it 
only takes 3 years for the spouse of a Japanese national, 5 years for Nikkeijin and 
refugees. With regard to HSMs, if “(t)he person has been recognised to have made a 
contribution to Japan in diplomatic, social, economic, cultural or other fields, and has 
stayed in Japan for more than 5 years” (Immigration Bureau, 2017a: 2), they can apply 
for the permanent residency without the 10-years’ consecutive residence. However, 
this special treatment is quite narrowly implemented considering Immigration Bureau 
lists a Nobel Prize laureate as an example of “a contribution” (Immigration Bureau, 
2017a ). Therefore, it is generally understood among HSMs that it takes 10 years to 
obtain permanent residency. 
 
3.3 Points-based system (PBS) 
In 2012, Japan introduced the PBS to attract HSMs. This is the first policy 
implementation to ‘attract’ HSMs in that the Japanese government proactively 
developed the strategies aiming to increase the number of HSMs (Kodo jinzai ukeire 
suishin kaigi, 2009). 
 
Even though it is designed as points-based, it is not a selective system that screens 
migrants intending to work in Japan. In this regard, the PBS is different from the models 
introduced in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK to ensure the transparency 
and predictability in the application process. The formal name of the system is ‘Points-
based Preferential Immigration Treatment for Highly-Skilled Foreign Professionals’. As 
the name indicates, it provides migrants approved to be ‘Highly-Skilled Foreign 
Professionals’ with preferential treatment not granted to other migrants. 
 
There are three categories of Highly-Skilled Foreign Professionals (Immigration 
Bureau, 2015): 
 
1. Advanced academic research activities: “activities research guidance or 
education based on a contract entered into with a public or private organisation 
in Japan”; 
2. Advanced specialised/technical activities: “activities of engaging in work 
requiring specialised knowledge or skills in the field of natural sciences or 
humanities based on a contract entered into with a public or private organisation 
in Japan”; 
3. Advanced business management activities: “activities of engaging in the 




Points are calculated on the basis of academic background, professional career, 
annual salary and age. In addition, there are so-called bonus points which are different 
in each category HSMs apply for. For example, Japanese language proficiency, higher 
education degree obtained in Japan, research achievement (only for advanced 
academic research activities or advanced specialised/technical activities), specific 
management position such as representative director (only for advanced business 
management activities) are evaluated. If an applicant achieves over 70 points in total, 
they are given the status of residence ‘Highly Skilled Professional (1)’ and the following 
seven advantages are awarded (Immigration Bureau, 2015): 
 
1. Permission for multiple activities; 
2. Grant of the 5-year period of stay; 
3. Easing of requirements for permanent residence; 
4. Preferential processing of entry and residence procedures;  
5. Permission for the spouse of the highly skilled foreign professional to work;  
6. Permission for bringing a parent(s) to accompany the highly-skilled foreign 
professional to Japan under certain conditions; 
7. Permission for a domestic worker to accompany the highly-skilled professional 
to Japan under certain conditions. 
 
When the HSMs with the status of residence ‘Highly Skilled Professional (1)’ work in 
Japan for more than 3 years, then they can apply for the upgrading status called ‘Highly 
Skilled Professional (2)’, which grants an indefinite period of stay together with the 
above preferential treatments (except for 4. since they have already entered and 
resided in Japan). As this upgrade status has no expiry date, it has a similar function 
to permanent residency in terms of the length of stay as long as they engage in a highly 
skilled job27. 
 
The number of HSMs who became ‘Highly Skilled Professional (1)’ for the first 11-
months of the implementation (7 May 2012 to 6 April 2013) was only 434 (Dai 6ji 
shutsunyukoku kanri seisaku kondankai gaikokujin ukeire seido kento bunkakai, 2013). 
That was far below the expectations the government had—the MOJ designed the 
points calculation so that around 10% of the existing HSMs can attain the threshold28 
according to an informant (Migration expert 3). Oishi (2014) also suggests it is a policy 
                                            
27 If the immigrant does not engage in a highly skilled job (prescribed by the points) for over six months, the status 
will be cancelled. Besides, they need to report to the MOJ where they work. Permanent residents do not have these 
obligations.  
28 There is no clear explanation about how points were allocated (Oishi, 2014). It was decided by MOJ with the 
consultation of other related Ministries. According to informant (Migration expert 3), MOJ used the unofficial 
statistical data, mainly HSMs’ salary, to define the points allocations.  
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failure since the initially-approved number of 434 represents only 0.2% of HSMs. As 
evidence, the government acknowledged the policy failure and necessity to drastically 
improve the system to increase the number of Highly Skilled Professionals (Japanese 
government, 2013; Immigration Bureau, 2017b). The advisory board for Minister of 
Justice also proposed the reforms: 
 
Under the status quo, it is pointed out that there are some groups of people 
who should be deservedly recognised as a highly skilled professional that 
are not approved in the system. Against this background, it is necessary to 
reform the points system urgently.  
(Dai 6ji shutsunyukoku kanri seisaku kondankai gaikokujin ukeire seido 
kento bunkakai, 2013: 5) 
 
As a result, the PBS has been remodelled on several occasions since December 2013. 
For instance, the minimum salary has been lowered from 6 million Yen to 3 million Yen 
for people aged over 40 of Advanced specialised/technical activities or Advanced 
business management activities29. For Advanced academic research activities, the 
minimum salary was even abolished regardless of age. Along with the points 
calculation system, the preferential treatment was also improved; for example, Highly 
Skilled Professional could be only accompanied by a domestic worker if their salary 
was above 15 million Yen before the reform. Now the salary condition is minimised to 
10 million Yen. Thanks to the reforms, the number of Highly Skilled Professionals has 
remarkably increased from the initial 434 to 8,515 as of June 2017 (Immigration Bureau, 
2017b). The statistical data of overall HSMs such as a breakdown of countries of origin 
and gender will be explained in detail later. 
 
3.4 Definition of highly skilled migrants in Japan 
According to the Immigration Act, skilled migrants are usually graduates of tertiary 
education or people with more than 10-years’ relevant professional experience. 
Nonetheless, there are some exceptions: IT engineers are deemed as skilled migrants 
if they have specific qualifications, of which the Japanese government has a mutual 
recognition system (Japan Information Technology Promotion Agency’s mutual 
recognition of IT professionals) with other countries. Intracompany transferees, need 
not satisfy the above two conditions if they work for their company more than a year 
and they are engaged in a job deemed as white-collar. 
 
                                            
29 Regarding salary, different points and minimum requirement are allocated by age-range. 
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Other than white-collar workers, occupations listed in the Act and Ministerial 
Ordinances such as chefs and nurses are only regarded as skilled. Manual workers, 
including factory workers, are not listed even if they have specific high skills and long-
time professional experience, for example precise welding skills in ship building. It is 
noteworthy that the UK includes social worker and high integrity pipe welder in Tier 2 
visa occupations (Home Office, 2018) while Japan does not include these occupations 
in the admitted ‘activities’ HSMs can do. Japan does not have a shortage occupation 
list system because it focuses on the required skills of occupation rather than the labour 
shortage. This sounds plausible in that the ‘skilled’ immigrants should be always 
deemed as skilled; If we take an occupation-shortage approach in defining skills, then 
the HSMs will be contingent on the labour market conditions—it means a skilled 
immigrant will be regarded non-skilled in a few years when there is no labour shortage 
anymore. When they are classified as ‘unskilled’ immigrants, there will be a problem 
about whether the government should suspend their status of residence or not. In other 
words, the occupation-shortage approach sets greater store on external factors (i.e. 
labour demand) for HSMs than the internal factors (i.e. skills) they can improve by their 
efforts. On the other hand, the labour-shortage system also has advantages in that it 
can accommodate the labour demands, subsequently contributing to the socio-
economic development as long as the government can appropriately and regularly 
revise the list. In the UK, the Migration Advisory Board consisting of migration experts 
plays this role. In sum, the definition of HSMs depends on a country’s specific socio-
economic condition and stance towards labour-shortage alleviation. 
 
The Japanese government has its own definition on HSMs called ‘specialist and 
technical status of residence’ (senmonteki gijutsuteki zairyushikaku) which spans 14 
categories (Immigration Bureau, 2016) in addition to ‘Designated Activities’ (see 






Source: Immigration Bureau (2016) 
 
Table 3-2 List of expert and technical status of residence 
Status of residence Examples 
Professor College professor 
Artist Composer, artist, or writer 
Religious Activities Missionary assigned by a foreign religious 
organisation 
Journalist Reporter or photographer of foreign press 
Highly Skilled Professional Highly-skilled human resources in accordance with 
the Points-based system  
Business Manager Manager or administrator of a company, etc. 
Legal/Accounting Services Attorney or certified public accountant 
Medical Services Physician, dentist or registered nurse 
Researcher Researcher at a government-related institution or 
company 
Instructor Language instructor at a senior high school or 
junior high school, etc. 
Engineer/Specialist in  
Humanities/International 
Services 
Engineer such as of mechanical engineering, 
interpreter, designer, language instructor at a 
private company or marketing specialist. 
Intracompany Transferee Transferee from an office abroad 
Entertainer Actor, singer, dancer, or professional athlete 
Skilled Labour Chef of foreign cuisine, sports instructor, aircraft 
pilot, or craftsman of precious metals 
Column Mind the Gap! What are Designated Activities? 
 
The status of residence ‘Designated Activities’ is quite elusive, but it is indispensable to 
understand the intricate definition in order to deal with the statistical data. It is defined as 
“activities which are specifically designated by the Minister of Justice for individual foreign 
nationals” (Immigration Act, Appended Table 1 (5), emphasis by the author). Before 
implementing the status of residence ‘Highly skilled professional’, all the HSMs in PBS 
were given the status of residence ‘Designated Activities’. Also, some IT specialists and 
researchers are given Designated Activities. This cohort is relatively small (1,632 people) 
and the statistical data issued by Immigration Bureau sometimes omit them. The author 
paid a careful attention to this omission in retrieving the data. When the statistical data does 
not include them, it is mentioned so hereafter. It should be also mentioned that the status of 
residence ‘Designated activities’ covers non-HSMs as well since it is in practice applied to 
immigrants who cannot be classified into the other categories. A good example is working 
holiday maker. Asylum seekers are also given Designated Activities until the decision is 
made. In this sense, Designated Activities can be interpreted as ‘other activities’. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the definition of HSMs in this dissertation follows the visa 
categories that the Japanese government prescribes. However, to make the 
arguments more precisely focusing on HSMs who are expected to bring innovation or 
clear added-values to Japan (Kodo jinzai ukeire suishin kaigi, 2009; Immigration 
Bureau, 2017b; Keidanren, 2018), three categories of status of residence were put 
aside: “Artist”, “Entertainer” and “Religious Activities”. 
 
It is true that the Japanese government classifies them as HSMs, but it is controversial 
whether they are highly skilled workers or not. Since these occupations often have 
great dispersal of ‘skills’, it is sometimes misleading to include them among HSMs on 
a par with the other types of HSMs. Especially, the status of residence of entertainer 
has been disputed since it was abused in the prostitution industry (Sellek, 2001; 
Ballescas, 2003; Sakanaka, 2017) as will be discussed in Chapter 5. With regard to 
Artist and Religious Activities, their primary role is not normally to add value to the 
economy but give artistic or spiritual inspiration. Therefore, these three categories are 
not counted in the dissertation although the author admits their potential to enrich the 
life of people in Japan. 
 
3.5 Statistical data 
This section overviews the landscape of highly skilled migration from the statistical 
data30 and consequently shows key puzzles through which the labyrinth is explored: 
rapidly increasing numbers of Asian HSMs and downward trend of Western HSMs. 
 
In total, there are currently 2,471,458 mid-to-long term (foreign) residents regardless 
of their skills (e-stat, 2017), accounting for 1.9 % of all the population in Japan. This 
number only includes the immigrants legitimately given a status of residence while it is 
estimated that there are 65,270 irregular immigrants 31  as of January 2017 
(Immigration Bureau, 2017b). The overall number of HSMs 32  stands at 288,542 
making up 11.7 % of all the mid-to-long term residents (e-stat, 2017).  
 
                                            
30 The data is as of June 2017 unless specified. 
31 Immigration Bureau calls them ‘overstayers’, who “illegally stay in Japan beyond the permitted period of stay 
without obtaining permission for extension or change of status of residence” (Immigration Bureau, 2007: 30). 
Apart from overstayers, Immigration Bureau also identifies ‘illegal entry’ (people who landed without going 
through immigration control e.g. stowaway). During 2016, Immigration Bureau deported 599 people of illegal 
entry (Immigration Bureau, 2017). 
32 As defined, this number does not include immigrants who have a status of residence of artist, entertainer or 




Looking at the component of the highly skilled status of residence, Engineers/ 
Specialist in Humanities/ International Services accounts for over 60% of all the HSMs. 
These people are desk workers in a company whilst the second largest group, Skilled 
Labour, is engaged in non-desk-work that requires physical techniques such as chefs, 
aircraft pilots and animal trainers. It is worth noting that intracompany transferees 
comprise only 6 % of HSMs in Japan. This signifies that most Japanese HSMs are 
independent migrants.  
 
 
*PBS: Points-based system (Highly Skilled Professional) Source: e-stat (2017) 
 
The aggregated data of status of residence does not clarify the business sectors HSMs 
work in. Subsequently, it is useful to consult employment statistics: Situation Notified 
Foreign National Employment Status is compiled by MOL every year from notifications 
all the employers are legally required to submit. According to the data, 16.7% of the 
HSMs work in the Information & Telecommunication sector, followed by Manufacturing 
(15.7%), Wholesale and Retail Trade (14.1%), Education (11.6%), Hospitality (6.6%), 





















Figure 3-2 Highly skilled migrants by status of residence 
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For gender, 68% of all the HSMs are male and 32% female. Breaking down the status 
of residence by gender, the gender division is clear with female HSMs in Medical 
Services remarkably overrepresented (84%) followed by Instructor (46%). This may be 
attributed to the significant number of female nurses echoing gendered labour 
migrations, inter alia the global chain of care (Raghuram, 2004). As evidence, the 
female ratio (percentage of female HSMs to the total number) in Intracompany 
transferee (21%) underrepresents that of the overall HSMs. This gender division 
among HSMs can be also observed in Europe (Kofman, 2000, 2013). 
 
Table 3-3 Status of residence by gender 
 Total Male Female 
Female 
ratio (%) 
Total 286,910 195,455  91,455 32  
Professor 7,551 5,179 2,372 31  
Journalist 237 182 55 23  
Highly skilled professional  5,494 3,811 1,683 31  
Business Manager 22,888 17,218 5,670 25  
Legal/Accounting Services 154 136 18 12  
Medical Services 1,632 268 1,364 84  
Researcher 1,612 1,123 489 30  
Instructor 11,183 6,060 5,123 46  
Engineers/Humanities/ 
International Services 
180,180 112,191 67,989 38  
Intracompany transferee 16,601 13,032 3,569 21  
Skilled Labour 39,378 36,255 3,123 8  
*The data do not include the number of HSMs of Designated Activities. 
Source: e-stat (2017) 
 
Geographical concentration is also notable. Administratively, Japan is composed of 47 
prefectures (synonymous with counties in the UK) and 36% of all the HSMs live in 
Tokyo. When it comes to the greater Tokyo area (adding Kanagawa, Saitama, and 
Chiba prefectures), it amounts to over 60%. Considering that the greater Tokyo area 
holds 28% of the whole population in Japan (MIC, 2015), HSMs are quite concentrated 
around the capital. Shimane prefecture has the fewest HSMs (306 people, 0.0003% of 




Table 3-4 The number of highly skilled migrants by prefecture 
 
Prefecture Number of HSMs 
    1   Tokyo  104,505  
    2   Kanagawa  30,131  
    3   Saitama  20,888  
    4   Osaka  20,513  
    5   Chiba  18,796  
--- --- --- 
   46  Kochi 308  
   47   Shimane 306  
 All Japan Total 286,910 
* Address not known: 323 people. 
* The data do not include the number of HSMs of Designated Activities.  
Source: e-stat (2017) 
 
Regarding nationalities of HSMs, the top 5 origins are China (consisting of 40% of the 
total HSMs), South Korea (10%), Vietnam (7%), Nepal (7%) and USA (6%) in 
decreasing order. The HSMs from these 5 origins comprise over 70% of all the HSMs.  
 
Table 3-5 Top 30 origins of HSMs 
 
Total 288,542 
    
Number of People 
1 China 115,795 11 Sri Lanka  3,919  21 Russia  1,322  
2 South Korea 28,420 12 France   3,828  22 Mongolia  1,178  
3 Vietnam 19,933  13 Canada  3,309  23 Italy  1,074  
4 Nepal 18,860  14 Australia  3,173  24 New Zealand   979  
5 USA   17,058  15 Pakistan  3,106  25 Afghanistan   946  
6 India    13,476  16 Indonesia   2,724  26 Singapore   827  
7 Taiwan   10,320  17 Myanmar  2,440  27 Spain   776  
8 Philippines     8,253  18 Bangladesh  2,095  28 Brazil   625  
9 UK     5,823  19 Germany  1,932  29 Jamaica   519  
10 Thailand     4,078  20 Malaysia  1,908  30 Turkey   473  
*The Western economies are highlighted. The total number indicates all the HSMs 
including stateless persons. China includes Hong Kong and Macau. 
Source: e-stat (2017) 
 
Immigrants from the top 30 origins listed in the table comprise 97% of all the HSMs, 
out of which are 10 western states (highlighted in the table) whilst 27 economies 
comprising over 80% of all the HSMs are Asian. Figure 3-3 traces the number of HSMs 
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for the past decade. The boosting trend of total HSMs is clearly synonymous with that 
of Asians albeit the number of western HSMs remains stagnant. 
 
 
Source: e-stat (2017) 
 
The tendency becomes more evident in the indexed longitudinal data. From 2006 to 
2017, the number of HSMs had more than doubled and showing a constant upward 
trend except for 2010 and 2011 when the worldwide recession and the Great 
Earthquake hit Japan. Asian HSMs are the driving force of the surge in the figure of 
overall HSMs. In contrast, the number of Western HSMs has constantly been below 
the level of 2006. In order to observe the overall trend, regression lines are depicted 
as small-dotted-lines in Figure 3-4; the lines indicate that the number of Asian HSMs 
has soared by 9% annually whilst that of Western HSMs has dropped by 0.8%, though 
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Figure 3-3 The number of highly skilled migrants (2006-2017) 
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Source: e-stat (2017) 
 
The Japanese economy entered a recovery phase in December 2012 (Cabinet Ministry, 
2018). It has since been boosted reaching the second longest growth thus far in the 
post-war period (Cabinet Ministry, 2018). Echoing the robust economy, employment 
conditions have hugely ameliorated. The unemployment rate had fallen from 4.3% 
(December 2012) to 3.1% (June 2017) with the surge of new employment at 3.31 
million people (MIC, 2017). Tracing back to 2006 when the figure 3-4 data were 
benchmarked (2006 data=100.00), the total employment has risen by 3.75 million 
people from 54.51 million (January 2006) to 58.26 million (June 2017) (MIC, 2017). 
Although the data include all types of employment regardless of skills, it is obvious that 
the labour market has expanded. The Ratio of Effective Job Offers to Application was 
1.51 in June 2017 reaching the highest level since March 1974 (MOL, 2017); it means 
there are 1.51 vacant posts for one job seeker33. The mounting trend of the overall 
number of HSMs has also accelerated from 2013. The Japanese business community 
expresses concern over the labour shortage (Lewis, 2017; Japan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 2017; Keidanren, 2018) which prompts the enterprises to 
increase immigrant employment in addition to hiring more females, elderly and 
                                            
33 When the ratio exceeds 1.00, the number of vacant posts is equal to that of job seekers. In Japan, it has constantly 
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Figure 3-4 The trend of Asian and Western HSMs (2006-2017, indexed) 
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handicapped workers (Keidanren, 2018). Therefore, it is natural that the overall figure 
of HSMs keeps an upward trend.  
 
Fractioning the western economies into a few areas hints at a more interesting trend. 
The number of European HSMs has increased by 2,300 from 2006 to 2017 whilst that 
of North America and Oceania34  (Australia and New Zealand) has decreased by 
approximately 2,500 and 3,200 respectively. Among others, the figure of Oceanian 
HSMs has plummeted by almost half for the past 11 years. 
 
Table 3-6 The number of highly skilled migrants by origin (2006-2017) 
 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2017 % change 
Total 152,603 193,442 193,268 194,520 209,719 255,253 288,542 89 
Asia 101,717 145,596 151,240 155,006 168,372 208,640 239,823 136 
Westerner 49,243 45,927 40,276 37,727 39,259 44,090 45,865 -7 
Breaking down the westerners 
Europe 17,889 17,312 15,336 14,580 15,783 19,452 20,189 13 
N.America 24,003 22,787 20,165 19,036 19,579 20,581 21,524 -10 
Australia 5,577 4,462 3,636 3,063 2,920 3,102 3,173 -43 
New Zealand 1,774 1,366 1,139 1,048 977 955 979 -45 
*The data of 2006-2016 are two-year.    Source: e-stat (2017) 
 
The following table presents more detailed fluctuations by countries. It extracts the 
number of HSMs from the top 7 Asian (excluding Taiwan) and top 10 western 
economies (the western economies are highlighted) as of 2017.  
 
  
                                            
34  According to the definition in immigration statistics, Oceania includes the pacific islands (e-stat, 2017). 
However, this dissertation only encompasses Australia and New Zealand in Oceania. Therefore, the table shows 
the number of immigrants from Australia and New Zealand rather than the whole of ‘Oceania’. Other areas (i.e. 
Asia, Europe, North America) are in line with the definition of the statistical data (c.f. Appendix 3); hence, it is 
described as areas. 
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Table 3-7 The fluctuation of highly skilled migrants by country (2006-2017) 
  2006 2017 Absolute change % change 
China 58,674 115,795      57,121  97  
South Korea 18,832  28,420       9,588  51  
Vietnam  1,449  19,933      18,484  1,276  
Nepal 1,743 18,860     17,117  982  
India 8,082 13,476      5,394  67  
Philippines 3,481 8,253      4,772  137  
USA 17,637 17,058       -579  -3  
UK 8,286 5,823     -2,463  -30  
France 2,793 3,828      1,035  37  
Canada 6,035 3,309     -2,726  -45  
Australia 5,577 3,173     -2,404  -43  
Germany 1,723 1,932        209  12  
Russia 1,033 1,322        289  28  
Italy 583 1,074        491  84  
New Zealand 1,774 979       -795 -45  
Spain 249 776        527  212  
* China includes Taiwan and South Korea includes North Korea in 2006 data. 
Source: e-stat (2017) 
 
The number of Asian HSMs has drastically increased with Vietnam experiencing a 
1,276% increase. In contrast, the westerners show mixed tendencies. Looking at 
European countries in detail, the number of UK citizens has remarkably fallen by 30% 
while that of France (37%), Germany (12%), Italy (84%), and Spain (212%) have 
increased. Especially, the surge in the figure of South Europe is prominent; it might 
partly be explained by the deteriorating employment conditions in these states (Rienzo 
and Vargas-Silva, 2014). However, it should be noted that Germany and the UK also 
have enjoyed economic growth during the period notwithstanding that the two source 
countries point to contrastive tendencies (decreasing numbers of UK and increasing 
German HSMs). It follows that there might be another significant push or pull factor 
than economic circumstances. Importantly, the declining trend of people from North 
America, Oceania, and the UK demonstrates the shrinking cohorts of Anglophones (or 
Anglo-American) although the other cohorts—especially Asians—show a robust 
increasing trend. It is notable that the number of Canadian, Australian and New 
Zealanders has almost halved even though Japanese economic growth has recently 
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offered more job opportunities to foreign professionals (Immigration Bureau, 2017b; 
MOL, 2018). 
 
In sum, there are two puzzles which cannot be answered by macro statistical data: (1) 
Why are the specific cohorts, namely the Western HSMs (inter alia Anglo-phone), 
shrinking in Japan; (2) Why didn’t Japan’s robust economic growth help increase the 
specific cohorts? These are the key puzzles through which this research deciphers the 
labyrinth of HSMs. 
 
3.6 Attractiveness to work in Japan 
Another important question in considering the status quo of Japan’s highly skilled 
migration is how attractive working in Japan is. As a part of the annual compilation of 
world competitiveness index, the World Economic Forum issues the world ranking of 
attractiveness which enables benchmarking Japan in the global talent competition. 
Japan has been placed between 70th and 80th out of 137 economies for the past 5 
years in terms of the capacity to attract talent from abroad, far behind other advanced 
industrial economies. 
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Figure 3-5 Japan's attractiveness rank for talents in the world 
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The most attractive state in the 2016-2017 survey is Switzerland followed by UAE, the 
UK, Singapore, and the USA. Even comparing within Asia, Japan is ranked below 
Hong Kong (9th), China (23rd), South Korea (42nd) and Taiwan (63rd). On the capacity 
to retain talent (regardless of nationalities), Japan is ranked 44th in 2016-2017 while 
the ranking has been slightly dropping. Again, the top country is Switzerland followed 
by UAE, USA, Norway and Singapore (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
 
In sum, the data suggest that Japan is less attractive for HSMs than other advanced 
industrial states including its Asian counterparts. At the same time, Japan’s capacity to 
retain the talent has also diminished. It is worth exploring the reasons in this study. 
 
3.7 Policies on highly skilled migrants in Asia 
3.7.1 Migration trends in Asian immigration economies 
This final part of the chapter attempts to position Japanese migration policies within 
the context of Asia in order to provide a wider landscape in the related policies in similar 
immigration economies. In not only skilled migration but also other migration agendas 
such as unskilled migration, there is a clear tendency that the immigration policies of a 
nation-state internationally converge (Hollifield et al., 2014). On account of the 
globalisation and transport innovation that accelerate borderless movement, a nation-
state faces enormous difficulties in maintaining its own distinctive policies without being 
influenced by other nations or international institutions. Therefore, it is indispensable 
to hold the international perspective in examining the policies and its variations 
(Hollifield, 1992, 2008; Shachar, 2006; Castles et al., 2014). Notwithstanding that the 
focus of this research is not a multinational comparison but Japan, international 
benchmarking will help elucidate policy implications. In so doing, this part will highlight 
the similarities and distinctiveness of Japanese policies in comparison with other Asian 
immigrant economies35.  
 
Asia is quite diversified among countries in terms of the degree of economic 
development, political regime, demography, history, culture, religion, and social issues. 
This is why generalising Asian migration trends is far more difficult than in other world 
regions (Asis et al. 2010; Castles et al., 2014). However, looking at statistics, the 
literature identifies predominant immigration destinations, which are Japan, Singapore, 
                                            
35 Brunei is also an immigration country but it is not described here because of the much smaller number of 
immigrants (approximately 200,000) compared with the other observed countries and the distinctive industrial 
structure (oil and gas industry accounting for 60% of GDP). 
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South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and emigration countries such as China and 
India (Hugo, 2005; Massey et al., 1998).  
 
The statistical data on the stock of migration irrespective of visa categories (e.g. skilled, 
unskilled, family reunification and so forth) in the predominant immigration destinations 
reveal some interesting features36. First of all, human mobility is dominated by intra-
regional migration within Asia. Although there are a few exceptions (such as South 
Americans in Japan and the US citizens in South Korea), the countries accept most of 
the immigrants from Asia. Among others, China is remarkably an important contributor 
for these destinations. It is also noteworthy that South Korea has still more emigrants 
than immigrants with the gap exceeding double. This means that it is an emigrant 
country as well as China although the majority of previous surveys on South Korean 
migration centre on the immigration in the country (Seol, 2013). 
 
Table 3-8 Stock migration in Asian economies/area 
 Japan South Korea Singapore 
Immigrants  
in stock 
2,437,169 1,232,220 2,323,252 
Emigrants 
in stock 


























Korea 699,290 28.7 China 656,846 53.3 Malaysia 1,044,994 45.0 
2 China 655,480 26.9 Vietnam 122,449 9.9 China 380,766 16.4 
3 Brazil 365,857 15.0 USA 71,817 5.8 Indonesia 152,681 6.6 
4 Philippines 226,179 9.3 Philippines 49,173 4.0 India 138,177 5.9 
5 Peru 68,642 2.8 Thailand 34,373 2.8 Pakistan 118,765 5.1 
 





















Ratio to all 
immigrants 
1 China 2,280,210 81.3 
South 
Korea 222,276 26.2 
2 Indonesia 132,985 4.7 Philippines 121,320 14.3 
3 Philippines 116,505 4.2 Brazil 115,347 13.6 
4 Macau 70,454 2.5 Indonesia 58,639 6.9 
5 Thailand 18,963 0.7 USA 42,655 5.0 
Source: UN (2013) 
 
Second, each destination tends to accept the majority of immigrants from neighbouring 
economies. The immigrants from the largest sending country stand at the nearly half 
of the foreign population with China at 53% in South Korea, Malaysia 45% in Singapore, 
                                            
36 Taiwan is not shown since the data are compiled by the United Nations. 
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China 81% in Hong Kong. This is due to historical and ethnic reasons. For example, 
South Korea opens its border to the ethnic Koreans in China. As already discussed, 
Japan also has a ‘blood-based’ immigration system for people who have Japanese 
ancestors (so-called Nikkeijin). Most of the Brazilian/Peruvian and some of the 
Pilipino/Chinese reside in Japan under this category. From the historical perspective, 
the descendants of Korean and Taiwanese who came to Japan during the colonial 
period (early 20th century) have Special Permanent Resident status in Japan: 338,950 
people in 2016 (Immigration Bureau, 2017b). Singapore tries to keep the ethnic 
balance among Chinese, Malay, Indian and others in its immigration policy. The history 
of nations also plays an important role in immigration; Singapore became independent 
from Malaysia and Hong Kong was returned to China. 
 
Unskilled labour and international marriage are also key factors to examine the influx 
of immigrants in Asia. South Korea has a bilateral agreement with Asian countries such 
as Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand to import unskilled labour. Singapore accepts 
unskilled labour widely from Southeast Asia and China mainly in the sectors of 
construction, shipping industry and domestic services. A new tendency of human 
mobility has occurred since the 2000s; international marriage in South Korea and Hong 
Kong has surged. In South Korea, most of the cases are ethnic Korean brides from 
China but brides also come from Southeast Asia such as Vietnam and the Philippines 
in the form of so-called ‘mail-order brides’ (Lee, 2008). In Hong Kong, the number of 
marriages with Mainland Chinese women rocketed from 703 to 15,978 between 1986 
and 2007 (Ngan and Chan, 2013). 
 
In fact, the literature on Asian migration has concentrated on and been limited to 
remittances, diaspora, unskilled labour, marriage migration and brain drain (Asis et al., 
2010; Ngan and Chan, 2013) but there is little study on highly skilled migration and its 
policy implications in Asia (see for example Liu-Farrer and Yeoh, 2018). Therefore, in 
the coming section, policies of highly skilled migration (and unskilled immigration 
policies when they are relevant to discussing skilled mobility) in three destinations are 
described: Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan37. 
 
                                            
37 Although Hong Kong has its own immigration policies apart from China, it is natural to consider that Hong 
Kong is still a part of China as Ngan and Chan (2013) insist. The fact that the over 80% of immigrants are internal 
Chinese origins also support this view. Hence, Hong Kong is not discussed in the next section. 
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3.7.2 Policies in Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan 
Singapore 
Singapore is a leading nation in Asia not only in accepting immigration but also 
implementing policies focusing on HSMs38. The incipient policy targeting HSMs is 
‘Eminent Entrepreneurs and Professional Scheme’ which was introduced in 1988 to 
attract talent from Hong Kong 39  where concerns over the return to Chinese 
sovereignty prevailed at that time (Iwasaki, 2015). In 1989, when the Tiananmen 
Incident exacerbated their fear, the Singapore government eased the conditions of 
employment restrictions and permanent resident to lure in talent from Hong Kong (Yue, 
2011). In the 1990s, Singapore launched a few institutions which functioned as a basis 
of promoting the influx of HSMs such as Contact Singapore and Singapore Talent 
Recruit Committee. Above all, Contact Singapore directly links Singapore-based 
employers including foreign affiliates and global talents in addition to overseas 
Singaporeans, offering websites in Chinese (both simplified and traditional characters), 
English, Japanese and Koreans and having overseas offices to provide information. 
This policy functions to not only attract HSMs but also encourage overseas 
Singaporeans to return to their home country (Ho, 2008), which Japanese migration 
policies do not aim to do. 
 
There are two types of schemes for HSMs in Singapore: Personalised Employment 
Pass (PEP) and Employment Pass (EP). PEP is not tied to employers in Singapore, 
so the holder is free to change jobs. To gain this Pass, the immigrants should earn a 
monthly salary of at least S$ 18,000. On the other hand, PEP is issued to immigrants 
with jobs with the minimum salary of S$ 3,300 and is tied to the employer. EP is also 
beneficial for employers exempt from foreign worker levy and quotas unlike unskilled 
immigrants. In addition, the employer of HSMs can apply for tax deduction for the cost 
of recruiting foreign talent. The pass holder is usually offered permanent residential 
status from two to six years depending on other conditions like salary even though the 
Singapore government does not offer it to unskilled immigrants. The percentage of the 
two Pass holders—namely HSMs—to all labour immigrants was 13.2 % (176,600 
people) in 2014 (Iwasaki, 2015). 
 
South Korea 
In contrast with Japan which has 28 types of status of residence for HSMs, there are 
only eight types of visa for HSMs in South Korea: professor, foreign language instructor, 
                                            
38 It should be also noted that Singapore has a unique system in immigration to keep the ethnic balance. 
39 However, the western nations such as Canada and Australia were more appealing destinations than Singapore 
for people in Hong Kong. Skeldon (1995) raises historic, cultural, economic and political reasons for this. 
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researcher, technology guidance (someone who has specific high-tech knowledge and 
transfers it to Korean companies), special profession (such as lawyers, accountants, 
doctors), arts and entertainment, specially Designated Activities (other HSMs than 
listed before). Being similar with Japan, the criteria are prescribed in detail in each 
category while job offer is indispensable for all the categories. There are no labour 
market tests or quotas for HSMs unlike unskilled immigrants. 
 
South Korea started strategical policies to attract HSMs from 2000. There are three 
categories for HSMs: the Gold Card for high-tech specialists; the IT Card for IT 
specialists; the Science Card for qualified scientists and engineers (the Card holders 
can enjoy preferential treatment such as shorter time of visa procedure, longer period 
of stay permitted, special permission to be accompanied by a foreign domestic worker). 
South Korea also introduced a Points-Based system for HSMs in 2010 to screen 
immigrants who can apply for permanent residential status in a shorter period. The 
criteria evaluated on the system are academic background, income, age, ability in 
Korean language and so forth. If an immigrant scores over 80 from a total 120 points, 
they can be a permanent resident in three years although it takes 5 years for the other 
immigrants. 
 
Despite the efforts of offering preferential treatment and other programmes catering for 
HSMs, the number of HSMs remains relatively low level. The total number of HSMs is 
44,264 which is merely 6% of all the labour immigrants; furthermore, foreign language 
instructor stood at 50.7 % of all the HSMs categories in 2012 (Seol, 2013). 
 
Taiwan 
In Taiwan, labour immigrants need a work permit apart from visa which is called a 
Resident Visa because it only permits residence not employment. In addition, a work 
permit should be obtained by the employer not employee. The Resident Visa for HSMs 
is called Class A (white collar) and includes the following work: specialised or technical 
work, managerial position of foreign affiliate; teacher; sports coach and athlete; and, 
religious, artistic, show business work. 
 
For these HSMs, the government introduced Employment Pass Card to attract foreign 
talent in 2011. The card combines the permission of Resident Visa, work permit, alien 
resident certificate and multi-entry all together—the government named it ‘4 in 1’. The 
aim is to simplify the administrative procedure for foreign talent to increase the number. 
However, since combining visa and work permit has already been the norm in other 
industrial Asian countries including Japan, Singapore and South Korea, it is an 
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immigration policy to catch up with other countries rather than implementing a new 
strategy to win the competition for talent. As a matter of fact, the number of HSMs in 
Taiwan accounts for 30,623 and it represents only 5% of all the foreign workers as of 
July 2015 (Ministry of Labor [Taiwan], 2015). 
 
Nonetheless, one of the interesting features in Taiwan’s skilled migration trend is return 
migrants. Taiwan has experienced brain drain for the last four decades; many highly 
educated Taiwanese emigrated to the USA. Some of them launched IT business in 
Silicon Valley or were employed by high tech companies or research institutions. 
These talented Taiwanese tend to return to their homeland contributing to the 
development of an innovative industry (Saxenian, 2006). A good example is Hsinchu 
Science-based Industrial Park, where return migrants set up 31.2% of high tech 
business (Chiu and Hou, 2007). 
 
Another feature is a prominent social cohesion policy. In contrast with the 
homogeneous nature of the Japanese population, Taiwan holds indigenous ethnic 
minorities in addition to other minorities coming from mainland China such as ‘Hakka’ 
or ‘Waisheng ren’; consequently the importance of multiculturalism is more widely 
recognised than Japan even though it is not provoked by labour migration (Kim and 
Oh, 2011; Imaizumi, 2012). National Immigration Agency runs a comprehensive web-
site for potential immigrants explaining visa issuance and daily life issues like health 
care and housing so that they can “adapt to the lifestyle in Taiwan and improve their 
quality of life” (National Immigration Agency [Taiwan], 2015: About this site). The 
website offers information in seven languages: Chinese, English, Japanese, 
Vietnamese, Indonesian, Thai and Cambodian. 
 
3.7.3 Comparison with Japan 
Each economy has adopted different schemes for HSMs although some similarities 
are also found. For instance, HSMs in each destination can apply for permanent 
residential status if they reside between three to five years except for Singapore where 
the criteria are multi-faceted. All the governments normally require job offers to admit 





























Japan 2012 no 5-10 
(depend on contribution) 
yes 1.4 18% 
Singapore 1989 yes 2-6 
(Points-Based) 
yes 1.2 13% 
S. Korea 2000 yes 3 yes 1.2 6% 
Taiwan 2011 yes 5 yes 1.0 5% 
*2013 data. Taiwan: National Statistics Republic of China [Taiwan] (2015), others: 
World Bank (2014) 
**Japan (2017 data): MOL (2018), Singapore (2014 data): Iwasaki (2015), South Korea 
(2012 data): Seoul (2013), Taiwan (2015 data): Ministry of Labor [Taiwan] (2015) 
Source: the author 
 
On the other hand, the timing for when the government implemented special policies 
for HSMs is different. Singapore started the strategic policy for HSMs as early as 1989 
ahead of other states, followed by South Korea in 2000 with Japan and Taiwan far 
behind. Why has Japan, as the most developed economy in Asia and the one with the 
earliest aging society, been the last to implement a skilled migration strategy ? This 
enigma will be answered from the point of migration governance (Chapter 7). 
 
Another salient difference is the ratio of HSMs in overall immigration. Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan have an official scheme to introduce unskilled foreign labour 
although Japan does not have one40. Interestingly, this affects the percentage of HSMs 
to foreign workers. In Japan, HSMs make up 18 % of the total foreign labour force 
exceeding South Korea (6%) and Taiwan (5%) even overwhelming the percentage in 
Singapore (13%). This is partly because Japan has a policy not to accept unskilled 
labour officially and the other three economies tend to rely more on unskilled labour 
from overseas. This fact also indicates that the policies in other Asian governments on 
HSMs are not quite successful especially in the case of South Korea and Taiwan. 
 
As already described, the Japanese government referred to the UK’s PBS rather than 
Asian policies when designing Japan’s own PBS. This may be because it seemed to 
policy makers that Japan’s rival states in Asia failed in attracting HSMs41. So, Japan 
needed to look for another good practice: it was the UK that introduced the PBS when 
                                            
40 There are indeed some ‘back door’ routes to import unskilled labour such as Nikkeijin and Technical Intern 
Training programme (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004). However, Japan still keeps its ‘official’ stance not to accept 
unskilled labour. This will be detailed in Chapter 7. 
41 This notion of downplay is proved to be distorted later in the findings-chapters. 
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Japan started official discussions to launch strategies to increase the number of HSMs 
(Kodo Jinzai Ukeire Suishin Kaigi, 2008). It is said that South Korea and Taiwan 
replicated the Japanese model of technical training (Chung, 2010; Kim and Oh, 2011); 
this fact may have also discouraged Japanese policy makers from looking at Asian 
models. 
 
The comparison with other Asian models also gives some important implications to 
Japan on the societal dimension. Japanese immigration policies have been criticised 
for their lack of multiculturalism or social cohesion (Iguchi, 2007; Tsuda and Cornelius, 
2004). It is obvious when Japan’s policy is compared with South Korea and Taiwan 
that the significance of multiculturalism is not shared by nationals (Chung, 2010; Kim 
and Oh, 2011). With regard to the notion of diversity in society and policies, Japan is 
left behind other Asian nations. This is observed in return migration policies in Japan 
where the government only focuses on immigration rather than emigration. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter broadly mapped out the legal system of highly skilled migration, statistical 
overview and international comparison, subsequently showing the puzzles within and 
the distinctiveness of the Japanese system. 
 
It might be true that the Japanese immigration control is enigmatic for non-Japanese 
researchers, but it is not so different from the UK system in terms of legal structure and 
basic idea underpinning immigration control. In both countries, the decision on 
immigration control is entirely left to the discretion of Ministry (or Secretary) of Justice 
based on the detailed prescriptions across secondary/quasi legislation. It signifies that 
the immigration control is formed of a multi-stratification of rules that make 
comprehending the system difficult. Nonetheless, it is also an important role for 
academic researchers to explain the complicated system simply enough to inform 
research problems instead of exploiting academic jargon as Favell (2008) insists. 
 
The chapter also introduced the recent policy development to strategically lure HSMs 
in: PBS. Unlike other industrial states such as Canada, Australia and the UK, the 
Japanese system does not function as a screening mechanism but to provide the 
selected elites with several preferential treatments which other HSMs cannot enjoy. 
Even though it was deemed as a ground-breaking strategy for the closed immigrant 
state (Hollifield et al., 2015), the number of grants for the first 11-months comprised 




With regard to legal entitlement to reside in Japan, HSMs are given one of the 14 types 
of status of residence (plus newly added ‘Care Worker’ status). Albeit this research 
excludes three of them, namely, Artist, Entertainer, and Religious Activities. 
Statistically, Engineers/Specialists in Humanities and International Services account 
for 62% of all the HSMs whilst intracompany transferee represents as low as 6%. This 
means it is imperative to look at independent migrants in examining the research 
questions. 
 
Another salient feature is source economies. For the past 11 years, the total HSMs 
has risen by 89% and the driving force of this expansion is Asians who occupy over 
80% of the existing HSMs. Albeit the figure of Asian HSMs dipped in 2010-2011 due 
to the recession and Great Earthquake, it has drastically recovered and mounted in 
accordance with labour shortages that Japanese business sectors seriously suffer 
(Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2017; Keidanren, 2018). In contrast, the 
number of Western HSMs has been stagnant with the level steadily below the point of 
2006 over the decade. It cannot be explained by economic pull factors even though 
some of the South Europeans may be motivated by economic push factors, namely, 
deteriorating employment conditions in their home states. This contradiction between 
Asian and Western immigration patterns poses an intriguing puzzle the academic 
research so far has not resolved. 
 
Turning to international benchmark, it was shown that Japan has lagged behind other 
industrial states in terms of attractiveness and strategies to persuade the best and 
brightest to immigrate and stay. Singapore implemented the master plan to attract 
HSMs over 20 years before Japan launched the PBS. Japan does not have return 
migration policies or comprehensive policies for social cohesion. Nonetheless, the 
percentage of HSMs in the immigrant labour pool stands at the highest among other 
Asian immigration states because of its unique stance on immigration: Japan does not 
have an official scheme to accept unskilled immigrants. Although this dissertation deals 
with skilled migration, the banning of unskilled immigration is in fact closely related to 
Japanese policy makers’ stance and position on highly skilled migration as revealed 
later.  
 
To conclude, based on the examination of regulatory frameworks of highly skilled 
migration together with its statistics and benchmarking, this chapter presented three 
key propositions at play in the labyrinth. First, the Asian and Western HSMs exhibit 
contrasting immigration patterns. Specifically, it is unclear what theory can explain the 
stagnant Westerners’ mobility instead of economic factors. As already discussed, 
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professional posts have been drastically expanded and the mounting numbers of Asian 
HSMs have filled the vacancies. Nonetheless, the number of Western HSMs has been 
constantly lower than that of a decade ago. What creates this contradiction? How can 
it be explained within the framework of migration theory? Another proposition is why 
Japan is not attractive to talent from abroad. Despite the third largest economy in the 
world boasting cutting edge innovative technologies and plenty of job opportunities, 
why has it failed to appeal to the global talent? And the other proposition is why the 
PBS did not function properly.  
 
These key propositions can be answered through the previously fixed research 
questions, which will unfold the labyrinth of highly skilled migration. In sum, what this 
background chapter unravelled will form the basis of the empirical analysis in Chapter 
5-7. The next chapter discusses academic methods to explore the puzzles. 
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Chapter 4 Methodologies and Methods 
 
Not everyone can see all the truth.  




This chapter43 sets out methodologies and methods chosen to answer the research 
questions, whose central inquiry (i.e. overarching research question) is to reveal 
agencies and actors in attracting HSMs to Japan. In unpacking the interplays among 
the agencies and actors, this study adopted qualitative methods due to its inductive 
and in-depth nature, which enables unravelling the intricate process of decision-
making. This chapter is devoted to explaining why the qualitative methods were taken 
and how the research was undertaken.  
 
The first part of the chapter deals with the strengths and weaknesses of methods to 
acquire a suitable research design. Then, the research strategies of qualitative 
inquiry—textual context and interviews—are shown including its data collection, 
sampling and analysis together with how ethical issues were dealt with. The final part 
explores the intrinsic challenges and limitations of the methods. It critically examines 
sensitivities, sample size, translation and positionality, discussing how the author has 
overcome these challenges during the fieldwork and analytical process referring to 
methodological literature. Finally, the chapter reflexively addresses a fundamental 
question on qualitative methods: what is a good interview? 
 
4.2 Methodologies 
4.2.1 Nature of qualitative research 
It is widely recognised that there is no clear and universal definition of qualitative 
research (Mason, 2002). Although Ormston et al. (2014: 23) agree that there are 
various definitions, they define qualitative research as “an in-depth and interpreted 
understanding of the social world”. Denzin and Lincoln (2013: 7) describe how 
qualitative researchers attempt to “make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of 
the meanings people bring to them”. In order to interpret society, qualitative methods 
                                            
42 from Shiono (2004: 5) 
43 The chapter is partly drawn from the author’s essay (Wakisaka, 2015) submitted in January 2015 as the 
assignment for Qualitative Methods Unit (one of the required for the PhD degree), to School for Policy Studies, 
University of Bristol. 
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rely on words and images (Bryman, 2016; Creswell, 2014; Ormston et al., 2014), while 
quantitative data are always numeric. This is often pointed out as the distinct nature of 
qualitative research when compared with quantitative research, having an inductive, 
subjective, and interpretivist approach 44  (Bryman and Becker, 2012; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2013; Flick, 2014; Ormston et al., 2014).  
 
It is noteworthy that there are various qualitative methods available other than 
interviews. To name a few, observation, focus groups and textual context are among 
the qualitative methods, and even economists, albeit often regarded as quantitative 
researchers, employ these approaches (e.g. reading the minutes of the Monetary 
Policy Meeting of the Central Bank; interviewing experts before building up 
hypotheses).  
 
Qualitative research is to investigate the characteristics of the research participants, 
for example, how they are different from others, what promotes them to be so, and how 
they reach specific decisions. Each person may have their own account for these 
questions (Creswell, 2013). In contrast, quantitative research is based on the 
assumption that the characteristics of the population can be generalised in order to 
transform the data into a homogeneous (i.e. numerical) group rather than describing 
the differences (Bryman, 2016). Importantly, qualitative research focuses on ‘process 
and reasons’ rather than ‘results’. This in-depth approach to focusing on multi-
dimensionality and process is both the strength and weakness of qualitative research: 
social scientists should be aware of the different nature and philosophy between 
qualitative and quantitative research in choosing their research methods. 
 
4.2.2 Reasons for using qualitative methods 
The most determinant reason for choosing a qualitative approach for this research is 
its inductive nature. In the inductive approach, research generates a theory whilst the 
deductive approach uses research to test a hypothesis inferred from theory (Bryman, 
2016). Given there are not enough data to build a hypothesis of this study, the agency 
and actors in attracting HSMs can be located by exploring peoples’ experiences of 
being a migrant throughout an inductive approach. The previous chapter clarified a 
puzzle showing the contrasting migration patterns between Asians and Westerners: 
the former shows a remarkable increase whilst the latter remained quite stagnant 
notwithstanding the robust job creations in Japan. 
                                            
44 It should be noted that these distinctions are not always appropriate, for quantitative research is sometimes 





However, the statistical data do not reveal the reasons why these contradictions have 
occurred. In addition, a quantitative survey has limitations in explaining contextual 
backgrounds behind the phenomena although it has more explanatory power of 
generalising a theory. As Ritchie and Ormston (2014: 32) assert, “because of its facility 
to examine subjects in depth, qualitative research provides a unique tool for studying 
what lies behind or underpins, a decision, attitude, behaviour or other phenomena”, 
this research relies on this inductive nature to verify the factors to which HSMs attach 
importance when deciding to migrate. Above all, it is helpful to reveal micro-macro 
interplays among actors and agencies (Izuhara and Forrest, 2013). As this research 
shed light on three dimensions (namely micro, meso, macro), aiming to bridge these 
angles to produce dynamic policy implications, qualitative methods are fit for the 
purpose.  
 
4.2.3 Philosophical underpinnings 
Even though there are various points of view and methods in qualitative approaches, 
qualitative researchers generally share philosophical assumptions that are different 
from quantitative research. 
 
One is ontology, which represents the nature of reality. Bryman (2016) points out that 
objectivism regards social phenomena as external factors, while its counter-philosophy, 
constructionism, takes the position that society is dependent on people; 
constructionism is predominant in qualitative research. More significantly, whichever 
stance the researcher takes, there is a common understanding that reality is 
multifaceted (Creswell, 2013; Ormston et al., 2014). This concept supports the fact that 
the number of HSMs migrating from some countries to Japan is stagnant, whereas the 
total number of HSMs is vigorously growing. According to Creswell (2014), ontological 
assumptions permit reporting various perspectives and nuances as themes develop in 
the findings. As society becomes more complicated during the process of 
internationalisation, this assumption, looking at diversity, provides an insight to 
exploring the actors and agencies at play in the skilled migration mechanism. 
 
The other is the epistemological assumption, which represents how to form 
“acceptable knowledge” (Bryman, 2016: 24). In other words, it means on which 
academic grounds the research questions are explored: positivism or interpretivism.  
From the positivist view, the methods of the natural sciences should be applied to the 
social sciences, and the subjectivity of the qualitative research, especially interview 
findings, is unacceptable because it cannot be scientifically measured and proved. On 
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the contrary, from the interpretist view, social phenomena cannot be measured rigidly 
and scientifically because there is no natural law to prescribe participants’ behaviours. 
Therefore, an interpretist posits that “a social researcher has to explore and 
understand the social world through the participants’ and their own perspectives” 
(Ormston et al., 2014: 24). As discussed above, the determinations of migrants are 
extremely diversified and cannot always be described numerically whilst the findings 
of qualitative research could bring something hidden from the statistics. Hence, this 
research takes the position of interpretivism. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that these two sets of philosophical 
assumptions are not always distinctive and dichotomous (Castles, 2012). For instance, 
Ormston al. (2014: 4-5) assert their ontological position as qualitative research is close 
to objectivism (or what they call ‘realism’) that posits “external reality which exists 
independently of people’s beliefs about or understanding of it”. It signals that qualitative 
researchers do not necessarily share identical philosophical underpinnings. In fact, 
mixed methods—combining quantitative and qualitative approach—are academically 
established and employed widely (Bryman, 2016; Victoria et al., 2008) even though 
the two combined methods are predicated on different philosophical assumptions. 
Bryman (2016: 34) justifies this point by claiming: 
 
Quantitative and qualitative research represent different research strategies 
and that each carries with it striking differences in terms of the role of theory, 
epistemological issues, and ontological concerns. However, the distinction 
is not a hard-and-fast one: studies that have the broad characteristics of one 
research strategy may have a characteristic of the other. 
 
Thus, the philosophical assumptions may well be better understood as interactive than 
dichotomous. A good example is that an asset manager of an investment bank also 
employs semi-structured interviews with corporate executives in deciding their 
investment, mixing with quantitative data such as PER (Price Earnings Ratio), interest 
rate or the market growth. This means the asset manager also puts a great store on 
qualitative data from the corporate executive including their business philosophy which 
cannot be quantified. In sum, it is reasonable to consider which method(s) can help 
collect more illuminating data for the research. On this point, this research takes an  
inductive approach which allows the exploration of an individual’s process of decision 




4.2.4 Weakness of qualitative method 
This research enjoyed the advantages of an inductive, in-depth, and multi-dimensional 
approach in the qualitative inquiry. Yet, there are some intrinsic issues in qualitative 
methods in order to ensure validity, reliability and generalisability. As with the 
difficulties in sampling strategies, qualitative research has been developed to meet the 
requirements of epistemology to be regarded as social sciences. In other words, the 
research design should be in line with the epistemological criteria. Although there is no 
clear set of criteria, “two basic stances” (Bryman and Becker, 2012: 275) are 
considered here: the adaptation position (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982) and the 
replacement position (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
 
The adaptation position sets out reliability, validity and generalisability as criteria for 
qualitative research (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982). Reliability means that the research 
can be reproductive. In fact, LeCompte and Goetz (1982) admit it is difficult to 
reproduce the situation in which the research was conducted. Instead, it is regarded 
that the research process, specifically, “research strategies used to collect data” 
(LeCompte and Goetz, 1982: 40), is clarified to the extent that the research ensures 
the ability to replicate. 
 
Validity addresses the strong linkage between the data and the theory that the 
researcher is confirming. As qualitative research is inductive, the researcher draws 
certain theories according to the data cited. Creswell (2014: 252) proposes using a 
“rich, thick description” (original italics) to report the findings so that the conclusion of 
the research becomes more realistic and understandable for readers. 
 
Generalisation is concerned with the ability to generalise the theory. This might be the 
most challenging criterion for this research because it has a relatively small sample 
size, which is not sufficient to generalise the findings. Nonetheless, as the research 
aims at explanatory research rather than generalising the theory, it might be 
reasonable to concentrate on reporting the cases. Creswell (2014: 204) claims that 
generalisability in qualitative analysis should not be regarded equally with quantitative 
analysis, since “(p)articularity rather than generalizability (Greene and Caracelli, 1997) 
is the hallmark of good qualitative research...The generalization occurs when 
qualitative researchers study additional cases and generalize findings to the new cases. 
It is the same as the replication logic used in experimental research” (citation in 
original). Then, the important criteria for generalising qualitative findings are to ensure 
“good documentation of qualitative procedures” so that the research can be repeated 
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or developed (ibid., 204). Generalisation is accordingly related to the repetition of 
ensuring reliability and validity. 
 
The replacement position (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) is another criterion to enhance 
trustworthiness by using terms such as credibility, authenticity, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability. They propose triangulation, reporting negative cases 
countering the findings, and member checks, as ways to increase the credibility of the 
study. In addition, the most unique feature of this criterion is auditing: researchers keep 
all the materials that they have collected or used to conduct the qualitative research, 
including records of all the procedures, so that they can be reviewed by auditors. 
Although “there are very few examples of an audit trail approach” (Bryman and Becker, 
2012: 277), many qualitative reports still refer to their criteria (Creswell, 2013).  
 
Since this research forms a PhD study, an audit trail is not applicable. Although the 
PhD supervisors can play a similar role as auditor—the fieldwork and theorising 
findings were conducted under their supervision—, their position to give academic 
guidance to the student is different from that of auditors who should neutrally monitor 
the research. Subsequently, the author takes the adaptation position while paying 
attention to the basic idea of the replacement position, which still widely influences 
qualitative practice. Referring to the extant literature of qualitative research on 
migration (e.g. Beaverstock, 2004; Leonard, 2008; Favell, 2008; Ho, 2007; Liu-Farrer, 
2011a, 2011b; Oishi, 2012) was also helpful when considering validity and reliability. 
Based on the methodologies, the next section overviews how the research was 
designed and administered. 
 
4.3 Textual context 
Three kinds of textual data were collected as reference points throughout the research: 
the documents from employers’ organisations, the government, and informants. 
 
There are numerous proposals designed to improve migration policies, including visa 
issuance and welfare systems. For example, employers’ organisations such as the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and the European Business Council in 
Japan, regularly make these proposals and lobby to implement the policies. Among 
Japanese business circles, Keidanren is actively involved with policy formations, 
constantly issuing reports or proposals to reform the migration regime. Two more 
nationwide economic organisations, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
and Keizai doyukai also compile reports on labour and management from the business 
perspectives. The former focuses on the economic activities of small and medium 
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enterprises and the latter tend to propose liberal (as opposed to conservative) 
economic and social policies comparing to other business lobbying groups. The reports 
and proposals from various private organisations, regardless of their positions (i.e. 
domestic or foreign, scales of business, political stances), promoted understanding of 
the issues that HSMs and their employers face in Japan. 
 
Furthermore, the Japanese government has established official study groups to 
examine effective migration policies such as Kodo jinzai ukeire suishinkaigi (the 
Council for the Promotion of Acceptance of Highly Skilled Professionals) and 
Shutsunyukoku kanri kondankai (the advisory committee on immigration policies for 
the Minister of Justice) in Japan. These public bodies publish reports and 
recommendations, making public their meeting minutes or distributed materials to 
demonstrate in detail how they have reached their conclusions. In addition, the textual 
context was extended to the documents made or commissioned by METI, MOL, MIC 
and the Cabinet Ministry to grasp the overall landscape of policy discussions or 
coordination in the government. Gaikokujin shuju toshi kaigi [Council of Municipalities 
of Concentrated Foreign Residents] also offered documents to consider social 
cohesion and local issues. To comprehend the political discourses, the documents 
from the two major parties in Japan, (Liberal Democratic Party) LDP and (Democratic 
Party) DP, were referred to as well. Also, informants gave the author some materials, 
which include unofficial documents. These were meeting minutes, pamphlets, 
brochures and research reports. Some of them were specified as only a reference by 
the informants—it means they cannot be cited but referred to in interpreting the data 
and writing the dissertation.  
 
These documents were used to understand how migration policies for HSMs are 
discussed and designed, in addition to how employers and HSMs view the current 
policies. This textual context has also provided the basis or complementary data for 
the interviews in fixing the topic guide. 
 
4.4 Method: Interviews 
4.4.1 Data collection strategies 
As is often the case with qualitative inquiry in the PhD dissertation, data collection 
through interviews occupied the core part of this empirical research. Unlike the official 
documents, the interview data are not on the internet and should be gleaned from the 
fieldwork with a careful design. Because of the limited resources for the fieldwork, the 
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author was required to finish it within two months45. As a result, it was imperative to 
carefully design the data collection strategies so that enough data can be obtained in 
the most efficient manner. Given the limited resources, the author formulated four 
distinctive strategies of data collection: (1) no snowballing, (2) triangulation through a 
gatekeeper and personal network, (3) reaching former policy makers, and (4) multi-
stratifications of policy evaluation. These strategies with some novelties in the data 
collection —dare to say, experiments borne out of necessity—eventually contributed 
to the migration research methods as shown below. 
 
(1) No snowballing 
 
Generally, migration researchers are prone to using snowballing due to the challenging 
nature to identify relevant participants (Atkinson and Flint, 2001; Oishi, 2005) although 
it may undermine the quality of data (Bryman, 2016) by only covering specific groups. 
This research needed the data of not only migrants themselves but also policy experts, 
who have especially gone through policy formations in the government. Since it also 
required critical examination from multi-angle perspectives of actors who have been 
engaged in policy making in a different position, the sampling was carefully designed 
not to use snowballing to exclude the possibilities of one-side arguments. Besides, 
snowballing takes a long time since the researcher should wait to be introduced to new 
participants. As the fieldwork needed to be completed within two months, this was not 
realistic. 
 
Oishi (2012) and Tsukasaki (2008), the existing qualitative research in this area, 
employed snowball sampling which may incur the problems of validity. While these two 
studies have larger samples [Oishi (2012), 65 samples; Tsukasaki (2008), 68], the 
‘quality’ of my samples (45 samples) compensated for the small sample size. To sum 
up, this research focused on increasing the quality of data rather than the mere quantity, 
thereby adopting another methodological challenge from the extant literature to 




                                            
45 The author was given a special study leave from the employer and a scholarship from another institution to 
conduct the PhD research. Both institutions, namely the employer and scholarship sponsor, required the author to 
do research activities outside Japan. This means the duration that the author can stay in Japan during the study 
leave is limited. Therefore, the author reached an agreement with them to do the fieldwork in Japan for a minimum 
period (that was 1-2 months) to be in line with their expectations. 
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(2) Triangulation through a gatekeeper and personal network 
 
Participants were reached through the gatekeeper or author’s personal network. In the 
case of migration experts, the author directly contacted some of them by sending an 
email since we did not know each other. 
 
The gatekeeper of HSMs was the author’s employer, Keidanren, the largest employer 
organisation in Japan. It was established in 1946 as a non-government and non-profit 
organisation and is still privately funded by around 1,500 member companies and 
organisations. Their member companies are large enterprises representing Japan 
internationally. For instance, the top executives of renowned Japanese firms such as 
Toyota Motor Corporation and Canon have recently taken its chairmanship. Its slogan 
is ‘Policy and Action’; they formulate future oriented policy recommendations—
Policy—and work with stakeholders to implement the proposed policies—Action— 
(Keidanren, 2017). Their counterpart in the UK is the Confederation of British Industries 
(CBI); they have similar functions and reputation.  
 
As Keidanren represents the Japanese business community in policy making process, 
it has a list of their member companies actively involved in the migration debate. The 
gatekeeper in Keidanren introduced me to these companies, whose employees were 
the interviewees. A detailed sampling framework will be described later in this chapter.  
 
One of the advantages in using this sampling strategy is the availability of wider and 
more balanced samples than snowballing. Keidanren’s member companies stretch 
across various industries such as financial, electronics, energy, IT (both manufacturing 
and services), automotive, chemical, food, real estate, conglomerates, all of which 
were the sectors the informants worked for. In addition, the character of the companies 
is quite diversified in terms of business orientation (international or domestic) and 
corporate culture (traditional, venture or foreign affiliated). It is possible to choose 
samples from these wide choices and take a balance of the samples such as 
nationalities, age ranges, gender, titles, professional experiences and types, visa 
categories, and educational backgrounds. The wide and balanced samples together 
with strict purposive sampling strategies are arguably one of the greatest strengths of 
this research. 
 
Having said that, it is expected that Keidanren’s network has some limitations: it does 
not cover some cohorts such as the self-employed (e.g. interpreter), academic 
researchers (e.g. professor in university) or foreign language teachers. These samples 
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were found through personal networks. This is a triangulation, which helped assess 
the validity of the data (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006; Bryman, 2016; Creswell, 2014). 
Triangulation is a technique using different data sources (or methods) to unpack the 
same social issue. It means the social issue is examined from different angles through 
the comparison of the different sets of data, thereby cross-checking the data to 
enhance the validity of research (Mason, 2012). 
 
For instance, as Keidanren’s members are large-scale and established corporations 
—one of the requirements to be its member is being listed on the stock exchange or 
its equivalent—, their employees are also elites enjoying stable and well-paid jobs. If 
the informants had been only confined within these elite cohorts, the research may 
have had ended up biased or at least looked at only one dimension—HSMs in a large 
firm. Thus, personal networks were mainly employed to recruit participants whom 
Keidanren does not cover due to its organisational nature.  
 
The informants recruited via personal networks include a start-up entrepreneur, the 
self-employed (interpreter/translator) and HSMs in a non-profit sector (e.g. 
academics/teachers). As triangulation is particularly useful in revealing the multi-
dimensions and diversities of social phenomena (Mason, 2012) in addition to 
increasing the validity, the data collection from the two different sources have 
successfully brought illuminative findings such as precarious HSMs whom were only 
observed through the personal network as shown in the findings chapters (see Chapter 
5 for more details). In conclusion, the distinctiveness of this research is the double 
strategy, namely (1) triangulation of the interviewed HSMs and (2) no snowballing, to 
ensure the validity with a relatively smaller sample size. 
 
(3) Reaching former policy makers 
 
The research also involved migration experts along with HSMs46 and there were three 
strategies in collecting data from them. First, the recruitment covered ranges of 
migration experts. They were recruited from the government (bureaucrats) but also 
included various stakeholders from business sectors, immigration lawyers, 
researchers and so forth on the condition that all of them have been involved in the 
migration debate in Japan (e.g. member of advisory board in the government). In so 
doing, migration policies and process were dynamically sketched out. 
 
                                            
46 Some of the migration experts were also migrants although they were labelled as experts. 
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Second, all the interviewed policy makers are (were) high ranked officers across 
Ministries (higher than Director level) who are often hard to reach. For instance, the 
headquarters of Immigration Bureau has only 13 Directorate posts although the total 
number of officials working for the Bureau stands at 4,614 in FY 2017 (Immigration 
Bureau, 2017b). This accounts for how elite these Directors are.  
 
As the policy making process involves political decision, accessing high level officers 
involved in the whole process is crucial to understand what happens there. Also, to 
grasp the specific characteristics of migration policies and its reforming process, 
interviewees should be well experienced in public governance so that they can 
compare the process with other policies. Usually, a Director (Kacho) in the Ministry is 
a main actor in shaping policies since s/he leads coordination within the Ministry or 
negotiations with other Ministries in reaching a consensus to reform policies. They also 
give a briefing to their Minister or visit politicians to explain the policies. Therefore, they 
are cognisant of the practical process and issues of policy formations and negotiations 
through their experiences, making them ideal informants in corroborating migration 
governance.  
 
Last, former officials were mainly recruited to glean their frank views. The incumbent 
officers normally repeat their Ministry’s basic stance and are not positive to reveal their 
personal opinions—it is quite natural because they accept the interview in their official 
role rather than privately. In contrast, the former policy makers are not bound by their 
former position and are free from these constraints. In addition, looking back the 
debates can make them reflect on the process impartially on the basis of its outcome, 
while estimating the current policy may be premature due to lack of data. This research 
particularly shed light on governmental decisions made in the past to unpack the 
process and actors. Hence, it was appropriate to interview the policy makers who were 
involved as high officials.  
 
(4) Multi-stratifications of policy evaluation 
 
One of the aims of this research is to give policy implications and this can be done only 
by assessing the current policies. For this purpose, policies were evaluated carefully 
by the wider stakeholders, including migration experts, former policy makers (ex post 
facto), and most importantly, users—HSMs. The Japanese government attempts to 
attract more HSMs in order to enhance industrial competitiveness and bring innovation 
(Kodo jinzai ukeire suishin kaigi, 2009; Immigration Bureau, 2017b), hence it is 




This is critically related to RQ 5 (Migration governance) which illuminated the policy 
making process. Although the majority of data used for the analysis was from migration 
experts, it took customer satisfaction into consideration to find out to what extent policy 
makers think it is practical. In other words, the analysis was not just constructed by 
experts’ views but supported by the data from migrants. This is also another form of 
triangulation puzzling out the dynamism and ramifications of migration governance.  
 
4.4.2 Sampling framework 
Highly skilled migrants 
 
This research adopted purposive sampling. As already discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, 
the definition of HSMs in this research is in line with the visa categories that the 
government prescribes as specialist and technical visa 47  (formally, status of 
residence). Therefore, the participants were chosen from those who have these 
categories of visa. Nonetheless, there were some exceptions: three people had 
permanent residency and two people had Japanese-spouse visa instead of the 
specialist and technical visa. In this case, I checked two points which are the 
requirements for obtaining the specialist and technical visa: (1) university graduate and 
(2) white-collar full-time. All of them satisfied these two conditions, subsequently 
matching the criteria. The other conditions included living in Japan for at least a year. 
As the research investigated how institutional and social conditions that surround 
HSMs should be improved to attract more HSMs, the informants were expected to live 
in Japan for a certain period to account for the questions asked. 
 
Based on the criteria, I asked the gatekeeper (who was working for Economic Policy 
Bureau in Keidanren) to approach their member companies and have approval of 
interviewing one of the migrants working for their companies. If the company agreed 
to join the research, they introduced me to potential interviewee(s). The approached 
companies were chosen by the gatekeeper alongside balancing business sectors 
(manufacturing, services, domestic, multinational, foreign affiliated and so forth) on 
consultation with me.  
 
The recruitment process had started before the author left the UK and some of the 
appointments were set up before arriving in Tokyo. In the earlier stage of the fieldwork, 
the choice of migrants was left to the approached companies. Yet, in the latter stage 
                                            
47 Except for Artist, Entertainer and Religious Activities as explained earlier 
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of the fieldwork, when some of them asked me if there are any preferences in 
nationalities or occupational types (e.g. engineers or administrative), I referred to some 
of the attributions which were scarce in the existing sampling such as female or 
Europeans. This is because the majority of interviewees in the first half of the fieldwork 
were Asian males and there was a need to balance the second half of the fieldwork 
although it is natural that the Asian respondents occupy the majority given the 
population (c.f. Chapter 3).  
 
With personal network, I mainly used my friends’ social network. I asked some of my 
friends and acquaintances to advertise my recruitment via email or social network 
services. The respondents who saw the advertisement contacted me directly via email. 
No snowballing was used even though some of them told me they could introduce their 
friends. 
 
The recruiting process for both gatekeeper and personal network worked better than 
expected as I expected around 20 samples of HSMs in total before starting the 
interview. This is partly because there were only two enterprises (telecommunications 
and securities) which declined to join the research via gatekeeper. They explained they 




Purposive sampling was also applied to migration experts although the recruiting 
process is somehow different from that of HSMs. First, conditions to screen the 
respondents as migration experts were categorised into two groups. The first group 
was policy experts who were involved in policy discussions such as policy makers (civil 
servants) or advisory board members of the government. Some employers’ 
organisations or migrant employers can also be categorised into this group since they 
are active in recruiting migrants or giving policy proposals. The second group is 
specialists in migration such as researchers, career consultant and immigration 
lawyers. 
 
As I was involved in the migration debate in the government between 2008 and 2012 
as a policy officer in Keidanren, I already knew some of the policy makers and experts 
interviewed. In such cases, I sent them emails directly to ask for appointments 
explaining the research aims. All but one agreed to join the research. I also sent emails 
to former officers or academics to hear their views although I did not know them. Their 
email address was on the website of their current affiliates such as research institutions. 
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Besides, I also directly sent emails to institutions including a recruiting agency, 
university, NPOs and so forth to fix the appointments with the specialists in migration 
employment or entrepreneurship. 
 
This recruitment also went well except for foreign chambers of commerce. I contacted 
several foreign chambers of commerce in Tokyo but most of them did not respond to 
my emails. I made phone calls to solicit them for the interviews but most of them did 
not respond to the requests either. Some of them said they would talk to the boss but 
they never replied. I would raise two reasons for their negative reactions. One reason 
is that they were scarcely staffed. Usually it is run by only a few people and this possibly 
discouraged them to respond to the requests. The other is that those who were 
reluctant are not so interested in policy affairs as they perceive their role as business 
matching and socialisation of the members. As evidence, their stances on migration 
policies were not on their websites. On the contrary, the foreign employers’ 
organisations interviewed are active in lobbying to bring policy makers’ or the general 
public’s attention to their interests.  
  
4.4.3 Basic framework of the interviews 
Based on these strategies, 45 semi-structured interviews were conducted from 
November to December 2015 in the greater Tokyo area, containing 60% of all the 
HSMs (e-stat, 2017) and Japan’s administrative/political centre. Each interview lasted 
around one hour (in some cases, two hours). All the interviews were previously 
arranged in emails explaining the purpose of the research. A participant information 
sheet and informed consent form were sent to them prior to the appointment. The 
interviews were conducted in either the participant’s office or public spaces such as 
café in line with participants’ preferences. Some of the informants (via personal 
networks) spared time during their off-time although the vast majority participated 
during office hours. 
 
All the informants are listed in Appendix 1 with their attributions: occupation, citizenship, 
gender, age, languages used, and recruiting methods for HSMs; former or current 
affiliates, the types of policy engagement for migration experts. 
 
The respondents of HSMs composed 15 Asians and 11 Westerners (total 26 people) 
whose ages ranged between 25 and 58 with the number of male participants at 18 and 
female 8. The ratio of Western informants (42%) is largely overrepresented considering 
it only stands at 16% of all the HSMs (e-stat, 2017). This can be justified on the grounds 
that the research involves comparative analysis between the Asian and Western HSMs 
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to unfold the puzzles discussed earlier. The female ratio of the informants (42%) is 
slightly larger than that of the population (32%). Fifteen informants were found through 
the gatekeeper. 
 
Approximately, two-thirds of interviews were conducted in Japanese and the rest were 
in English. As the author speaks both Japanese and English, no interpreters were 
employed. All the informants were also fluent in either (or both) language(s). After a 
few initial interviews, the author decided to first ask an informant which language to 
use during the interview48. This is because one of the informants (Jack, a native English 
speaker) spoke Japanese no sooner than we met although we contacted each other 
in English before the appointment, which made the author free of the preconception 
that an Anglophone wishes to speak in English. An informant (Eric) used both 
Japanese and English—he chose to be asked questions in Japanese and answer in 
English. Other informants who mainly used English also sometimes cited a Japanese 
word or phrase, which occasionally bore illuminative connotations as shown in the 
findings-chapters; when an English speaker specifically used a Japanese phrase, it 
means their perception can be best (or only) described in that special Japanese phrase. 
It is a significant signal indicating their potential idea, which even they are not aware 
of in their discourses. The languages used were maintained in both transcription and 
analysis to preserve these specificities although the data in Japanese were translated 
into English when cited. 
 
4.4.4 Analysis 
Analysis is the process of summarising or synthesising the data from the fieldwork. 
This research used thematic analysis, which is appropriate to inductively extract 
patterns and meanings of social phenomena (Spencer et al., 2014). Before the 
thematic analysis, raw data from interviews was transcribed, followed by coding and 
linking them with the research questions (Bryman, 2016).  
 
Coding is an important analytical process to categorise the data systematically into 
themes. In coding, text data collected from the interviews are segmented into blocks 
of phrases or sentences, which are categorised and labelled with themes (Creswell, 
2014). The coding and analysis were conducted through Framework, which is a matrix-
based format to index and sort the data (Spencer et al., 2014). This is an exploratory 
research into the significant agencies and actors attracting HSMs to Japan. Therefore, 
the data were categorised into several central themes related to the research questions 
                                            
48 Except for cases in which an informant appointed English as a working language when fixing the appointment.  
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such as the reasons why HSMs have chosen a specific country to work and factors 
relating to migration policies that have influenced their decisions. Then, the central 
themes were further broken down into sub-themes. In this way, the Framework enables 
moving back and forth between the data in different levels and subthemes (Spencer et 
al., 2014; Mason, 2002), subsequently establishing the patterns. In the analytical 
process, I especially focused on (1) repetitions, (2) metaphors or analogies, and (3) 
similarities and differences (Bryman, 2016). These are good signals to find significant 
agencies and actors at play in the informants’ decision making.  
 
One of the sensitive factors was translation. As the fieldwork employed the two 
languages, the data itself were a mix of different languages. Much care was paid to 
interpretations since the meaning of the words might be different between the 
languages depending on the contexts. For example, in English, citizenship can be also 
described as nationality although Japanese has only one word to describe it: ‘kokuseki’. 
The Japanese government uses ‘nationality’ as the translation of this word (e.g. 
Immigration Bureau, 2007; Immigration Act). Nonetheless, precisely speaking, 
citizenship has a different connotation to nationality in English (Ho, 2007). Hence, the 
analysis was carefully done in catching all the nuances from the informants, always 
replicating the interview situations in my mind. The emphasis on nuances was also 
maintained in reporting the data since Japanese was translated into English in citation. 
The challenges and issues concerning translation (Larkin et al., 2007) are discussed 
in the last part. 
 
4.4.5 Ethics 
It is of the greatest importance not to harm anyone while conducting the research, and 
for this purpose, “two basic principles, informed consent and anonymity”, were applied 
(Cook et al., 2012: 334). 
 
Considering that qualitative research aims to reveal “people’s social and material 
circumstances, their experiences, perspectives and histories” (Ormston et al., 2014: 
23) through direct contact with them, interviewees are to be respected and protected. 
Specifically, the research purpose, means of making it public, requirements and details 
of the data management including how to protect confidentiality and its limits were 
clearly explained to the interviewees at the outset and their consent in writing or orally 
recording was obtained. It should also be mentioned that interviewees have the right 
to refuse to answer questions or withdraw from the research whenever they decide. 
The researcher should turn off the recorder at their request albeit this request was 




Practically, this research was approved by the ethical review from the School for Policy 
Studies Research Ethics Committee and guaranteed to conform to its Guidelines. In 
line with the Guidelines, the participant information and informed consent sheet 
explaining the above ethical principles were sent to the participants in advance. At the 
outset of the interview, I always explained about the aim and principles in brief and 
reconfirmed their consent. All the interviews were digitally recorded upon their consent 
except for two cases where the participants preferred not to be recorded.  
 
Apart from the fieldwork, the researcher should always be aware that ethical issues 
also arise “during several phases of the research process, and they are ever expanding 
in scope as inquiries become more sensitive to the needs of participants” (Creswell, 
2013: 56). Above all, when researching vulnerable people, greater attention should be 
paid in light of their social and physical vulnerability. According to Liamputtong (2012), 
migrants are vulnerable and need to be treated more carefully when conducting 
research. For example, to ensure confidentiality and anonymity, this research made all 
possible effort to respect their privacy, such as “assign(ing) fictitious names” so that 
individuals cannot be identified (Creswell, 2013: 59). In addition, where it is necessary, 
I did not reveal the detailed attributions of the informants in this dissertation. For 
instance, I erased the visa types from the list of participants because if there is detailed 
information on the informants, this may help identify them. For the same reasons, I 
expunged the current affiliates of the interviewed former-policy makers. The risk that 
the general public can identify them seems to be low. However, as the ‘circle’ of 
migration experts is small enough to recognise the source, it might be easy for the 
‘circle’ members to discern them. In sum, confidentiality of the informants was weighed 
more than the research product. 
 
Data storage and security are also indispensable to protect confidentiality. The contact 
details of the participants, the list of participants, consent forms, audio-recorded data 
are separately stored with password lock whenever available. I carefully kept the 
computers from cyber-attack such as updating the software regularly and keeping 
email security high. In addition, I carefully stored the memory media in locked lockers. 
The hard copy data containing information of participants were also stored in separate 
locked lockers. In this way, both the soft and hard data were securely managed to 




4.5 Challenges and limitations 
4.5.1 Sensitivities 
Vulnerable people such as migrants are likely to be harmed by sensitive questions 
about themselves. Therefore, no harm to the researched is essential. In addition, it 
might be possible that the interviewees do not speak the truth or raise significant points 
because of certain sensitivities. Dickson-Swift et al. (2008: 8) raise the importance of 
building a relationship of mutual trust when conducting interviews with vulnerable 
groups, saying “the quality of the data collected may be dependent of the researcher’s 
ability to develop an intimate and ongoing relationship with the participant”. Although 
the ethical issues are fully examined, it must be admitted that as the interview is an 
intervention, it influences the participants to a greater or lesser degree. For this reason, 
researchers should always think of ways to mitigate the negative intervention. I 
therefore sought to improve my communication skills like creating a frank environment 
using plain expressions (e.g. visa rather than status of residence) or keeping eye 
contact. 
 
In discussing sensitivities, the necessity to research vulnerable groups should be 
examined as well. Because of its potential difficulties, researching vulnerable groups 
is often shunned by academics (Liamputtong, 2012). Hence, researchers must also be 
aware of the significance to bring people’s attention to those who are neglected in 
society as Liamputtong (2012: 75) articulates “the needs and concerns of vulnerable 
people are often ignored in the scientific literature. This will make these people even 
more vulnerable”. As social researchers, it should be also our role to disseminate the 
views of minority groups and to implement the relevant policies to improve their life 
circumstances. 
 
4.5.2 Sample size 
The sample size of this research was 45 in total. It might be argued that the sample 
size is comparatively modest to truly unfold the labyrinth of highly skilled migration if 
not too small. However, “a key characteristic of qualitative samples is that they are 
relatively small in size. This enables in-depth exploration of the phenomena under 
investigation” (Ritchies et al., 2014: 112). Ritchie et al. (2014) also claim that sample 
size does not simply reflect the contribution to knowledge. It is widely known that 
however many samples, if the samples are confined within the idiosyncratic group, the 
social research loses its validity. This suggests that if the quality of sample is ensured, 
the sample size itself can be accordingly small (Sato, 2015). Indeed, sampling 
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strategies not only include the size of sample but also how to select the samples. 
Based on this idea, this survey was designed to use triangulation and no snowballing 
to enhance the quality of the data.  
 
In fact, it has been widely discussed how many interviews is enough, but there is no 
shared answer yet. What is commonly understood is it depends (Baker and Edwards, 
2012). The qualitative sample size hugely relies on the research aims, analytical 
methods, characteristics of population, and types of research questions (Bryman, 
2012). If these conditions are satisfied, even one interview is enough (Denzin, 2012). 
 
Saturation is also considered a signal during the period of fieldwork (Mason, 2002, 
Baker and Edwards, 2012; Creswell, 2014). However, it is a little risky to use saturation. 
Reflexively, saturation is very subjective and can be a good excuse to finish the data 
collection, for it is easy to say that we have reached saturation, but it is hard to verify 
the ‘real’ saturation; the data are entirely depending on the interview techniques and 
sampling. Saturation can solely be attained after repeating numbers of interviews 
which finally confirm no new data. In other words, even if a researcher cannot find new 
data from a few interviews in the last stage of the fieldwork, it does not necessarily 
point to saturation. In addition, there are possibilities that another researcher can draw 
out new data from the same informants. Personally, I feel saturation can be judged 
only when a researcher gains enough experience to do scores of high quality studies. 
Therefore, even though I felt a kind of saturation in my fieldwork, I would not articulate 
that it was saturated. 
 
Apart from saturation, Bryman (2012) indicates there are expected requirements for 
sample size. For instance, Warren (2002) suggests the minimum number of interviews 
is between 20 and 30 despite the fact that it depends on other conditions. Bryman 
(2012) also supports this view considering Mason (2010) reported that the mean 
average PhD dissertation in the UK and Ireland was 31 with the median 28. In this light, 
my sample size of 45 is justifiable for the PhD research. 
 
Seal (2012: 286) indicates another point focusing on the inductive nature of qualitative 
research which is devoted to discovering what happens; metaphorically speaking, 
“instead of seeking to describe how many red, or black, or oval pebbles there are on a 
beach, the qualitative researcher may be researching for the pebbles that stand out 
from the rest”. Further to this feature, Arber (2001: 58–9) insists that the sample 
strategies are to be designed according to what the researcher attempts to find from 
the qualitative approach: “Some researchers select samples in order to maximise 
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theoretical understanding, while others are primarily concerned to obtain a 
representative sample to make inferences about a whole population”. Therefore, it is 
more important to choose the appropriate sampling strategies to fit the research 
purpose than merely discussing the size itself. For instance, if the purpose of the 
research is grounded theory, the sample size should be larger. Nonetheless, as this 
research aims for an explanatory understanding of the motivation of HSMs, which is 
not clear from the statistics, the sample size of 45 would not be problematic. 
 
4.5.3 Translation 
All the interviews were transcribed in the original languages the informants used. The 
data in Japanese, however, was translated into English when it is cited. Translation in 
qualitative analysis has not been the main academic focus (Lendvai and Bainton, 
2013). Yet, languages are the crucial element to make up the qualitative findings, and 
subsequently the appropriateness of translation directly influences validity (Edwards, 
1998). 
 
To maintain the validity of qualitative research, Larkin et al. (2007) propose four criteria 
for translation: cohesion, congruence, clarity, and courtesy. Cohesion means striking 
a good balance between translators’ knowledge of the language and researchers’ 
knowledge of the theme. If this balance is well kept, in-depth understandings on 
language-sensitive issues will be possible. Congruence describes how to find 
equivalent word(s) when translating into a foreign language. It is well known that 
different translators use different words when the target language of translation does 
not have the same concept. Clarity is important when a word has more than two 
different meanings that a foreign language does not have. Clarity “enables clear 
meaning to emerge in much the same way as the detail of woven threadwork reveals 
something of the mastery of the designer” (Larkin et al. 2007, 472). Courtesy is 
associated with the extent to which a translator maintains the formality of the language. 
In some cases, if a translator uses informal language, the data from the interview might 
change. 
 
Although an interpreter is not employed in this survey, by regarding the author as an 
interpreter who collaborates in the research, these criteria were applied to increase the 
validity of the research. However, it was challenging to keep these rules on my own. I 
sometimes consult bilingual friends or academics on how they translate some of the 
data. Their translations were different, but it helped identify how to convey the message 




In addition to these criteria, Gawlewicz (2016: 31) raises “the linguistic competence of 
the translator/s; the translator’s knowledge of the culture of the people under study; the 
autobiography of those involved in the translation and the circumstances in which the 
translation takes place” as significant factors when conducting research on migration. 
One of the interesting points that she makes is about autobiography: any auxiliary 
information on the researched enhances the quality of translation. For example, many 
of my informants used social media such as Facebook or LinkedIn, which helped 
understand the contexts of their accounts. It may not be autobiography exactly, but it 
had a similar function. 
 
In some cases, such as elite interviews, there is a way to aid the translation with 
existing texts, which could represent interviewees’ views. For example, MOJ compiles 
reports on migration issues in English so that they can be internationally recognised. 
Referring to these texts when translating was also helpful in terms of reporting the 
findings appropriately. In this sense, textual context was useful to cross-check the 
appropriateness of the translation.  
 
4.5.4 Positionality 
In qualitative research involving minorities such as migrant and handicapped persons, 
researchers need to reflect themselves and explain their social and personal position 
since their positionality influences the data (Rose, 1997; Sanchez-Ayala, 2012). 
Typically, positionality is based on various factors, to name a few: nationality, age, 
language, gender, social class and physical factors (Shinozaki, 2012; Ow Yong, 2018). 
There are two arguments associated with positionality in this research: one is ‘power’ 
balance between researcher and participants and the other is ‘insider’/ ‘outsider’. 
 
Using Keidanren’s network and my position as one of its employees might affect the 
responses of the interviewees in terms of the relationship between the participants and 
me. Keidanren is the most powerful employers’ organisation in Japan (Vogel, 2006), 
composed of corporate executives. And their employees were the participants 
identified through the Keidanren network. As a result, the interviewees might hesitate 
to talk frankly about their employers and colleagues for fear that their remarks can be 
identified by their employers. 
 
It is true that they work for one of the member companies of Keidanren; however, 
Keidanren and I are not allowed to open any information regarding the interviewees 
according to Japan’s Personal Information Act and the ethics rules. I strictly honoured 
this rule: Keidanren did not ask me to reveal such personal data either. Instead, I 
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compiled a brief report describing what kind of policy issues affect the life of HSMs 
drawn from the initial analysis. The data in the report was aggregated; therefore, the 
informants were not identified by their employers. This process was explained to the 
participants thoroughly to ensure their understanding of the confidentiality in this 
research. 
 
Being an employee of Keidanren might also have influenced the informants of the 
personal network. In the recruiting process, I clarified my two positions that I was a 
PhD student and at the same time under the employment of Keidanren. If a participant 
is cognisant of what Keidanren does, it might give them a kind of impression that I 
represent the pro-business ideology or conservative side. Whether or not I have such 
views, the external attributions of the researcher can be a good signal to the 
informants 49 . Actually, Keidanren is deemed a strong supporter of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, the ruling party, and perceived to be embody a liberal economy 
based on market mechanism (Crump, 2003). 
 
In addition, although my position would not have directly influenced the data since it is 
unlikely that I would report the data to their employers, it might have affected the 
recruitment: it is possible that pro-business participants more eagerly joined the 
research than the less pro-business. For example, there were possibilities that some 
of the participants were more likely to be interested in my position in Keidanren than 
the PhD project and approached me. On the other hand, someone critical of 
Neoliberalism might not be interested in the participation. This may have led to 
research bias towards pro-business theory. Fortunately, I was able to gather the data 
of precarity of migrant life from the informants who were relatively in less economically 
advantageous positions than the gatekeeper’s respondents. Still, I must admit that my 
professional position should be taken into consideration in critically reading this 
dissertation. 
 
Apart from the professional position, I must also acknowledge my social position (male, 
Japanese) may have affected the data. It was possible that the participants might 
regard me—a Japanese citizen—as an ‘outsider’ who does not share their ethnicities 
and nationalities, their mother languages as a native speaker and social background. 
Being a member of Japanese-native-society, I studied minority perceptions through 
their experience; the data collected might have been different from that collected by an 
                                            
49 Imagine if someone attached to the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) is looking for research participants, 
it is natural to assume they are doing research from business perspectives. Very few people assume they research 
into charity. Or, if someone on study leave from the European Commission administers research, many people 
would think it is likely to be pro-EU than Eurosceptic.  
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‘insider’ who is, for instance, in a migrant position like the participants. For instance, 
Liu-Farrer (2011a, 2011b) unpacked various struggles of Chinese migrants in Japan 
from gender discrimination in small and medium enterprises to underground life of 
irregular migrants. Being of Chinese origin, she was successful in retrieving sensitive 
and nuanced realities that migrants cannot tell ‘outsiders’. This may be what I did not 
achieve in this dissertation. 
 
However, it is known that the boundary deciding ‘insider’/‘outsider’ is not so obvious 
and changing when the interviews are going on since each person has a different 
background ultimately (Ganga and Scott, 2006; Pechurina, 2013). The important thing 
is to make a relaxed atmosphere where the participants can talk frankly and to redraw 
(or clear) the boundary so that they can trust the researcher (Shinozaki, 2012). In this 
sense, the interview techniques are more influencing factors than whether being 
‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ (Sanchez-Ayala, 2012). For this purpose, I kept the following 
ground rules to make participants comfortable in speaking honestly: 
 
• Not to give an impression of being interrogated by offering them opportunities 
to freely ask questions to me and be willing to answer—being interactive; 
• To choose familiar words/phrases to make an informal atmosphere and 
overcome language barriers. For instance, as described earlier, I used ‘visa’ 
instead of ‘status of residence’ although the definitions are legally different; 
• To show sympathy by nodding and never challenging the remarks; 
• To weaken the sensitivity of questions and give a concrete image through a 
question. For example, when I check their social occasions with the native 
population, I asked “do you sometimes hang out with Japanese friends when 
you are off?”, which is better than “do you have any good Japanese friends?” 
 
In this way, I devised and restructured the order and contents of questions so that the 
informants could find their potential ideas. 
 
4.5.5 What is a good interview? 
The challenges discussed here were all about ‘what is a good interview?’ which I have 
repeatedly asked myself through the PhD. It all depends on the types and aims of the 
qualitative research (e.g. exploratory or grounded theory approach). In this dissertation, 
one of the aims was to unpack migration patterns and the decision-making process, 
which are not clear from statistical data. In this regard, I kept reflecting on the interviews 




I established a way to assess the quality of interview—by quality, I mean how deeply I 
was able to draw out the informants’ perceptions. Some of the informants said that the 
interviews made them find something they had not realised. When they encountered 
the ‘discovery’, the interview time got longer than initially planned because they also 
posed questions to me. This is indeed a good sign for a high ‘quality’ interview. I was 
successful in unravelling their potential perceptions throughout the interview process. 
On the other hand, if an interview is something mediocre and undiscovering, they 
would not pose any questions to me: they would like to go back to their office or home 
as soon as possible.  
 
This throws light on an important aspect of qualitative survey unlike a quantitative one: 
a good interview should be illuminative for both the researcher and the researched. An 
interview which is always one way—from the researched to the researcher—is not 
emancipatory for either. It is important to keep in our minds that an interview is a 
research method intervening into personal territory making a participant (re)draw or 
realise the internal boundaries. In a sense, qualitative research is a shared-journey 
where a researcher is a tour operator and participants are the guests exploring their 
own life story. Accordingly, we should conduct an emancipatory tour. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
To address the research questions, this research employed qualitative methods that 
are appropriate for making sense of people’s decisions and its contexts (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2013). Specifically, the inductive and interpretivist nature of the methods 
(Bryman and Becker, 2012; Ormston et al., 2014; Mason, 2002) allowed in-depth 
analysis of the process and reasons for migratory decisions or policy failures. 
 
On the other hand, the weakness of the qualitative methods was also discussed to 
examine how to overcome these challenges. This chapter first set out philosophical 
underpinnings predicating the research design, which are different from the 
quantitative methods. Then, the last part of the chapter provided detailed accounts for 
potential risks and challenges lying in the fieldwork and analytical process, especially, 
in the four areas: sensitivities, sample size, translation, and positionality. Above all, 
some of the distinctive challenges to be overcome were translation and positionality, 
which have not been the central focus of leading scholarship such as transnational 
elite geographies (Salt, 1983, 1988; Findlay et al., 1996; Beaverstock, 2002, 2005; 
Beaverstock and Broadwell, 2000) and middling mobility (Willis and Yeoh, 2002; 
Conradson and Latham, 2005a; Yeoh and Willis, 2005; Leonard, 2008, 2010). By 
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shedding light on these epistemological aspects, this research also attempts to present 
academic contributions. 
 




Chapter 5 Obstacles in Public Policies and Society 
(Findings 1) 
  
All the services—whether it is commercial or public— provided in Japan  
are designed so that Japanese nationals use them. Foreigners are  
not assumed to use them.   Informant (Yang) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to contextualise the background motivation of the HSMs together 
with social obstacles they encounter in their daily life. It particularly answers RQ1&2 
through the theoretical lens of transnational elite geographies. In so doing, the chapter 
presents three keys to exploring the labyrinth: antithetical trajectories between Asian 
and Western migrants, hidden barriers in public policies, and the lack of diversity in 
Japanese society. 
 
As shown previously, the number of Asian and western HSMs in Japan has remarkably 
demonstrated contrastive patterns—rapidly surging numbers of Asians and constantly 
stagnant numbers of westerners. Therefore, the first section delineates why and how 
they migrated to Japan employing two contrasting yet representative vignettes. This 
also guides us to understand how Japan is perceived or stigmatised by potential HSMs. 
Then the next part presents several issues in public policies such as immigration 
control and social security. In the extant literature, Japanese immigration control has 
been regarded as relatively restriction-free (Oishi, 2012, 2014; Holbrow, 2017); 
however, the research points to new policy issues affecting the life of HSMs and 
invisible precarious cohorts whom the skilled-migration researchers have overlooked. 
This chapter also sheds light on how the lack of diversity brings societal barriers for 
HSMs; one of the typical examples is the educational system where every child is 
expected to behave the same. The homogeneous nature of Japanese society 
distresses HSMs by cramming them into the ‘prescribed boxes’ drawn from insular 
social norms. 
 
Even though the cultural barriers uniformly confront HSMs, different attitudes toward 
accumulating social capital have been observed with Asian and Western migrants. The 
past scholarly works suggest the wider cultural gap between the migrants and locals 
urges the migrants to forge stronger compatriot networks in the host country (Lee, 
1966; Saxenian, 2006; Scott, 2007; Harvey, 2008; Harvey and Beaverstock, 2017). 
The last part of the chapter examines why this classical model does not apply to 
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Japan’s case, thereby presenting a unique and novel pattern of migrants’ network 
formation alongside its potential risk.  
 
5.2 Trajectories contrasted: Discipline vs Walkabout? 
Before going into detailed discussion on barriers confronting HSMs, it should be 
explained how HSMs came to work in Japan since this background reveals how they 
perceive Japan as a place to work and live. While the literature foregrounds studying 
in Japan as the initial stage linking Asian HSMs to Japan (Chiavacci, 2017; Tsukasaki, 
2008; Liu-Farrer, 2011a), this section provides more precise explorations breaking 
down the attributions such as countries of origin and professional background so as to 
chart the mobility patterns of each migrant type. 
 
5.2.1 Remarkable contrast between the Asian and Western migrants 
The fieldwork pointed to five main routes where HSMs gained their first contact with 
Japan: (1) studied in Japanese university (or secondary school), (2) intracompany 
transfer, (3) recruited abroad to work in Japan, (4) came to Japan as an English teacher, 
then changed jobs, (5) marriage. There are stark distinctions between Asian and 
Western HSMs in the routes and motivation as seen in the table below50 describing 
how the respondents eventually came to Japan. 
 
Table 5-1 Categorised routes by migrants’ origins in the interviews 
 Asian HSMs Western HSMs 
Study 9 5 
Intracompany transfer 3 1 
Recruited abroad 2 1 
English teacher 1 3 
Marriage 0 1 
Total 15 11 
Source: the fieldwork 
 
This table, however, has inexorable limitations to show the complicated nature of 
migrants’ trajectories. A good example is a respondent51 who had been educated in 
                                            
50 The table shows the absolute number of the respondents categorised. It should be noted that this table aims to 
clarify the types of interviewed migrants and has no statistical meaning and representation as the source is not 
from quantitative but qualitative samplings.  
51 His nationality/age range cannot be shown here to protect his anonymity since his background is so unique that 
one may identify him based on the data shown here. 
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Japan until he became 15 years old due to his parent’s job. He eventually married a 
Japanese citizen whom he met in his ‘home’ country’s university and came to Japan 
to commence his professional career—he obtained a spouse visa but worked for an 
administrative department in a Japanese manufacturing firm for a few years until he 
moved to his home country. Over a decade later, he came back to Japan again as an 
intracompany transferee and has since worked in Japan. In this case, he was 
categorised into ‘marriage’ since his initial voluntary decision to move to Japan was 
family reunification. However, it is possible to declare he also belongs to ‘study’ or 
‘intracompany transfer’. This case in fact tells the complexity of migrants’ trajectories; 
however, it is necessary to code the complicated stories into stratifications or 
classifications to induct theories with the limitations in mind. 
 
The majority of Asian HSMs, except for Indians, came to Japan to study at the initial 
stage. While some of them (3 out of 9) were exchange students on undergraduate 
degrees, the rest did master’s degrees after completing one to two years in Japanese 
language schools. This investment in acquiring language skills is one of the notable 
barriers for the western migrant to migrate to Japan. The comparison between the 
following tables show an interesting tendency indicating this barrier. For both Asian 
and western HSMs, study is the most common route to come to Japan in the first 
instance. Nonetheless, none of the westerners obtained a degree in Japan except for 
a PhD holder who was in a double degree programme with an overseas university and 
did the PhD research in English. This is because all the western HSMs of study-route 
came under the one-year exchange programme. In contrast, nearly half of the Asian 
HSMs (6 out of 15), who share Chinese characters (Chinese ethnics) or a similar 
language system (Korean) completed a formal degree programme in Japanese. As 
there is a language barrier and huge investment to overcome it, the western migrants 





Table 5-2 The breakdown by the highest degree gained by respondents 




Japanese Univ. 2 0 
Overseas Univ. 6 (3*) 7 (2*) 
MA/MSc Japanese Univ. 4 0 
Overseas Univ. 3 2 
PhD Japanese Univ. 0 1 ** 
Overseas Univ. 0 1 
Total   15 11 
* A number in brackets indicates Science or Engineering degree. 
** A double degree with an overseas university, but the respondent was mostly based 
in Japan 
Source: the fieldwork 
 
Table 5-3 The breakdown of academic majors of overseas students in Japan  
 Percentage of the total 
Humanities 45.2% 
Social Sciences 26.4% 
Engineering 11.8% 
Other  16.6% 
Total 100% 
*FY 2015 survey 
Source: Japan Student Services Organisation (2016) 
 
All of the study-route respondents majored in Social Sciences or Humanities in Japan 
with the figure a little over-representing, considering the statistical data of all the 
overseas students. Especially in the case of Asian migrants who did a degree in Japan, 
they successfully got a job in Japan or engaged with Japanese related business in 
their home countries, then came to Japan as an intracompany transferee. The 
following vignette represents an illustrative story of such an Asian migrant. 
 
Renhao52 first came to Japan as an exchange student when he was an undergraduate 
in Taiwan. His father, grandfathers and even uncles were educated in Japanese; all 
his relatives are pro-Japan and he “had been encouraged to study Japanese”. So it 
                                            
52 All the informant names are pseudonyms and correspond to the list of participants shown in the Appendix. 
109 
 
was quite natural for him to choose Japanese as a major in his degree. He came to 
like Japan more than before after spending a year as an exchange student. Having 
completed the degree and military training, he worked in Malaysia for a lumber trader 
doing business with Japan for two years. He then decided to return to Japan and was 
enrolled in a language school. He finally obtained an MBA in Japan and was employed 
by the branch of a Japanese conglomerate in Taipei—here, Renhao met his 
Taiwanese wife who “was delighted to learn his transfer to Tokyo” on a three-year 
contract. This is the third time for him to reside in Japan but this time is somehow 
different because he now has his own family—the accompanying spouse who speaks 
Japanese and two little sons. This relocation is also a turning point for him in addition 
to his family members; he was told by his senior colleagues that “this transfer is a good 
opportunity for a career”. 
 
Like Renhao, the study-route Asian informants answered that they had wanted to study 
in Japan longing for Japanese culture or a high standard of living. Some of their parents 
or close relatives are pro-Japan and highly recommended studying in Japan. A Korean 
respondent described the influence of the family as well: 
 
Junyoung: My father studied in Japan and that influenced me. He told me 
to go to Japan for a while. Yes. 
Q: Why did he suggest so? 
Junyoung: That time, I think, politeness. Well, of course, we keep politeness 
in Korea, too. But he told me that Japanese people are more polite and I 
should go there to be made a man of. 
 
This narrative delineates two emblematic elements in explaining the Asian traditional 
values relating to studying in Japan: “politeness” and “to be made a man of”. Without 
exception, all the Asian respondents valued politeness as a Japanese virtue comparing 
to their culture. Also their parents or senior relatives appreciate this traditional virtue 
so they recommend studying in Japan to be ‘disciplined’ (to be made a man of). No 
western migrants said they were encouraged by their relatives to come to Japan to be 
disciplined as a polite person; In contrast, these typical points—politeness, discipline 
and senior family members’ recommendation—are based on Asian (especially 
Confucian in East Asia) values and subsequently widely seen in the motivation of 
HSMs from Taiwan and Korea53. In other words, for some Asian migrants, studying in 
                                            
53 Interestingly, this tendency was not observed with the mainland Chinese where traditional Asian values have 
partly been changed during the Communist reform as seen in Sechiyama (1996). The narrative of Yeoh and Willis 
(2005) also shows Asian values and communist reform in mainland China. 
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Japan is linked with their traditional social values which still bind or constrain their 
(including family’s) decision. 
 
On the other hand, the western HSMs tend to come through intracompany transfer or 
as an English teacher instead of obtaining a degree in Japan. Especially, for native 
English speakers, to find a job as an English teacher is quite common to start their 
career in Japan. The vignette below illustrates such an archetype contrasting Renhao’s 
life path. 
 
John is a foreign-language-enthusiast. After studying French and German throughout 
his Master’s degree in Ireland, he “just felt like coming here (Japan) for a year, just a 
kind of one year abroad. Just for coming experience”. He was originally thinking to go 
to China but his friends who have been to Japan recommended Japan. They told him 
“it’s very safe and clean. Everyone is very polite and friendly”. Then he used a travel 
agent specialising in gap year/volunteering to arrange his “coming experience” to 
Japan but some staff told him not to choose Japan because of the unattractive salary 
and hard job. “Japan is usually the last choice for going abroad to Asia” except for 
people studying Japanese. “For people coming here from the western countries, it’s 
cultural reasons more than business unless they are expats”. As he is not an expat54, 
the only job he could find to obtain a visa was English teacher at a private English 
school. After a year in Japan—the initial duration of his visa was one year—, John 
decided to remain to master Japanese. Having worked as an English teacher for four 
years, he found a post as international officer in a Japanese university. It’s a 5-year-
limit one year contract—the contract can be renewed annually up to the 5th year. John 
has recently got engaged and is at a turning point of his career and private life. “I will 
be 30 next year, thinking about buying a house. But I can’t buy houses here cos they 
(banks) won’t give me mortgage if I have a three-year visa”. John thinks to go back to 
Ireland when the 5-year-limit ends in two years and would like to find a civil service 
post like a diplomat. 
 
John’s trajectory embodies some of the typical commonalities the western migrants 
share. First, they came to Japan, thinking to stay for a few years as experience. It is 
like a walkabout (King and Shuttleworth, 1995; Scott, 2006), aimless wandering (Yeoh 
                                            
54 The term ‘expatriate’ is vague and contested as Leonard (2008: 58) described “It is usually used by (white) 
Westerners who have lived abroad for various lengths of time. In Hong Kong many British people refer to 
themselves, other white migrants, as expatriates”. Leonard (2008) suggests the term is one of the examples of 
‘otherness’ discourses drawing the boundary of self (white) and others (non-white). She includes self-initiated 
migrants (such as English teacher like John) ‘expatriates’. However, John used the term to indicate intracompany 
transferees. John’s remarks can also be understood as otherness discourses distinguishing self (culturally attracted 
migrants) and others (expatriates).  
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and Willis, 2005) or postgraduate-gap-year for the early career seeker, and typically 
observed with the western people for whom migration has traditionally been a rite of 
passage (Scott, 2006; Urry, 2007). Through the migration process, they acquire the 
mobility capital. As is often the case with adventure, the western migrants who ended 
up coming to Japan were attracted to the exotic environment and interested in Asia but 
not specifically Japan. In other words, Japan is only one of the many portfolios and 
they happened to choose Japan as a destination rather than from their strong will. 
Eventually, they came to like the life in Japan and decided to stay more. Except for 
people from Australia where Asian languages are widely taught in secondary schools, 
they did not study Japanese before coming and eventually have (had) a Japanese 
spouse/partner. The research found that these remarkable contrasts to Asian HSMs 
are associated with their distinctive western perception on working and living in Japan 
as shown hereafter. 
 
5.2.2 The emerging new trend (pull factors) and unique ‘constraints’ (push factors) 
This research also reveals a new important trend in Japanese companies’ HR strategy 
that emerged from the late 2000s: recruiting HSMs abroad. HSMs are hired when they 
graduate from universities abroad and given training of Japanese corporate culture 
(and Japanese language if necessary) in Japan. These companies recruit the young 
potential professionals worldwide; for instance, a heavy industry manufacturer uses 
this scheme in China, Korea, Europe (the job interviews are conducted in London but 
cover all the European students) and the USA. A trading company also stretches its 
scope to China, Korea, Taiwan, Europe, the USA and Brazil to recruit global talents. 
 
There are mainly two interplaying reasons for this new practice: labour shortage and 
globalised business. Because of the decreasing population of the young cohort 
coupled with the retirement of the baby-boom generation (who were born around 1950 
just after the Second World War), the Japanese corporations started to face severe 
labour shortage from the late 2000s. This shortage occurs in not only manual work but 
also mental jobs, the potential pool of managerial elites. A decreasing population 
means the scale of the cohort is also shrinking in Japan but as the corporations expand 
their businesses globally, they are forced to maintain or boost the scale of this group 
without reducing the quality. Therefore, they choose to recruit the young talent from 
overseas to keep the quality level of HR portfolios. 
 
As the corporations negotiate severe global competition to expand their business, they 
also require innovative talent regardless of nationalities (Keidanren, 2015). A good 
example is Alastair, electric software engineer, who joined an internship in Japan from 
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the UK and was recruited through it. The internship is highly competitive (only four or 
five non-Japanese students were able to secure a place out of 200 applications) but 
offers a three-month career experience in the cutting-edge workplace with enough 
stipend. At the end of the internship, a job offer was informally given even though it 
would take one more year until he graduates from the university. The hastiness (a job 
offer prior to one year of graduation) indicates the strong demand of global talent. 
 
While this recently emerging trend indicates traditional pull factors, HSMs from the two 
specific countries, Korea and mainland China, raised unique push factors attributing to 
their socio-economic background. In Korea, due to the shortage of professional posts 
in contrast to the Japanese labour market, it is so challenging even for prominent new 
graduates to find a good job that they ultimately emigrate for their careers (KITA, 2017). 
This phenomenon has also been observed in the EU where highly educated young 
people from the Old EU (e.g. Spain, Italy, France: pre-2004 member states) emigrate 
to the UK searching for a better job because of the deteriorating employment situation 
in home countries (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva, 2014). For Japanese companies, it is 
easier to recruit the young talent in Korea than in Japan where labour shortage affects 
their HR strategies. 
 
On the other hand, mainland Chinese informants in their 20’s point to nepotism and 
their conservative culture where they are to be exposed to pressures from their parents 
and relatives. All of them indicated the intervention by their parents or relatives more 
or less on their life paths such as professional career and marriage based on the 
normative life plan (e.g. people should marry by their late 20’s). For them, working in 
Japan can be one of the ways to flee from the family pressures and confirm the 
ownership of their own life course.  
 
If I had remained in China, I could have easily predicted my future. As a 
matter of fact, China has a One-Child policy. Therefore, a child is incredibly 
important for their parents. So the parents decide their child’s life including 
where to work, when to marry and when to give birth. I used to think to follow 
such a life but now I don’t like to. Overall, looking at my former classmates 
(who are in China), they are like that (in line with their parents’ intention). 
(Qian) 
 
They are very likely to rely on their families’, most notably parents’ resources to find a 
satisfactory job or ask them for financial support to afford housing if they were in China. 
The mainland China push factors are made up of the three interplaying pieces of social 
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embeddedness: nepotism, One Child Policy and super-expensive housing. The 
relative networks in China play more significant roles in their social life such as finding 
a job or gaining an administrative approval compared to Taiwan, Korea and Japan 
(Sechiyama, 1996). In addition, One Child Policy enables the parents to invest ample 
money for their only child and this also entails strong pressure to make him/her marry 
in their 20’s. Ozaki and Yamaya (2008) showed in their comparative survey that more 
people in Beijing regard marriage as the way to deliver the expectation of family or 
obtain a social reputation than in Korea and Japan. On this point, marriage may involve 
a social rather than individual contract in China. Especially in big cities like Beijing and 
Shanghai, it is normally expected that the parents give financial support for house 
ownership due to the expensive market. All three factors are firmly embedded in 
China’s unique parents-child relationship affecting the autonomy of young Chinese. 
 
On the contrary, being in Japan makes the Chinese professionals free from those 
invisible constraints since they can be professionally and financially independent. 
These are interesting contrasts to migrants from other Chinese economies 56  like 
Taiwan where relatives ‘recommend’ Japan while the pressures of relatives motivate 
the mainland Chinese to emigrate. Despite different determinants, these factors offer 
new perspectives into push factors whilst economic or political reasons have 
traditionally been regarded as the major push factors (King, 2012a; Castles et al., 
2013).  
 
5.2.3 Intracompany transferees 
As examined in the theoretical framework chapter, intracompany transfers have been 
the central focus in transnational elite geographies, which principally postulate 
remuneration, career enhancement and knowledge transfer as determinants of skilled 
migration (e.g. Beaverstock, 2005). The fieldwork also supports this argument and 
found no serious barriers confronting intracompany transferees. For example, they 
receive enough financial rewards including doubled or trebled salaries (taxes/social 
securities adjusted) compared with their ‘home’ remuneration apart from children’s 
international school fees. 
 
More notably, all the transferees benefit from rich housing support. Some companies 
own special houses for transferees near to the office. Meanwhile, Renhao’s company 
settles a renting contract directly with the house owner on behalf of him and covers 90 
percent of the rent. The covered rent is included as personal income to calculate tax 
                                            
56 Although the interviewees also include Hong Kong and Singapore migrants, who are ethnic Chinese, the 
research did not identify the mainland Chinese unique factors with them either. 
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but the salary is also adjusted to cover the tax. The visa process is also left to the 
company. A UK informant, who lived in London before coming to Tokyo, agreed that 
the life as a transferee is totally different from that of a ‘normal’ employee. 
 
I would say it’s more comfortable living here (than London) but it’s not really 
possible to compare my life in Daikanyama (posh housing area in Tokyo) 
as an expat with that in the suburb of Wimbledon. Being taken much care 
of and protected by the company is quite different from given less care. (…) 
It would be difficult to say so (it’s more comfortable living in Tokyo) if I was 
not an expat. 
(Brandon) 57 
 
As his life is “protected by the company”, he thinks the life in Tokyo is extraordinarily 
affluent. All the other transferees support this view and expressed little concern with 
their life in Tokyo. They are “more than happy to stay in Tokyo and willing to come 
back as transferees” (Sarvesh). Nonetheless, Brandon’s narrative offers an interesting 
supposition that he would find his life less easy if he was not an expatriate. To explore 
this assumption in detail, the following sections mainly argue issues with independent 
HSMs. 
 
5.3 Issues in immigration control 
5.3.1 Application process 
For HSMs hired by a large company as well as an intracompany transferee, a visa 
procedure is not a big obstacle at all. Some of them left the application processes to 
their HR staff or immigration lawyer whom their companies employ. Even in the case 
that HSMs visit the immigration office for themselves, the examining process itself is 
very simplified and expedited. MOJ (2015a) clarifies they process the application of 
both HSMs and their nuclear family members within 10 days if they are hired by a 
company listed on the Japanese stock exchange or equivalent58. In addition, they are 
allowed to omit the submission of certain documents HSMs normally require such as 
degree diploma. This is because these large enterprises comply with the strict listing 
requirements thereby delivering good corporate governance. Given the well-facilitated 
                                            
57 In this thesis, (…) [three dots within brackets] indicates silence while … [three dots without brackets] indicates 
some words (or lines) omitted. This is one of the ways to secure qualitative reliability by reproducing the precise 
and actual situations that the informants created in the interviews since the non-verbal reaction is equally important 
in analysing discourses. In so doing, the author also attempted to bring more lively realities to the readers. 
58 The equivalents include, for example, life insurance companies (normally not listed on the stock exchange 
markets), the central and local governments and its public corporations. These organizations are considered to 
practice good governance as well as the listed enterprises. 
115 
 
process, many interviewees asserted Japan is one of the easiest countries to obtain a 
work visa while gaining a visa without using lawyers is almost impossible in countries 
such as the USA. 
 
However, the study found a new issue the extant literature has not dealt with. All the 
HSMs, who went through the visa process on their own, articulate that they are made 
to wait for more than three hours—in many cases four to five hours—in the immigration 
office just to submit their application. This does not include the process of examination; 
they only wait to be called to hand out their application. If there are no missing 
documents, this submission process takes only half a minute. 
 
To renew (visa), I have to take two-days off-work. Because we have to wait 
in immigration office. You can’t post it (the document to renew the visa). You 
know, you have to go there with the application form so I have to take a 
vacation to go to immigration and queue for maybe five-six hours then they 
give us an information form and (I) go home. And then in two weeks, I come 
back and I wait for five-six hours and I collect it and I go back home. So, the 
counter time takes 30 seconds but I have to wait for five-six hours. 
(John) 
 
The following figure charts the process that John takes to renew his visa. 
 
 
Yang described ironically that waiting for over four hours is now “common sense”. 
Cyrille arrived at the Immigration Office in Shinagawa (Tokyo’s head office) at 16.00 
and waited incredibly long until 23.00 when he finally handed out the documents59. 
                                            
59 Their “Office hours” are “9:00 to 12:00, and 13:00 to 16:00 (except for Saturdays, Sundays and national 
holidays)” (Immigration Bureau, 2018). Cyrille came to the office in the last-minute but he was made wait due to 






































Figure 5-1 Application process and waiting time 
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Obviously, the counter time should be shortened by increasing the number of counter 
staff60 or be transparent by issuing a ticket and showing the estimated waiting time. 
 
5.3.2 Permanent settlement and parents reunification 
Relaxing restrictions on permanent settlement and accompanying parents are also 
important factors to be improved. In Japan, foreigners should reside lawfully in Japan 
for over 10 years continuously to be eligible for permanent settlement61. Ten years is 
longer than the USA, Canada, Australia (some people are given permanent residency 
at the outset in these settler countries) and Korea, Taiwan, UK (5 years). In addition, 
‘continuously’ makes it more difficult for HSMs to have the status. If a HSM was 
transferred abroad for a while, say for two years, they need to reset the count when 
they come back to Japan. Especially Chinese HSMs were concerned about this issue 
because they need a visa even for a short stay and the permanent residency is the 
only way to freely move in and out of Japan. 
 
HSMs with young children claimed that they sometimes need the support from their 
parents living abroad to look after their children while they are in work. Specifically in 
the case of the HSMs couple—dual career migrant households (Hardill, 2002; Kofman, 
2004; Raghuram, 2004; Ho. 2007)—, this becomes serious because they do not have 
anyone to depend on in Japan while Japanese people can ask their parents or relatives 
to take care of their children. Jiawei needed to bring his Chinese mother to Tokyo and 
extended a short stay visa for her who looked after his child: 
 
A short stay visa allows my mother to stay for 3 months only. And it can be 
extended only once. So she stayed for 6 months by extending it. Six months 
is maximum since the extension is allowed only once. She stayed in Japan 
twice (both times for 6 months) when my daughter was perhaps, I think, two 
and four years old because we (he and his wife) were both busy with work. 
It had been greatly helpful for us if my mother could have stayed in Japan 
up to when my daughter started going to primary school.  
(Jiawei) 
 
                                            
60 The counter staff in many Immigration Offices is outsourced so it is not directly run by MOJ according to 
interviewed MOJ officers (current policy maker 1; former policy maker 4). 
61 There are some exemptions regarding the condition. For instance, the spouse of Japanese and their biological 
children (i.e. no stepchildren) can obtain the permanent settlement for one year of lawful residency when the 
spouse has been in marital relations with Japanese for over three years; Nikkeijin can gain the permanent settlement 
with over five years of residency (MOJ, 2017). 
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Chinese (including Taiwanese) and Korean ethnics tend to raise children in the 
extended family network compared to the Japanese care system relying on the public 
services like nursery school (Noda, 2016). The comparative survey conducted in Tokyo, 
Beijing and Seoul indicates the double income families in Beijing and Seoul depend on 
grandparents for their child care while that of Tokyo mostly uses nursery school 
(Nagase, 2008). What’s more important, the carer may be extended to relatives such 
as couples’ siblings or uncles/aunts in addition to the couple’s parents in Taiwan or 
South China (Sechiyama, 1996). This suggests the wider concept of ‘family’ should be 
considered in care provision (Vullnetari and King, 2008) and immigration system to 
attract HSMs. 
 
5.3.3 ‘Stigmatised’ cohorts 
The extant literature suggests very few obstacles for HSMs in obtaining a visa (Oishi, 
2012, 2014; Tsukasaki, 2008; Holbrow, 2017) and the majority of respondents also 
endorsed this view. Nonetheless, the fieldwork identified specific groups struggling to 
obtain or renew their visa: people on a fixed-term contract (most of the young English 
teachers working for private English schools), the self-employed (e.g. translator), 
entrepreneur (e.g. in the samples, a web designer who has just launched his office), 
Asian female worker in small business. 
 
The last case was a Filipina teacher in an international nursery where children grew 
up in a multi-lingual environment. A manager in this nursery has sought teachers who 
have both international background and a degree in child education. The suitable 
candidates are usually foreigners since Japanese staff are often domestic-orientated. 
The manager found the Filipina who taught English in Japan as an appropriate 
candidate; however, she was once refused to extend her visa to work for the nursery 
even though she submitted all the necessary legal documents. The immigration office 
did not explain to her why the application was turned down and they gave her one 
month to prepare her departure. She was desperate because she could not grasp what 
was wrong with the process and visited the immigration office the next day with the 
Japanese manager. 
 
The manager was told by a senior officer63 (instead of the counter staff with whom the 
Filipina respondent had talked) that her job description includes child care which is 
deemed an unskilled job and that’s the very reason to refuse the application. They 
explained to the immigration officer about her role as a teacher to create an English-
                                            
63 He came from the office far from the counter and seemed to be senior to the respondent. 
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speaking environment in the international nursery and revised the job description as 
such. At last, her visa was extended. The Filipina raised a few problems with the 
immigration process. First, the counter officer did not have enough communication 
skills in English to explain the reasons for refusal64 . After all, she needed to be 
accompanied by her manager to grasp the situation. Second, they did not tell her any 
possible solutions even though this was due to misunderstandings. Since the visa 
extension was finally approved, there were a few solutions to break the deadlock. She 
describes what she felt in the process: 
 
I was shocked and I didn't know what to do because I was hoping, you know, 
all was good. I was expecting that, I have all the legal documents and I do 
not do anything wrong in Japan. I hope that they could be more considerate 
and they could be, you know, they could open to the foreign people to tell 
us what to do in the case. So those things (…) I felt something (…) umm 
(…) discriminatory? (... ) They may sometimes think that Asians, like 
Filipinos, are (…) like (…) illegal immigrants. 
(Lydia) 
 
For migration experts in Japan, Filipina conjures up an image of irregular migrants. 
From the 1990s to early 2000s, tens of thousands of Filipinas entered Japan as 
entertainers who were supposed to work as dancers. At its peak (2004), there were 
50,691 Filipina entertainers which made up 78 percent of all the entertainer visas 
(Japan Immigration Association, 2005). However, many of the Filipina entertainers 
were exploited in the sex industries (Sellek, 2001; Ballescas, 2003; Sakanaka, 2017). 
As a result, they were made irregular migrants and this prompted the Japanese 
government to strictly tighten the immigration control of overseas entertainers (Iguchi, 
2006) obviously targeting the Filipinas. This crackdown drastically reduced the number 
of entertainers from the Philippines by half from 50,691 to 23,643 over 2004-2005 
(MOJ, 2007). Although there are authentic HSMs from the Philippines, the incident has 
eventually left a stigmatised image to Filipinas and aroused (sometimes excessive) 
caution in the immigration officer. 
 
The case also implies how the concepts of ‘highly-skilled’ and ‘low-skilled’ are bounded 
by gender and unreasonable images, that cause a barrier to social innovation’ in Japan. 
In this context, innovation specifically means the social transition to encompass 
                                            
64 As indicated before, the counter job is almost outsourced. Therefore, it is not possible or allowed for the counter 
staff—their role is prescribed on the contract—to explain the decisions made by immigration officers. This is why 
the senior immigration officer discussed with the nursery manager the next day the application was refused and 
they finally found the solution. 
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diversified values and promote internationalisation. As discussed earlier, the biggest 
challenges HSMs found in the Japanese educational system is the lack of diversity and 
international perspectives. The nursery school improves it by offering quite innovative 
educational methods employing multi-national teachers (they intentionally hire 
teachers from various origins such as the USA, Canada, Australia, Korea, China, 
Singapore and the Philippines) considering the homogeneous nature of Japanese 
nursery. This innovative concept attracts a lot of parents who wish to educate their 
children in an international environment; subsequently, only half of the applicants are 
admitted. The nursery would like to hire more international teachers to accommodate 
the surging demands but the ‘stigmatisation’ partly hinders their efforts of recruitment. 
The manager puts it. 
 
Many parents using this nursery work for foreign affiliates or large 
enterprises in Tokyo, so they wish to have more chances to educate their 
children in English in this globalised era…To maintain the quality of 
education we offer, we carefully screen the teachers, who should fulfil the 
certain conditions to embody our idea. We will keep this rigid screening 
process. I think this trend (making a transnational environment in nursery) 
will continue. Not only us but also other nurseries would like to hire teachers 
from overseas. But as they do not have know-how (to hire them), they can’t. 
I think if the immigration process becomes more simple and transparent, 
these nurseries can be more internationalised (by hiring transnational 
teachers). 
(Employer of migrants 1) 
 
This case clearly shows that in the immigration control, some specific kinds of migrants 
are stigmatised, thereby facing unreasonably formidable challenges in going through 
an immigration procedure because of nationalities, gender or occupations even though 
they are well-sought-after HSMs who can potentially transform Japan to more 
globalised economy. Although care work, carried out mostly by women, is relatively 
associated with lower skilled work, it should be noted that it can also add tremendous 
value to the socio-economy. 
 
These negative cases are only observed with the interviewees found through the 
personal network; in other words, these issues were not applicable to the informants 
through the gatekeeper (Keidanren), whose member companies are reputable well-
known large companies given priority access to the visa screening process. This may 
suggest the social cleavages of HSMs: the ‘establishment’—mainly employed by large 
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companies or intracompany transferees— and the ‘stigmatised’ group such as Filipina, 
start-up entrepreneurs and the self-employed. The skilled migration literature 
regardless of the disciplinaries, time, countries or gender focus, has principally dealt 
with the former group (e.g. Salt, 1988; Beaverstock and Boardwell, 2000; Yeoh and 
Wills, 2005; Oishi, 2008) while the latter group has almost been marginalised in the 
research except for a few cases such as Ho (2007) or Scott (2006)65. This is partly why 
the obstacles in immigration control have not been discussed in the literature66. It is on 
this point that this research advances the traditional theories by showing the innovative 
skilled migrants may suffer from precarity due to immigration control even in the less 
restrictive Japanese immigration system. 
 
5.4 Issues in tax and social security 
The high taxation on personal income (maximum 55%) sometimes impedes high-
income HSMs from residing in Japan. Japan’s tax revenue has hugely relied on direct 
taxes such as personal income or corporate taxes maintaining the rate of consumption 
tax (VAT: indirect tax) of 8%67. This has caused an unbalanced tax structure between 
the direct and indirect taxes, subsequently keeping the level of income tax high. As the 
tax rate accelerates according to the increase in income, the business executives seek 
to minimise the tax to pay. 
 
Table 5-4 Tax Band of Personal Income Tax in Japan  
Income (Million Yen) national tax rate (%) regional tax rate (%) total tax rate (%) 
Less than 1.95 5 10 15 
1.95 - 3.30 10 10 20 
3.30 - 6.95 20 10 30 
6.95 - 9 23 10 33 
9   - 18 33 10 43 
18  - 40 40 10 50 
More than 40 45 10 55 
* as of FY 2015. There is no plan to update the tax rate at the moment. 
Source: National Tax Agency (2016) 
 
                                            
65 Ho (2007) and Scott (2006) use the ‘middlings’ concept (i.e. their focus is not elite migrant but only confined 
within the middle class) unlike this research. 
66 One other major reason why the immigration control has been under-researched in skilled migration is that the 
research participants tend to enjoy EU’s free movement (e.g. Scott, 2006) or Ancestor Visa (e.g. Conradson and 
Latham, 2005a) which enable the migrants regardless of precarious positions in the host country to move around 
with less restriction. 
67 5% before 2012 
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Especially for HSMs in the income range of over 18 million Yen, over half of their 
income will be deducted as tax. In this case, they are likely to shun away from Japan 
or they choose to be ‘based’ in Singapore or Hong Kong but travel to Japan as ‘a 
business trip’ for two weeks or every month to avoid paying tax in Japan. They ‘work’ 
in Japan and receive the salary, but they have the residential address (therefore 
residential visa as well) in Singapore or Hong Kong to avoid the tax. An immigration 
lawyer whose clients include wealthy corporate executives explained: 
 
Japan has lost so many talents because of the high tax. There are lots of 
foreigners earning 60-70 million Yen. For example, they are working for an 
investment bank…My customers often seek advice not to become a 
resident in Japan although they should work in Japan since the company 
transfers them. So, for example, they want to abandon the visa (to work in 
Japan). But in reality they need to come and stay in Japan very often to 
work. Or, they would like their family to remain in Japan (because of the 
safety and high quality of life) but they themselves would like to have a 
residential address in Singapore due to the lower tax rate. They were 
concerned if their family can retain the visa to stay in Japan (after they 
moved their address to Singapore). I know many cases like this with regard 
to the high tax rate. 
(Migration expert 9) 
 
Japan accords tax treaties with 110 economies including Singapore, China, Hong 
Kong and Macau (Yoshino, 2017) from which migrants can easily fly to Japan. The tax 
treaties stipulate the tax payer residing in these economies should not pay any income 
tax to Japan as long as their total stay in Japan is less than 183 days annually (Miki 
and Maeda, 2012; Fujii, 2007). This nominally means the migrants can ‘work’ in Japan 
for a maximum of 183 days while avoiding income taxes by residing abroad. 
 
The mobility patterns of HSMs can be broken down into eight categories like long-term 
assignment (over one-year residence), short-term assignment (three to twelve months 
residence), long distance commuting, rotating, business travel, virtual mobility and so 
forth (Millar and Salt, 2008). Which portfolio to take is entirely contingent on the firm’s 
business strategies (Millar and Salt, 2008; Beaverstock et al, 2009); in other words, 
the academic arguments on elite mobility portfolios have been confined only within the 
corporate mechanism with employees’ portfolios opaque. The only exception is long 
distance commuting due to family reasons often observed with dual career 
household—for instance, London-Paris commuter in Ho (2007). They commute long 
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distance because their family is based far from their workplace. The scholars depicted 
the commuting portfolio as compromise between family formation and career 
aspiration—usually for female professionals, consequently having been researched as 
a gender issue (Ho, 2007; Mizuno, 2008). 
 
On the other hand, as opposed to the commuter, the long-distance business traveller 
of the findings shows two novel dimensions: (1) personal but economic motivations 
(reducing income tax to pay) and (2) family separation (residing abroad to have a 
residential address in lower-tax area while deliberately leaving the family in Tokyo). 
The findings strikingly indicate the employees’ circumstances also shape the mobility 
portfolio. In addition, it presents a new and significant policy implication in that the 
public policies—particularly the divergence of policies in the globalised world—
inextricably affect both the life and migration strategies of HSMs. Thanks to the 
development of transportation technologies and infrastructures, long-distance 
business travel has been drastically facilitated and will be more convenient. This may 
increase or incentivise the policy-affected-migrants (or long-distance business 
traveller) even though they would not do so if the policies (e.g. tax rate) were converged 
internationally. Considering the long-distance travel affecting the environment 
(Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006; Beaverstock et al, 2009), policies should be updated 
to prevent unnecessary mobilities. 
 
Apart from taxation, some HSMs claimed that the social security system in Japan is 
not easy to follow for them. In many cases, the notification from the government is only 
written in official Japanese which even native speakers find difficult to comprehend. 
This gives them some misgivings that the Japanese system is enigmatic even though 
they are compelled to contribute to the system. Some of the interviewees obviously 
misunderstand the rules but they did not have any opportunities to check their 
understandings. Chinese HSMs were concerned about the pension they paid in Japan 
because Japan does not have a social security treaty with China and that will make 
some people give up contributions already paid when they leave Japan. 
 
5.5 Institutional obstacles 
An institution that has been cultivated and existed long as a custom in society forms 
people’s behaviour. Unlike regulations made by the government (e.g. laws), it does not 
have an express provision but the member of society is bound by the implicit order, 
which affects the life of HSMs. There are mainly three obstacles that interplay with the 





Education is the top priority for HSMs when they are accompanied by children (Scott, 
2006); however, the Japanese educational system has been criticised for the lack of 
international perspectives (Goodman, 2003) and the insufficient teaching level (Oishi, 
2012). The respondents with children were often concerned that their children will be 
left behind in the globalised world if their children are educated in Japanese. Some of 
them send their children to international schools to raise them in an international 
environment despite the necessity to cover the expensive tuition fees on their own 
while intracompany transferees are given a package covering the fees. 
 
For instance, Eric has spent most of the salary on International School fees. Even 
though he lives in a company’s residence and works as a senior manager in one of the 
three largest Japanese car manufacturers68, he struggles to finance education saying, 
“I have no money. No money, man. All my money was spent on education”. Japan 
Council of International Schools have 28 member schools all over Japan (Japan 
Council of International Schools, 2017). In addition to these schools, Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) recognises there are 127 
International Schools69 as of May 2011 (MEXT, 2012). Although the tuition fees cost 
at least two million yen annually, what motivated Eric to send his children to 
International School despite the financial hardship? He problematises the lack of 
diversity as the main issue with Japanese schooling notwithstanding the satisfactory 
level of education:  
 
They teach so many life skills. But what happens after grade 3 or so, is that 
they try to make everyone the same. There’s a pressure of conformity. 
Everyone learns the same and everyone writes the same, you know. If you 
are left handed, they try to teach you to write with your right hand, you know. 
We thought, OK, in the early school period, Japanese school is wonderful 
but once they start to socialise, to start to become a social being, it’s not 
good to be in Japanese school so we put them in international school. 
(Eric) 
 
“A pressure of conformity” would not create diversities in a classroom and cannot 
cultivate the strengths of individual pupils. Eric thinks the Japanese educational system 
                                            
68 Toyota, Honda and Nissan are the three largest manufactures. 
69 They include Brazilian, Korean, French and German schools. However it is not clear from the data whether 
Indian Schools are included. There are South and North Korean Schools in Japan although the source does not 
clarify this point.  
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particularly weighs on improving defects rather than further enhancing strengths. It 
seems to him that education tries to produce equal-standard-person without marked 
individuality. Particularly for the Western, it is much more important ‘how different you 
are from the others’ than ‘how similar you are with the others’ (Florida, 2005). Therefore, 
HSMs do not approve of the Japanese norm that everyone should be same (everyone 
learns the same and everyone writes the same). In theorising Third Culture Kids 
(TCKs) which illustrates the challenges and benefits of raising children outside the 
parents’ culture, Pollock and Van Reken (2009: 56) insist the biggest advantage TCKs 
can gain is “expanded worldview” that the children can nurture through their 
multicultural backgrounds and base on in mediating different cultures/experiences. 
Nonetheless, TCKs raised in the Japanese educational system are not to hold the 
expanded worldview since they are forced to fit in “the prescribed boxes” (Pollock and 
Van Reken, 2009; 56) where everyone should be the same. 
 
Not only non-Japanese children but Japan’s returnee children (Kikokushijo) also suffer 
from the homogeneous educational system (e.g. Goodman, 2003). They were raised 
abroad with expanded worldview and eventually came back to Japan. However, as 
“the school in Japan is the focal place of instruction and socialisation, where young 
Japanese learn how to become proper Japanese”, it is not easy for them to square 
with the school and “they are often bullied for their difference” (Pang, 2000: 313-314). 
As evidence, Renhao chose international school for their children in line with his 
Taiwanese colleague’s advice for fear that the children might be bullied. In short, the 
core problem with the Japanese education is not the level of education but the void of 
diversified values. The lack of diversity is also reflected in social norms. 
 
5.5.2 Social norms 
The lack of diversity in Japanese society or the workplace also puzzles HSMs. It 
sometimes seems to them that Japanese people are judgemental and the mindset is 
old fashioned. They perceive that homogeneous Japan has uniquely developed its 
social norms—rules of behaviour underpinned by social expectations—which 
eventually excludes the diversified views or backgrounds. For example, if something 
is different from the norms, they can be regarded as an outlier. 
 
Yang: Recently, I introduced myself to someone who works for a large 
(Japanese) enterprise. He said to me “You are ambitious”. I think it’s normal 
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in the USA. (…) In the USA, it doesn’t matter if you are gay or doctoral 
woman or whoever. But in Japan, these are abnormal. 
Q: Did he mean you are ambitious because you are Chinese or female? 
Yang: I’m not sure. Perhaps, everything. Because I am female, foreigner, 
and go everywhere. 
 
The comment made to Yang (You are ambitious) would be perceived as harassment 
if it was in the USA where even the UK professionals are careful in telling jokes due to 
strict equal opportunities rules (Beaverstock, 2005). It is sometimes frustrating for 
HSMs that Japanese people try to categorise them into Japanese standard which is 
apparently inconsistent with their diversified life paths. Japanese people are bound by 
their stereotypical life cycle image including professional career and family formation 
(Roberts, 2016), for instance, finding a permanent job at 23 years old, marrying at 26, 
and having a child at 28 and so forth. An Australian respondent also felt a strong sense 
of incompatibility with the conformity to the social standard. 
 
At first when I came to Japan (as a PhD student) it was very difficult to 
express myself and quite frustrating in the first year. So for example, they 
(University staff) kept asking me whether or not I am going to do a Master’s 
although I am a PhD student in Australia. They constantly didn't believe that 
I was a PhD student…Uh, there is a cultural expectation on what people do 
at their life stages. So at that time, (I was) 27 or 26 years old. So the 27 or 




Overall, the life course of HSMs is different from the standard of Japanese people; 
however, Japanese society is not yet ready to accept the diversity. This would also 
brew dissension between Japanese and HSMs. When there’s something out of the 
norms, it may result in something which HSMs perceive to be discrimination. 
 
5.6 Discrimination 
The research identifies two kinds of discrimination that HSMs face during their stay in 
Japan: one is institutional discrimination such as explicit restrictions due to 
nationalities; and, the other is racial discrimination which surrounds them implicitly. 
Interestingly, most western people reported that they encountered discrimination but 
fewer Asian migrants insisted so. This is partly because institutional discrimination 




5.6.1 Institutional discrimination 
At the first stage of their life in Japan, HSMs were confronted with intense difficulties 
in renting an apartment, obtaining a mortgage, credit card, and in some cases mobile 
phone in a specific operator as they are a foreigner without permanent residency. All 
these are private contracts between foreigners and Japanese companies/people so 
when a Japanese contractor refuses them, they cannot access these services. 
 
Sometimes when we are looking for a house, a lot of houses don't allow 
gaijin (foreigners). So your selections are already narrowed. And they used 
to annoy me (laugh) because you know, if you look from the western point 
of view, it’s really racist. They say “No gaijin (foreigners)”. And some of the 
fudosan (letting agencies) that I went to, you know, have (apartments) like 
petto ka (pets OK) gaijin ka (foreigners OK). I mean, if you do that in Europe, 
I am pretty sure that you’ll be sued for like racism or something but in Japan 
that’s normal…Now I use one (letting agency specially for foreign 
customers) because it’s easier. But before, I used to go to a normal one. I 
went to just like a normal fudosan (letting agencies), they actually said 
“Please leave”. I was pretty angry about that. 
(John) 
 
This case alludes that some Japanese letting agencies or house owners equate 
foreigners with pets; as evidence, foreigners are listed as equivalent to pets (foreigners 
OK, pets OK). All the western informants—all of them are Caucasian—who have lived 
in Japan longer than 20 years and speak Japanese, experienced refusal to dine in a 
restaurant (they think) because they are a foreigner. Although they admit that it is now 
rare that a restaurant turns them away, Jack offered a photo of the notice “Japanese 
Only” written in English, Chinese and Korean, that was put on the entrance door of 
some ‘pink’ bar he occasionally walks by, putting “Not that I would want to go there in 
any case, but I'm sure this kind of sign would create a stir and probably even a lawsuit 










Source: offered by Jack (respondent) 
 
Another case is mortgage. A Korean migrant complained that she cannot obtain a 
mortgage even though she has enough means to pay it. 
 
When I bought a house, it was nil that I could have on loan just because I 
am a freelance foreigner. Even though I earn 10 million Yen, which exceeds 
my (Japanese) husband’s income, I was told that the money I can borrow is 
nil. Even though I have enough financial means to return the money, I 
cannot borrow even a pence. So, my house is officially registered in my 




Discriminating against overseas nationals in offering services is a structured and 
taken-for-granted reality that Japanese people do not even question when they refuse 
them. Yang described “All the services—whether it is commercial or public— provided 
in Japan are designed so that Japanese nationals use them. Foreigners are not 
assumed to use them”. According to the western standard, it is obviously unacceptable 
to limit services on the basis of nationalities. Besides, it is ‘visible’ discrimination since 
they clearly turn away HSMs due to their nationalities or residential status. That’s why 
western migrants claim more discrimination in Japan than Asian migrants.  
 
5.6.2 Racial discrimination: unconscious segregation and prejudice 
Unlike visible institutional discrimination, racial discrimination requires careful 
consideration because of three reasons. First, the definition of discrimination depends 
Figure 5-2 “Japanese Only” sign in a bar 
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on the person. For example, Luke said that he felt discriminated when he is praised for 
his fluent Japanese saying, “I studied hard to master Japanese. It was very hard. I feel 
insulted, or made fun of, when they praise my Japanese”. It is arguable whether this is 
discrimination or not. Obviously, Japanese people appreciating his language skills do 
not intend to discriminate him but take their hats off. It is, however, also true that they 
unconsciously segregate him from the normal Japanese and this may irritate him who 
is trying to speak and behave like Japanese. In this sense, the border of segregation 
and discrimination is ambiguous. 
 
Second, the cultural differences occasionally lead to discrimination for some people. 
For instance, many Japanese people perceive tattoos as the symbol of an outlaw 
(Yamamoto, 2017). From the 18th century the body or face of some convicted criminals 
was tattooed70. In more recent years, tattoos have been associated with mafia: when 
people become a member of the mafia, they are forced to tattoo the skin to show their 
irreversible commitment not to return to regular society. On the contrary, in western 
countries, it is a kind of art/fashion or ethnic expression. Some foreigners were refused 
to use a public bath or swimming pool because of tattoos they have. Local authorities 
legislate not to offer services to antisocial groups (e.g. Tokyo Metropolitan Office, 
2011) and one of the ways to identify them is tattoo. The issue of tattoo sometimes 
affects HSMs’ life in their private relations. 
 
Tom: I’ve got a lot of tattoos, uh, which, you know, come from like ,uh, the 
earlier part of my life, I actually love my tattoos and I would like to get more 
and I already have lots so it doesn't matter. Uh but, for example, when E 
(his wife) and I started dating, her supervisor, a professor in T (University), 
actually told her she shouldn't date me because I was a bad person.  
Q: Is she a Japanese professor? 
Tom: Yes. She is Japanese. She said that I have lots of tattoos so I am 
obviously a mafia. 
 
The Japanese culture associating tattoos with mafia can exclude someone innocent 
and be excessive. However, it should be also noted that the culture, on one hand, may 
have a reasonable aspect rooted in its history. Perhaps this kind of cultural issues will 
be addressed gradually as Japanese society becomes more diversified and 
internationalised because it is inevitable to honour a visiting foreigner’s culture as well. 
As evidence, the Chief Cabinet Minister called for understanding of foreign cultures to 
                                            
70 This punishment system was imported from China where it was called Jing Xing, whose Chinese characters 
were pronounced as Geikei in Japanese. Therefore, associating tattoos with outlaw is not Japanese unique culture. 
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welcome more foreigners referring a case that a Maori was refused a public bath due 
to her ethnic tattoos (Sankei, 2013). Japan Tourism Agency (2016) also called for 
flexible solutions based on the guidelines so that the tattooed foreigners can use the 
public bathing services. 
 
Third, the perception to be discriminated or not is quite subjective when it comes to 
racial discrimination. After all, it depends on the person whether they take it personally. 
Many informants reported that an incident which makes them uncomfortable might not 
be discrimination but quite often from misunderstanding and miscommunication. 
 
Well, any discrimination? …If, if I didn't speak Japanese, I would sometimes 
feel so…but since I do not have any difficulties in communicating, I do not 
find any discrimination in my case, perhaps. 
(Qian) 
 
Like Qian, a lot of informants think that when their communication skills in Japanese 
improve or they adapt themselves to Japanese customs, they face less uncomfortable 
incidents—some may call it discrimination. Also the research found that especially in 
Japan, the issue is not crystal clear due to Japanese discreet culture. For example, 
some informants point out that since Japanese people are so ‘polite’ their remarks and 
actions are not straightforward. In other words, the discrimination is so invisible (even 
though it exists) that even the discriminated realises it very little. 
 
This ambiguousness is observed regardless of races or nationalities. However, the 
research clarified two kinds of racial discrimination to specific groups. One is 
‘unconscious segregation’ to Korean and Chinese people, and the other is more 
obvious prejudice to the mainland Chinese. Unconscious segregation occurs when 
Japanese people have a stereotypic view on a specific group and assume arrogantly—
although they are not aware of their arrogance—that they are different from Japanese 
without intention of discrimination. Since it is not intention—in other words, it’s 
unconscious—, it mainly appears in casual remarks as a Korean informant reported: 
 
Japanese people do not talk straight. Korean people also look down on 
people from developing countries and there are sometimes riots against 
discrimination in Korea. I sometimes touch upon discriminatory remarks 
made by Koreans when I join dinner as an interpreter. On the other hand, 
Japanese people do not make such remarks even if they hold that kind of 
view. They normally try not to show their honest feeling (on these kinds of 
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sensitive issues). But when I was talking to fellow mothers, I occasionally 
sense discrimination to the Korean in our conversation. For example, when 
we dine together in a group, they inadvertently mention “the Korean is 
emotional. I can tell so watching a Korean soap”, “they are stubborn to make 
Japan apologise about the wars71”. I know that they make such casual 
remarks since they do not think that I am Korean. So I don't mind. 
(Jihye) 
 
She speaks Japanese like a native and her child has a Japanese name since his father 
is Japanese. Therefore, her fellow mothers may not be conscious that she is Korean 
and their remarks hurt her. She claims that these are not specific in Japan as these 
kinds of stereotyping exist everywhere even in the western countries or Korea. 
However, it is also true that Japan and Korea still have sensitive historical and political 
issues; they may affect personal relations between the nationals. 
 
Apart from the sensitive Japan-Korea case, prejudices against the Mainland Chinese 
seem to be more serious. Here, it should be noted that Chinese people other than 
mainland (e.g. ethnic Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore) are not included. 
Interestingly, the discrimination is mainly reported by non-(Mainland) Chinese. 
 
I trained in S (famous Japanese martial art institution) and I made lots, lots 
of friends who studied overseas like America and Australia but when I 
mentioned that I was studying Chinese people in Japan, they really turned 
cold. Researching China is problematic in Japan.  
(Tom) 
 
As mentioned before, Japanese people whom HSMs encounter in their daily life are 
usually polite and unemotional. These people seem to be very gentle to the HSMs 
therefore they are surprised to find some of them become hostile to mainland Chinese. 
Similarly, another case was reported by a Taiwanese informant: 
 
There are cases where Japanese people get more cautious or change their 
attitudes depending on the nationalities. For instance, in my Certificate of 
Alien Registration72, it was written Nationality: China, Place of Birth: Taiwan. 
                                            
71 Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945. Korean public discourse has constantly called for Japan to 
apologise for the colonisation and wars that Korea was inevitably involved in due to Japanese militarism (c.f. 
Morris-Suzuki et al, 2013). 




When a police officer stopped me on a street to make an enquiry, I showed 
it to them and they said “Oh, you are from Taiwan. Then no problem. It’s OK 
unless you are (Mainland) Chinese” and the enquiry finished. The Police 
officer became less cautious realising that I am Taiwanese.  
(Guanlin) 
 
This case may be explained that mainland Chinese rank as the top foreign nationality 
(32.7%) of those who are filed in criminal cases in Japan (Research and Training 
Institute of the Ministry of Justice, 2017)73 so the police become more cautious about 
this. If this is purely coming from the reason to reduce the number of foreign criminals, 
it will not be discrimination although it may still conjure up a sense of prejudice against 
the specific nationality as is demonstrated in the immigration procedure. 
 
Nonetheless, the actual case of discrimination was not prominently observed from the 
interviews with mainland Chinese HSMs. Most of the Chinese informants did not report 
serious discriminatory cases and they even said that the Japanese people are very 
tolerant. At the end, all of them said that it is not nationality but the individual that forms 
the relations. A Chinese informant already holding permanent residency cited his 
experience: 
 
I have been told that “I don't like Chinese people, but you are an exception”. 
I am currently engaged with a project in H (Japanese countryside) and at 
the outset, people there were a bit cautious of me. I could list many things 
like discrimination, but I don't mind. I can make them open minded. It’s 
personality rather than nationality that counts finally. The governor now calls 
me “Mr Y (his Chinese family name), Mr Y” intimately. 
(Jiawei) 
 
Jiawei’s remarks “It’s personality rather than nationality that counts finally” is what the 
extant literature on racism of migration has constantly overlooked. Indeed, Hall (1998) 
and Arudou (2015) discuss Japan’s embedded racism revolving only around this 
institutional discrimination (i.e. limiting services to foreigners) but they do not really 
discuss racism on a personality basis. Jiawei’s account reveals the significance of 
examining personality-based discrimination in addition to the ways in which HSMs 
negotiate it. 
 
                                            
73 Followed by Vietnamese (20.6%), South Korean (9.5%). The figure excludes the arrests based on Road Traffic 
Control Law and Immigration Act (ibid.). 
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5.7 Fostering social networks among compatriots 
Another distinction between the western and Asian migrants can also be found in the 
way of building social networks. In general, the western migrants tend not to be so 
eager to widen their compatriot network but socialise with other nationalities. They are 
neutral in choosing the networks rather than hesitating to make compatriot friends in 
Japan. That is to say, they just drift with the tide: it’s not bad to make compatriot friends 
in Japan but not indispensable. So, they do not make much effort to meet new 
compatriot friends. A testimony made by Alastair coming from Scotland represents this 
view: 
 
Q: Do you have any Scottish networks in Tokyo? 
Alastair: I go to, like, a Scottish bar in Shinjuku (shopping and night life area 
in Tokyo). I go there not very often. But to be honest I’ve never checked if 
there is a Scottish society in Japan.  
Q: But you sometimes go to the bar? 
Alastair: Yeah, sometimes I want to have like, yeah Shinjuku, like erm, or 
you know, I like to take Scottish food or something like that but I never, I’ve 
never reached a Scottish society in Japan. I don't think there’s one, I’ve 
never checked.  
Q: But you can meet new people in the Scottish bar. 
Alastair: It’s even, I don't even go there to meet people. It’s just to feel home 
or something.  
Q: Because you can eat haggis (typical Scottish food)? 
Alastair: Yeah, like eat haggis, yeah. Well, haggis is hard to buy in Japan. 
 
There is a Scottish society in Tokyo and Yokohama offering Scottish events such as 
Burns Supper and it is easy to find them on the internet74. Like this data, many of the 
western migrants go to a western style bar or pub but they do not necessarily go there 
to widen their networks. Jack also indicated several opportunities to socialise with 
American people in Japan like Tokyo American Club (established 1928), but it’s too 
expensive to join and he thinks it is only for the establishment, in other words, it is a 
‘closed’ society for specific elite migrants. However, the circumstances surrounding the 
Asian migrants are completely different. 
 
                                            
74 St. Andrews Society (Yokohama and Tokyo) runs annual events such as the St. Andrew Ball and informal 
ceilidhs along with Burns Supper. There is another organization called Japan Scotland Association (established 
2012) in Tokyo offering an English website on their events although they have more content in Japanese. 
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The vast majority of them reported they benefitted from the firm compatriot 
communities widely spread from university Alumni to social network services (SNS): 
 
Q: Do you have any challenges living in Japan? 
Qian: So far no…well, since there are a lot of Chinese in Japan. Considering 
the number of Chinese friends, my life in Tokyo is not so different from that 
in Beijing since I have so many Chinese friends here. 
Q: Are they your colleagues? 
Qian: Various. Such as alumni members of my university and so on. And 
there are communities based on the business sectors. For instance, there 
are Chinese communities for people working for, like, trading companies or 
financial sector and so forth. When I make a friend belonging to the 
community, my network will develop further from there. 
Q: Aha, like they invite you to their dinner since you are working for the same 
business sector. Is it something like that? 
Qian: Yes, it is. So, how can I explain…now it’s so easy to create a 
community through social network services. So, it’s easy to make friends. 
 
Thus, they enjoy close-knit compatriot communities where friendship snowballs 
(Conradson and Latham, 2005a). Especially in the age of digitalisation, SNS plays an 
important role in developing their community and facilitating their life in Japan as 
another Chinese informant describes: 
 
Chinese embassy in Japan hold a few events for local Chinese every year. 
Since there are a lot of Chinese, it is easy to get together. We have a party 
inviting Chinese friends. In Japan, we have a Chinese SNS where we 
organise many kinds of activities and I enjoy hiking there. There are indeed 
many sorts of activities like making dumplings and exchanging second-hand 
home appliances. We can do most things on the SNS so it’s fairly easy to 
make friends…the name of the SNS is KOHARU, written as small (Ko) 
spring (haru) in Chinese characters. A Chinese living in Japan created it. 
There are Tokyo and Kansai (Osaka area) versions. If you have questions 
on visa and so forth, you can post it on the SNS and get advice. 
(Ting) 
 
It is almost the de-rigueur for Asian migrants to utilise the SNS to settle well in Japan. 
This can be applicable to not only Chinese but also other Asian migrants such as from 
India. What’s more interesting, the above testimony also shows a significant difference 
134 
 
from the western migrants: ‘intervention’ of their home governments. She said that the 
Chinese embassy holds a few events for Chinese people to widen migrants’ networks. 
This research also located the different levels of intervention made by foreign 
institutions (e.g. embassy) and this influenced the way in which HSMs settle. While the 
western embassies in Japan, in general, are mainly for the establishment society, the 
Asian embassies are prone to invite a variety of compatriots regardless of their social 
positions to their annual events. A Singaporean, who is in a similar career stage with 
Alastair is occasionally invited to the Singaporean Embassy in Japan unlike the UK 
migrant. 
 
Singaporean Embassy in Japan stages several events annually. They can 
be a party like bonenkai (end-of-year party), Singapore national holiday and 
so on. On these occasions, everyone gets together and enjoys Singaporean 
dishes. This is a good opportunity to widen my Singaporean network. It’s 
mainly for Singaporeans but if you have a Singaporean spouse, you can 
join it as well.  
(Junjie) 
 
Enjoying national dishes and developing networks in the Embassy is a remarkable 
contrast with Alastair who pops up in the Scottish bar to eat haggis on his own although 
they belong to a similar social class in Japan. It is clear that the Asian embassies are 
keener to offer chances for their compatriots to get together using their institutions than 
the western embassies that are deemed an unfriendly establishment by their nationals. 
The literature has suggested the level of support made by migrants’ home 
governments also has great impacts on the life of HSMs (Harvey, 2008; Harvey and 
Beaverstock, 2017); however, it has not been clear why there are different levels of 
support by governments. 
 
There are two possible reasons to explain the contrasted approaches toward the 
compatriot migrants among the countries: national strategies of return migration and 
international relations. The fieldwork identified Singapore and China as major countries 
keen to offer socialising occasions for their nationals in Japan. These two countries 
have national strategies to induce their emigrants to come back (Ho, 2008). For 
instance, the Singapore government has an official website to widely advertise job 
opportunities for their emigrants so that they can easily return to Singapore. Keeping 
close contacts with Singaporean emigrants is one of the important missions for the 
Singaporean Embassy in Japan; therefore, they often provide social occasions for 




As for China, it can be more about sensitive Japan-China relations. As the two 
countries’ relations are politically sensitive, the Chinese government may try to protect 
their nationals by linking them with the Embassy (or their public institutions) in Tokyo. 
It also plays as an agency to improve the sensitive Sino-Japanese relations as Yang 
said she is often invited by the Chinese institutions in Tokyo to a short trip (one or two 
days) where she socialises with not only fellow Chinese but also Japanese who are 
interested in China and discuss international issues. 
 
Apart from these macro issues such as governmental strategies, micro (i.e. individual 
level) factors also play out in determining compatriot socialisation. As shown in the 
theoretical framework, the cultural differences are the significant factor for HSMs 
having a firm compatriot community in a host country (Beaverstock, 2002; Saxenian, 
2006; Harvey and Beaverstock, 2017). If this theory could be also applied to HSMs in 
Japan, the western migrants would be more likely to mingle with their compatriots than 
the Asians who are supposed to share similar culture with the host Japanese. 
 
One of the possible explanations that this was not the case is that most of the western 
informants have Japanese partners. Since they are already embedded in a Japanese 
community, they do not necessarily socialise with their compatriots. In other words, the 
social capital originating from compatriot groups constitutes a private ‘insurance’ which 
will help them when they face challenges (e.g. visa process as Ting suggested so they 
can ask for advice on their Chinese SNS). Therefore, if they already have the reliable 
network in a local community through marriage, they do not require the insurance any 
more. Here, the compatriot community is not craved for. 
 
This, however, poses another issue to, this time, the Asian migrants. Ironically, the fact 
that the Asian migrants rely on their compatriot network means they need the 
‘insurance’ to stabilise their life because they have less contact with the Japanese 
community unlike the western migrants. As evidence, the Asian informants who show 
stronger compatriot networks are less likely to socialise with Japanese like Ting 
benefitting from the KOHARU SNS struggles: 
 
I had a Japanese pen pal before coming to Japan. At that time, I thought it’s 
easy to make Japanese friends. But now I feel a friendship gap with 
Japanese. It’s challenging to have a friendship from the bottom of the 
heart…I often drink with my Japanese doki (see glossaries) colleagues but 
I still feel a gap…though it’s hard to explain. Like in China, if we are 
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She speaks Japanese fluently and is well-versed with Japanese culture but still 
struggles in making Japanese friends like she expected in China. This suggests 
language capability is not a sufficient condition (JAPI, 2010). Then, what are crucial 
factor(s) to socialise with the host nations? As Ting suggested, many of the Asian 
migrants think that the ways in which Japanese people develop friendship is rather 
different from their culture although none of the western migrants indicated so. For 
Asian migrants, Japanese people are not so deeply involved in friends’ lives and not 
so dedicated compared to their home friends but respect the individual decision made 
by them—some of them think it’s western style. This means Asian migrants have 
distinctive values from Japanese regarding forging friendships. As a result, they are to 
rely on their migrant community. 
 
5.8 Discussion 
Stretching out from migrants’ motivations to their network strategies, this chapter 
presented key factors to comprehend policy and societal obstacles they should 
negotiate. Among others, this research gives three important policy and academic 
implications: the distinctive Asian and Western mobility patterns, invisible obstacles 
together with marginalised groups in immigration control, and network building. 
 
First, the stark contrast of motivations contextualising distinctive migration strategies 
predicating the ways to accumulate migration capital. East-Asian migrants are still 
influenced by their traditional Asian values like Confucianism, whereas the western 
migrants follow the nomadic traditions (Conradson and Latham, 2005a) invoking their 
walkabout. Among others, the findings foregrounded a unique push factor of Chinese 
young migrants who crave ownership of their life course disentangling from the social 
pressures. Although the traditional push factors mainly posit poverty, political or 
household strategies outlining the agency of remittances or democratic motivations 
(King, 2012a; Findlay and Cranston, 2015), this research illuminated more 
individualistic and socio-cultural push factors which brings migrants’ determinants to 
bear on self-autonomy. It suggests not only economic or democratic gaps but also 
implicit social pressures defining their migratory decision. This will lead to significant 
policy implications for both sending and receiving countries when the educational and 
skill level of potential migrants becomes higher since it enables them to be more mobile 
and longing for freedom (Florida, 2005; Ho, 2011). In the context of war for talent 
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(Chambers et al., 1998; Beechler and Woodward, 2009), a country that offers better 
‘freedom options’ succeeds in acquiring more HSMs (Favell, 2008). 
 
Nonetheless, the findings showed Japan’s policies were incongruent with the 
implication. The data, for instance, problematised the stringent conditions for 
permanent residency as Chinese migrants worried it would take a long time to be 
eligible especially when they engage in international business requiring them to move 
out of Japan intermittently. It also affects the migration strategies of the western HSMs 
who came through walkabout. As John described, young migrants reflect on their 
career and life plan when they reach their 30’s; this is coherent with the western culture 
where people tend to be highly mobile in their 20’s and start to immobilise in their 30’s 
(Findlay et al., 2015; Scott, 2013). They happened to remain in Japan, but later 
considered their life at their turning point. However, as it takes 10 years to gain a 
permanent residency, they are left in limbo for some years after becoming 30. In 
addition, it is difficult to obtain a mortgage unless a foreigner has a stable residential 
status albeit the stable housing is key for the long-term life plan (Izuhara, 2015). As a 
result, the strict condition of the permanent residency may drive out HSMs like John. 
These issues offer intriguing empirical evidence that Japan’s policies are not well 
designed to encompass the life course of HSMs which are different from Japanese 
conventions. This resonates with Findlay et al. (2015) calling for a life-course approach, 
whereas the plethora of migration scholarship has centred on the cross-sectional 
dimension (Findlay et al., 2015). My findings corroborate that the policies should be 
updated in line with the life-course dynamism of not Japanese but HSMs. 
 
Another policy implication is inductive from the stigmatised cohorts exemplified by the 
Filipina nursery teacher. The case represents immigration control can exclude HSMs 
who can contribute to the socio-economic development of Japan due to 
preconceptions. It also attested to the significance to accept diversified HSMs to 
innovate Japanese society. As already shown, the transnational elite geographies 
have mainly focused on intracompany transferees as HSMs (Beaverstock and 
Broadwell, 2000; Salt and Wood, 2011); however, the findings call for the wider 
concept of HSMs to examine its policies and impacts by shedding light on the 
overlooked cohorts. Approving diversity also plays a far-reaching role in addressing 
societal barriers such as education. Unlike the scholarly works on the level of education 
or Japanese language (Oishi, 2012), the research identified the fundamental obstacle 
for Third Culture Kids (Pollock and Van Reken, 2009) as the lack of diversity inhibiting 




Finally, the research also unearthed new dimensions in network building. The 
traditional theory positing the forging of compatriot networks is an indispensable 
strategy for not only elite migrants (Beaverstock, 2002; Saxenian, 2006; Harvey and 
Beaverstock, 2017) but also the middlings (Scott, 2007; Ryan, 2015). Harvey (2008) 
raised some explanatory variables determining the degree of compatriot networks such 
as cultural gaps. However, the research witnessed that the western migrants socialise 
less with their compatriots comparing to Asian HSMs. It alludes that the western HSMs 
were more embedded in the Japanese community than the Asian HSMs who were 
prone to rely on ‘virtual’ networking through SNS. Indeed, SNS brought by rapid 
technological development has become an important agency for mobile citizens 
(Hannam et al., 2006), but this research also suggests it also carries the risk that 
migrants can be far more disembodied from the local host community by offering an 
easy but intangible social plaza. More research is needed to further examine how the 
SNS promotes or impedes the social cohesion. 
 
As shown in this chapter, the case of Japan’s policy and societal barriers surrounding 
HSMs attest to unique features that the past scholarly works on western countries 
(Scott, 2006; Harvey, 2008) and intracompany transferees (Salt, 1983; Beaverstock, 
2005) have not assumed. Yet, these are only partial dimensions HSMs navigate 
through. There is another aspect we should explore to unfold the labyrinth of skilled 
migration in Japan: labour market and employment relations, which also brings into 
play: what, how, and why are they so distinctive? 
 
Now let me take you into the next maze—workplace issues. 
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Chapter 6 Negotiating Professional Careers: Japan’s 
Endemic Employment Practices (Findings 2) 
 
Wakisaka-san (author’s name), what you are dealing with 
 is not reality or knowledge. It’s image. Right? 
Informant (Executive of international recruiting agency) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
He smiled when he read the company rulebook but stopped smiling when 
he realised the rules applied to him, too. He was instructed not to walk 
around with his hands in his pockets, shown how to choose the correct place 
to sit at a meeting and given the words of the company song for studying 
after work. He learned the etiquette for offering and receiving business 
cards, the staff canteen rules (take one portion of vegetables, one portion 
of rice and finish eating by the time the bell rings) and the regulations for the 
company dormitories for new recruits (regular room checks, no noise, no 
females). 
Niall Murtagh (2005), Blue-Eyed Salaryman75 
 
The word “salaryman” was coined in Japan and regarded as Japanese-English, but 
now in the Oxford Dictionary is described as “a WHITE-COLLAR worker” (Turnbull et 
al., 2010: 1351). The above cited autobiography was written by Niall Murtagh, a blue-
eyed salaryman, who was one of the pioneer HSMs making a career in the Mitsubishi 
group. The citation underlines the mysterious everyday practices in the salaryman life 
such as rules on politeness and seniority (prohibiting leaving hands in the pocket and 
choosing a correct seat), loyalty to the company (learning the company song) and 
welfare (company dormitories). It indeed depicts funny and attention-grabbing 
anecdotes HSMs are surprised to find; however, it deserves full scrutiny given the fact 
it has been 30 years since he got his foot on the bottom rung of the career ladder in 
Japan. Murtagh (2005) also needs epistemological examination on the salaryman’s76 
life. 
 
This chapter deals with RQ 3 & 4 aiming to make sense of what working in Japan is 
like for HSMs through the epistemological approach that Murtagh’s (2005) storytelling 
                                            
75 This is the description written on the cover of the book for its advertisement. “He” indicates its author, Niall 
Murtagh. 
76 As the gender biased name (salaryman) implies, the word has been deeply associated with the male breadwinner 
model. Even though the gender neutral expressions (e.g. business person) have become common in Japan, the 
word salaryman still prevails. 
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lacks. This chapter specifically casts light on recruiting practices, career making and 
workplace collegiality via the theoretical optics of transnational elite geographies and 
Japanese employment relations.  
 
Amazon UK introduces Murtagh (2005), saying “With his shiny suit, his attache case 
and a good dose of humour, Niall Murtagh describes a world that is an utter mystery 
to most westerners” (Amazon UK, 2017). This chapter also illuminates how the 
perceptions of ‘mysterious’ Japan have been constructed and affect migrants’ decision. 
 
6.2 Seeking employment: the recruitment practices can be a listed 
heritage  
Unlike other developed countries, Japanese companies still keep unique recruitment 
practices called “Shinsotsusaiyo” (simultaneous recruitment of new graduates). Unlike 
the western countries where the recruitment is based on vacancies, there is one fixed 
date when Japanese firms generally hire new graduates: the 1st of April right after they 
graduate from universities in March. It is when the news covers an initiation ceremony 
together with messages from the CEOs (e.g. Nikkei shimbun, 2016). For instance, on 
the day in 2016, 2,239 newly employed joined the ceremony of Toyota in their 
headquarters in Aichi (Toyota, 2016). Thus, Shinsotsusaiyo is the system which 
recruits a large number of new graduates at the same time and this means there is 
little room to hire people away from this opportunity. In the western countries, the timing 
of starting a career for a new graduate varies—someone finds a job the next month 
they graduate but others not. With Japan, the season of job hunting and the start of 
employment are completely decided. 
 
As Japanese corporations prefer new graduates (Tsuru, 2016), it is unlikely that people 
who have already graduated can use this Shinsotsusaiyo scheme; therefore, some 
students intentionally delay their graduation when they fail to find a job before 
graduation (Oishi, 2012). HSMs who studied in Japan and faced this unique 
recruitment practice claimed that it confounded them. For example, Jiawei was not 
eligible to use the Shinsotsusaiyo scheme because of age restriction, so he sought a 
job in foreign affiliates offering the western style recruitment system77. This case 
indicates that the diversified life paths, such as a postgraduate-gap-year (c.f. 
walkabout westerners in the previous chapter) or doing a second bachelor, are unlikely 
to be approved in Japanese firms. For example, Haruno Yoshida, former-President of 
                                            
77 He had already graduated from a Chinese university when he did his second bachelor in Japan. When he 
graduated from a Japanese university over 10 years ago, the corporations had the age limitation to apply for 
Shinsotsusaiyo. Even though he was a new graduate, he was ruled out of the process because of his age. 
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BT Japan, is one of the sufferers although she is now a successful businessperson, 
chosen among the top 50 World's Greatest Leaders (Fortune Magazine, 2017). 
 
I started my career at Motorola‘s (Tokyo office), the (then) largest American 
telecom manufacture. This is because I fell ill just before (university) 
graduation, which took four years to recover. (After recovering,) I made 
every effort to find a job but only this American firm gave me an offer. 
However, the workplace was beyond my expectation. It was something I 
could have only seen in a film. They provided every employee with an Apple 
computer regardless of position. I had been so despondent over my lost 
career before that, but I vividly remember that the job attracted me instantly. 
(Yoshida, 2017: 28) 
 
Yoshida described missing the Shinsotsusaiyo scheme “as if I was left in a dark alley. 
I despaired over my future wondering if there was any place I could live” (Yoshida, 
2017: 28). Shinsotusaiyo is the rite of passage that the young Japanese should be on 
to reach ‘a place in the sun’. 
 
In addition to the inflexible system, the recruiting process itself also bemuses HSMs. 
As the corporations severely scramble for talented new graduates, they try to start the 
screening process earlier than their rival companies. Thus, the screening starts one 
year before their graduation. This timing is declared by Keidanren, the employers’ 
organisation, on the consensus of their member companies to prevent the companies 
from beginning the process too early which will impinge on students’ study (Keidanren, 
2017). In 2013, Keidanren announced a delay to the screening process so that the 
students can have enough time to study rather than job hunting (Keidanren, 2013). 
Therefore, the screening for FY 2017 employment started on the 1st of June in 2016, 
two months later than usual.  
 
Despite this change, job hunting starts 10 months before the graduation. If they are in 
a master’s programme which usually lasts for two years, they need to start job hunting 
at the beginning of their second year. It would be too early for them to decide their 
professional career. All the informants experiencing Shinsotsusaiyo were also 
surprised at the unusual atmosphere at the venue of the interviews.  
 
Yang: I realised that it (job hunting in Japan) can be a (UNESCO’s) World 
Heritage. My great surprise was that everyone wears a similar black suit 
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with a similar black briefcase and even similar facial expression. Everyone 
is the same, indeed. 
Q: Is it different from China? 
Yang: Unlike Japan, there’s no such thing like a recruit suit (a suit 
specifically made for job hunting). They wear a suit but there are many 
variations in colours and forms. 
 
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) lists 
cultural and natural heritages of unique and great value to be protected, which include 
Machu Picchu (Peru), Serengeti National Park (Tanzania) and Venice (Italy) to name 
only a few. Yang cynically claims Japan’s recruiting practices are so unique that it can 
also be listed on a par with these invaluable heritages. Her account points to 
homogeneity of the Japanese recruiting practices such as wearing “a recruit suit”. 
 
Source: Photo AC (2018) 
 
Toyokeizai, a classic business weekly magazine in Japan, explains how to choose a 
recruit suit irrespective of gender: it should be dark in colour like black without stripes, 
saying “please consider which suit can be the best for you to gain a job offer rather 
than what you would like to wear…the best is neutral appearance” (Tamiya, 2014). 
Neutral means that a student should not stand out in appearance; therefore, everyone 
should look the same otherwise s/he may be regarded as too fabulous. That’s why 
stripes are to be ruled out because it seems (to employers) too decorated. This is 
indeed about appearance but it also alludes social norms of being the same as others. 
What the traditional Japanese companies don’t like is outliers rather than being 
Figure 6-1 Typical recruit suits 
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characterless. It in fact clearly links with the lack of diversity of Japanese firms as 
shown later. 
 
6.3 Japanese language: pursuing foreigners who can be ‘Japanized’ 
One of the biggest issues in working in Japan is language. Surprisingly, even in foreign 
affiliates, the basic infrastructure such as IT systems and employment contract are 
constructed in Japanese. A representative in an international recruiting agency clarified 
that 90 % of the human resources they introduce to their clients—mostly foreign 
affiliates—are eventually Japanese since the jobs require both English and Japanese. 
This tendency is more evident in traditional Japanese firms whose recruiting staff 
acknowledged that they only recruit Japanese speakers even when they recruit HSMs 
abroad. As described earlier, recruiting the talent abroad is a new movement in 
Japanese large enterprises; however, they mainly target people who studied Japanese. 
One of the HR staff in a large trading enterprise explains the reasons: 
 
If someone who does not speak Japanese works here, I think they cannot 
be successful since their initial office and training will be in Japan. They will 
struggle in Japan (if they don’t speak Japanese). So it is defacto that no one 
who doesn’t speak Japanese has been offered a job. 
(Employer of migrants 2) 
 
This company is famous for their transnational business, holding global branches and 
offices in over 100 locations, and as a matter of fact, their employees speak English. 
They offer rich foreign (not only English) languages training to the employees. Besides, 
all the young staff—in their 20’s—are given an opportunity to be seconded overseas 
to gain worldwide views. Nonetheless, they still require Japanese skills from their 
foreign staff working in Japan. This notion is somewhat relevant since most of the 
informants also reiterate the importance of the Japanese language. When being asked 
whether they recommend working in Japan to their compatriots, they mostly answered 
it is recommendable on the condition that they speak Japanese. Apart from the reasons 
explained earlier, some HSMs raised the necessity of language abilities for socialising. 
 
As is often the case with elite circles, the tacit knowledge and informal communication 
play the important role in facilitating their work (Millar and Salt, 2008; Beaverstock and 
Boardwell, 2000; Yamashita, 2008). Language ability is then crucial to access informal 
networks. Since most of their colleagues or superiors are Japanese, it is extremely 




Speaking Japanese is fundamental. If you don’t speak Japanese, you 
cannot get information (relating to the company). Even if you got the 
information, you don’t understand what it really means. We go out for a drink, 
but if you don’t speak Japanese, you cannot join the community.  
(Yu) 
 
The information widely ranges from private gossip to confidential business, rumours to 
truth. Then, of more significance than gaining the information is to evaluate and screen 
it to make the most of it. Considering it is challenging even for Japanese employees, 
HSMs need to have enough communication skill in Japanese to do so. However, this 
doesn’t indicate that HSMs should employ native-level perfect Japanese. To some 
extent, common sense and experience will help them weigh up the information 
appropriately. 
 
Nonetheless, the demand for language skills becomes sometimes too high for the non-
native. HSMs occasionally feel pressure that they are expected to master Japanese to 
perfection. For example, although writing Japanese is quite hard for foreigners and it 
is not easy to attain the native level, their colleagues sometimes indicate their mistakes 
in writing. This is highly frustrating for HSMs since they think they are not hired to 
employ perfect Japanese but another skill which their Japanese colleagues do not 
have such as foreign languages, special skills or networks. Given the expertise to 
complement Japanese staff, HSMs can make other contributions in the business than 
Japanese language. They, however, feel their employers set greater store on 
Japanese skills than the unique expertise they hold. A French interviewee gave an 
example: 
 
I have a friend who is very fluent in Japanese. And he worked for Japanese 
medicine maker, and the problem was he was hired as a foreigner to open 
new markets. But he told me that at a certain point, his colleagues and his 
hierarchy asked him to be more Japanese. He received many emails saying, 
“Oh, you are writing, you are making mistakes in your Japanese emails”… 
At first, they employed him as a foreigner, but little by little, he thought that 
he has the impression that the whole group is asking him to become more 
Japanese. But that’s not why he was employed. And he got depression and 





Her account clearly shows that Japanese corporations would like to hire foreigners 
who can be ‘Japanized (to behave like Japanese)’ rather than someone who can offer 
unique expertise. This Japanization is borne out of peer pressure, which this study 
terms ‘coerced harmonisation’. A ‘recruit suit’ is also a form of coerced harmonisation 
as it psychologically compels the students to look the same so that nobody stands out 
in appearance. It can be more clearly understood within the concept of diversity 
(Vertovec, 2007, 2012, 2017) which calls for acknowledging the human differences in 
society: diversity covers a wide range of dimensions including (yet not limited to) age, 
ethnicity, gender, physical abilities, race, and sexual orientation (Wrench, 2015). 
Therefore, it not only focuses on nationalities but also includes clothing (appearance). 
In this context, the custom of the ‘recruit suit’ is a typical example demanding 
‘sameness’ while suppressing diversity. Kandola and Fullerton (1998: 8) use a 
metaphor of ‘mosaics’ to describe the necessity to acknowledge the differences and 
bring more diversity into the workplace:  
 
Differences come together to create a whole organisation in much the same 
way that single pieces of a mosaic come together to create a pattern. Each 
piece is acknowledged, accepted and has a place in the whole structure.  
 
Mosaic is enriched by the different colours and shapes of the parts. However, Coerced 
harmonisation will dim the brilliance. The Japanese workplace prefers the 
characterless to the uniqueness in selecting and maintaining its members: Coerced 
harmonisation is the mechanism to exclude the organisational outcasts. This is, in fact, 
not only the issue of language fluency nor clothing but ultimately cultural assimilation: 
 
They (employers) want foreigners who understand the Japanese culture 
and who understand that. I don't know, when they go inside, they have to 
take the shoes off, use the chopsticks, you know, it’s ok for them Japanese 
food, understand the hierarchy in Japan, the way things get done. They also 
want someone who can comfortably fit in, and that’s not very easy. The only 
way you learn how to fit in as a foreigner is having been here for a period of 
time. So that’s the really big, natural barrier that exists. 
(Executive of international recruiting agency) 
 
Language skills and familiarising with Japanese culture are requisites for HSMs 
working in Japan. As shown earlier, non-Japanese firms also demand the Japanese 
language skills since the customers and colleagues are predominantly Japanese. On 
the other hand, the research identified some areas which don’t necessarily require the 
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language skills: engineers and scientific researchers. Especially in the technological 
area such as chemistry or IT, the lingua franca is English. Therefore, it is natural to use 
English in their office or laboratories and HSMs working for the areas do not find any 
language barriers. Also, some informants point to the change in another field. For 
example, an accounting firm tends to hire an accountant78 who can speak Japanese 
since their clients have been operating their business in Japanese even if they are 
foreign affiliates. However, as more and more foreigners acquire an important 
managerial position, a change seems to be emerging: 
 
As Japanese companies get more globalised, we see the increase in foreign 
managers who have a position with ‘C’ such as CEO, CFO and CIO. They 
do not necessarily speak Japanese…so far we thought that the staff in an 
accounting firm in Japan should speak Japanese, but recently, it has been 
changing. Even if they do not speak Japanese, as long as they have specific 
skills, they can, for example, develop sales networks to non-Japanese-
speaking clients.  
(Brandon) 
 
Engineers, scientific researchers and accountant/consultant do not need excellence in 
Japanese since their working language and field have already become 
internationalised. This suggests if the number of foreigners in Japanese companies’ 
clients and employees surge, their working environment might be more 
internationalised; consequently, the Japanese language might be a smaller barrier for 
HSMs. Bringing diversity in the workplace will be a practical solution for the language 
barrier as a Chinese informant said: 
 
If the number of foreign employees increases in my company, the required 
level of Japanese writing skills will be less demanding although it was 
demanding before. This also makes the office more open and friendly. For 
example, my friend works for a foreign affiliate. Her boss is from the UK and 
her colleagues come from various countries, but her office is in Tokyo. The 
ambience in the office is different from the one which has 80% Japanese 
                                            
78 They are more consultant than accountant since their business is to give advice to Japanese companies on 
overseas business (particularly regarding country risks, financial regulations and M&A process). Given the 
different financial rules, the qualification of accountant is not mutually recognized between Japan and the UK (or 
USA either). Therefore, the overseas-qualified accountant is not expected to do accounting. 
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and 20% foreigners like mine. If there are more foreigners doing strange 
things (in my office), the office will be warmer or more frank, I suppose. 
(Qian) 
 
If there are “more foreigners doing strange things”—strange things can be interpreted 
as a non-Japanese behaviour—, Japanese colleagues or hierarchy will be more open 
minded because there are a lot of people who do not stick to Japaneseness. This 
simply means the Japanese office has not been diversified; therefore, they are strict to 
‘outliers’ and one of the good examples is demanding perfect Japanese and to be 
Japanized. Again, coerced harmonisation is the process to debar the outliers. Yet, in 
a truly diversified office, few people employ Japanese perfectly and no one is required 
to be Japanized anymore; then, the office becomes more friendly and accepting. In 
short, the language issue is deeply linked with the diversity and openness in the 
workplace. 
 
6.4 Career making: I can’t imagine maybe that scenario  
There are remarkable distinctions in the perception of Japanese employment practices 
between Asian and Western HSMs. Asian HSMs tend to take a lifetime employment 
system and seniority salary positively and praise Japan’s unique corporate culture 
such as industriousness of their colleagues as an Indian informant articulated “I would 
like Indian young people to learn Japanese spirit such as politeness, industriousness 
and punctuality” (Raj). Thus, Asian HSMs are prone to think that they can enhance 
their professional career in Japan. They especially applaud rich training systems in 
Japan that an informant describes as “second university”: 
 
I was surprised that I can keep my business diary during the office hour. I 
was just surprised because during office hours, I thought that I need to 
present the outcome, but it was said that I can reflect on my day writing the 
diary…Japanese company basically has the stance to train their staff from 
scratch offering rich and practical training. Japanese company is like a 
second university for the newly recruited. Training costs a lot. We do not 
have such a system in China. 
(Qian) 
 
All the informants, both Asian and Western, admire the rich training systems—whether 
it’s OJT (on-the-job-training) or Off-JT— offered by their employers. However, the 
Western HSMs confront communal challenges in building their professional career. As 
seen in the theoretical framework chapter, the traditional theory posits HSMs are 
148 
 
motivated by career enhancement and remuneration when they migrate (Salt, 1983, 
1988; Salt and Findlay, 1989; Beaverstock 1990, 1991). However, this theory is not 
necessarily applicable to the western HSMs in Japan; they think working in Japan 
would not be the best option for their professional career and financial rewards due to 
three reasons: career specialisation, endemic office customs such as slow decision 
making and risk averse behaviour, and the seniority system in promotion and salary. 
 
First, the personnel strategies in Japanese corporations are different from the western 
ones. They prefer a generalist to a specialist when they foster their employees who will 
eventually be in a managerial position (Whiltshire, 1995; Kumano, 2017). This is why 
Japanese companies prefer Shinsotsusaiyo where they can train new graduates from 
scratch to imbue them with their corporate philosophy and generalist career (Tsuru, 
2016); in fact, the rich training system is designed for this purpose. The relatively small 
mid-career labour market (Oishi, 2012) also indicates this pro-generalist stance since 
the mid-career market is usually for specialists. Being trained to be a generalist means 
the employees do not know their ongoing career or choose their career path79. Looking 
back to his initial corporate training, Alastair expressed his surprise to find his fellow 
new-recruits not knowing to which division they would be attached. 
 
The differences (between Japan and the UK) are that when we apply for a 
job, we apply for the specific position (in the UK). Whereas something I know, 
cos I went for (new recruits’) training, and I was incredibly surprised to know 
that people don't know where they are going to work. Even they don't know 
which division they are working on. Like, I can’t imagine maybe that 
scenario… You have to specialise in something in the UK or America (to 
make a professional career). 
(Alastair) 
 
Alastair himself was employed as an IT specialist and assigned the appropriate post 
before coming to Japan; however, it is normal that Japanese new-recruits do not know 
where to work at the initial stage of their training. Becoming a generalist means HSMs 
cannot develop their specific skills and this keeps them from driving up their value in 
the international labour market. It is also frustrating for them that their companies do 
not have specific personnel strategies for their foreign employees. Most of the HSMs 
except for intracompany transferees claim that they are equally treated as Japanese 
                                            
79 Generalist career path itself is not only unique in Japan. For example, the UK civil servants also follow a 
generalist career (Rhodes, 2011) like Japanese bureaucrats, who will be discussed in Chapter 7. However, the 




employees, meaning the career path is also similar with their Japanese colleagues. 
However, many HSMs think that the HR strategies (eventually their career path) should 
be differentiated from Japanese employees since their background is different. That is 
to say, they demand more specialisation of talents rather than being a generalist. 
Besides, they attribute the void of specialisation to Japan’s loss of competitive edge 
over their international competitors. To some HSMs, fostering a generalist does not 
seem to be a well-devised personnel strategy but just a convenient excuse to gloss 
over the unorganised vision of HR management.  
 
Second, HSMs are often confounded by the endemic business customs in Japan. A 
good example is Nemawashi (prior consultation): when people make a decision in a 
meeting, they usually consult the meeting members informally and discuss the issue 
prior to the meeting. In other words, they hold a meeting but the decision has been 
already made. HSMs claim that the meeting should be basically held for fruitful 
discussions to produce better ideas, but in fact, it’s just a ceremony. This kind of 
unfamiliar business custom seems to be unnecessarily time consuming to HSMs. 
Endlessly having meetings and consulting one another, an informant criticises, makes 
the decision making excessively slow. 
 
We have incredibly many meetings (in Japanese office). When I was 
working in Hong Kong, I could do anything after getting an approval from 
my manager if there’s something I would like to challenge. However, in 
Japan, I need to get approval from various managers in addition to 
consulting with other related divisions. It takes lots of time…Moreover, they 
are too conservative. We don't know whether a new project can be 
successful or not without giving it a try, but they are too cautious to decide 
anything. After all, the decision takes too long. 
(Yu) 
 
Since Japanese decision making requires consensus rather than leadership, HSMs 
undergo an enormously (and unnecessarily) stressful process in their workplace. 
Besides, the risk averse behaviour attracts criticism as well. Many HSMs complain 
there is no dynamism: “Japan is the last country where the revolution occurs” as Jake 
cynically expressed. Normally, highly motivated HSMs are willing to tackle challenges 
that always entail risks which Japanese corporations, especially large enterprises, try 
to avoid as much as possible. So when HSMs would like to try something new, it needs 




Another custom that HSMs cannot get familiar with is sensitive hierarchy. As is widely 
known, Japan is a highly hierarchical society and business practices reflect the 
tradition. For example, Eric feels uncomfortable when he should change his language 
depending on the person he speaks to—Japanese grammar is honorific— and even 
his behaviour in line with seniority he encounters in the business. He is still bemused 
with this although he has now been in Japan longer than in his home country: 
 
We always have a sense of hierarchy though it’s changing. Why do you give 
meishi (business card) ? The first reason to give meishi is to know whether 
you are above us or very above us? Or same level? Without meishi, we 
might make a mistake. So we have to give a meishi. This sense of hierarchy, 
in Canada, we don't have. Canada is more the sense that all the people are 
equal. So for the westerner, that’s one hard thing in Japan. It’s always TPO. 
You have to figure out the part of TPO and you have to figure out if the 
people with you are equal or less, or above? Or do you have to change your 
language or behaviour? In Canada, or North America, we think that there’s 
something wrong if you change your behaviour. The good person always, 
you know, basically should be the same. That’s the good person…So the 
sense of TPO is very unique to Japan, I guess. 
(Eric) 
 
Exchanging a business card is an indispensable rite in an initial business meeting 
whether it is formal or not. A new-recruit is educated to carry their business cards 
always so that they can introduce themselves anytime as there is a Japanese saying 
‘your business card is your face’, implying the business card represents all of you. This 
is why Murtagh (2005) learned the etiquette of the business card. 
 
Hierarchy is also an important matter among colleagues. As a Japanese company is 
highly hierarchical, they always need to be aware of the ranking of their colleagues. 
Then, how do they rank their colleagues? Professional titles can be a measure but 
there is another implicit but simple signal. An intracompany transferee was surprised 
at a strange custom in Japan even though he worked for its Taiwanese affiliate: 
 
Everyone knows who enters the company like “when that person started 
working and he is bra bra bra”. Everyone knows it completely. It’s 
surprising…In my job in Taiwan, I tend not to realise hierarchy since my 
business is something to do with the USA. I roughly know who started 
working in my company and who is senior or junior to me in terms of 
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professional career in my office. But if they are capable, it’s not rare that 
they are promoted higher than their seniors. However, I was surprised that 




Japanese workers often use a term indicating the fellow employees who started 
working in the same year: doki (literally ‘same period’). As already elucidated, new 
graduates simultaneously join a company on the first of April each year. This labels 
them as the cohort starting their career in a specific year. It is thereby common to hear 
something like “he is a doki with her (joining the company) in 2005”. It’s a similar 
expression to ‘Class 2005’ in English although it means the timing of graduation. 
 
The reason why the notion of doki is so prevalent is it is profoundly associated with the 
seniority system: when someone becomes older, they are promoted at a similar pace 
with their doki. Japan’s promotion system is based on seniority, namely, the age or 
length of professional career. A typical promotional path for the white-collar in a large 
enterprise is starting the career at 22 years old and being promoted to manager by 
middle or late 30’s (Koike, 1991). This means it is very unlikely that someone becomes 
a manager in their 20’s even though they have enough capability to manage and lead 
a project. Since Japanese corporations have a lifetime employment system, where the 
employed keep working for the same company until they reach the retirement age, 
people can easily make a tally when someone becomes manager based on the year 
of their entry to the company (e.g. the doki members starting working in 2005 will 
become a manager around 2020). 
 
This seniority system is based on how long people are in the office rather than 
achievement. Obviously, this is hard to understand for HSMs who take meritocracy for 
granted for career assessment. Interestingly, when it comes to the seniority system, 
the overall expression made by the Chinese informants in their 20’s was a well-known 
joke among Chinese migrants: 
 
Japanese companies are more socialistic than China. 
 
Everyone is promoted quasi-equally and the salary is increased according to the length 
of career regardless of their achievement. This is Japan’s seniority salary and 
promotion system, which socialistic countries even do (can) not have. However, age 




I would want the company to evaluate my ability properly and reflect it on 
my salary. For example, when people get older, they understand IT less. 
But young people like us have grown up using the technology and employ 
it like our second language. So I have a kind of feeling like why the older 
employees can get more salary than us even though they understand the 
technology much less than us. 
(Luke) 
 
Apart from meritocracy, the seniority system has another serious issue that affects the 
life course of HSMs: it takes a long time to be promoted as Jake ironically said “it’s like 
waiting for someone to die. It’s too long (to acquire an appropriate position)”. Eric 
alternatively described it as if staying on an escalator: all of the doki stay on a slow 
escalator which brings them up at a certain pace. There, it doesn’t matter how 
competent they are. Most of them arrive at the same stage regardless of achievement. 
For talented people, it’s nothing but a waste of time and hardly acceptable. Therefore, 
it’s likely to drive out the capable HSMs.  
 
6.5 Salary: the salary is higher in Beijing and Shanghai than Tokyo  
The seniority system implies the lower salary for younger professionals since the pay 
structure is designed to be accelerated according to the length of career with their 
employers. In this respect, Japanese companies are less attractive especially for 
young HSMs. 
 
In comparing the remuneration, the exchange rate and living standard should also be 
considered; therefore, it is not easy to make a justifiable comparison. However, the 
majority of western respondents pointed out that they would be better off if they 
returned to their home country. For example, Luke earned double the salary when he 
was a part-time service staff in the business class lounge of a local airport in Australia  
than as a full-time IT engineer in Japan.  
 
In fact, the unattractive remuneration is not the only issue for the western people; 
Chinese respondents also indicated that the pay is not necessarily higher in Japan 




6.6 Work-life balance: you see your colleague not doing anything, just 
sleeping 
6.6.1 Staying in office without working? 
Last, overtime work should be reconsidered even though it is not a universal issue 
depending on the companies HSMs work for. The argument was also mainly posed by 
the western HSMs, claiming that their Japanese colleagues feel the need to do 
overtime to show their commitment. In fact, they are unnecessarily staying in the office 
until late at night but it seems they are not productive or give a good performance by 
doing overtime. A British manager carefully chose the words. 
 
Business practices which I think if we are truly trying to be an international 
force, we need to reconsider. A general point would be(…)if I 
consider(…)the length of hours people work(…)Here in Japan, people work 
long time. Or, I should say that they are staying at the office a long time, but 
I’m not sure whether they are working. This culture also spills over. When 
you finish your work at one o’clock in the morning, I cannot see any efficient 
and clear mind to work the next day. From the morning to one o’clock, but 
this is the culture…I think somebody needs to think about that. Because 
when I come in next morning, you see your colleague not doing anything, 
just sleeping. It’s not a complaint, it’s just an observation. 
(Scott) 
 
Japanese colleagues like to ‘stay’ at the office. They, however, are ‘not working’ but 
just showing their commitment to the company. In fact, this is closely related to the pay 
structure without meritocracy: the evaluation is not based on achievement but the 
length of time being in the office so the way they can show their dedication is being in 
the office until late at night. However, in the western countries where meritocracy and 
work life balance are the norms, staying in the office every night means they are not 
capable of doing the assigned work within the given timeframe. Or, the amount of 
assigned work is unrealistic so the employer might face a lawsuit for giving them 
excess burden. In either case, it is not a healthy working environment. 
 
Interestingly, the kind of obsession to be in the office late can be seen in foreign 
affiliates as well. Jack who once worked in a branch of an American bank, claimed his 
former Japanese boss suggested that he should be in the office longer. This means 
the employees are under peer pressure to stay in the office. Also, some HSMs were 
surprised to see their colleagues sleep at their desk at lunch time. This shows how 
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their colleagues are tired in the office. If they went back home earlier and had enough 
time to sleep, they would not need to sleep at lunch time. 
 
6.6.2 Emerging reform 
Nonetheless, there is evidence pointing to the reform of inefficient work practices. For 
instance, some of the respondents are not allowed to be in the office after a certain 
time. In the case of an electronics company where Sarvesh works—a traditional large 
firm employing over 25,000 people—If they remain in the office after 18.00, their boss 
will receive a caution by email the following day and is required to explain the reasons 
together with counter-measures to the HR division. As shown earlier, one of the 
reasons that Japanese staff remain in the office is peer pressure from their colleagues 
or boss. However, if the boss is required to send their staff home early, this pressure 
does not exist anymore. This company initially started this system to reduce the cost 
of overtime in the 2008 worldwide recession, but it eventually improved work-life 
balance. 
 
Regarding long working hours, the perception of Chinese HSMs is noticeable. They 
initially came to Japan to study and then finally found a job in Japan; therefore, they 
are better informed of and prepared for Japan’s corporate system including long 
working custom. However, especially the younger generation found it is not so bad 
compared to what they thought: 
 
I would say it (long working hours) is a preconception. People (in China) 
often ask me if it’s hard to work in Japan because of long working hours. 
But I think it’s not as hard and long as they imagine. I go back home when I 
feel like, even though my boss is still in the office. 
(Qian) 
 
Working long is a stereotypical image in working in Japan for foreigners but in fact, it’s 
changing gradually. This is a good example of Japan suffering from the stigmatised 
image, which ultimately keeps HSMs away from Japan.  
 
6.7 Stigmatised image: crazy, pricey, closed 
As a matter of fact, the general impression of a nation plays a pivotal role when HSMs 
choose a place to work (Harvey and Beaverstock, 2017). In this sense, Japan is in a 
very weak position to attract specifically western people. All of the western respondents 
suggested that their perception of Japan before residing was aged, fantastic and 
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unbalanced. In sum, the three stereotypes that represent Japan for the westerner are 
crazy, pricey and closed as Jake put it: 
 
Most people think it (Japan)’s exotic and even though it’s getting cheaper, 
they still think Japan is expensive. The perception of Japan is very old and, 
perhaps 20 years outdated(…)the general impression of Japan is very 
closed, like, police do not stop the hate speech. 
(Jake) 
 
Cool Japan became a slogan promoting the cool image of Japan from the early 2000s 
(McLelland, 2017); however, Cyrille said “they (Japan) advertise Cool Japan but 
French people only knows Kyary Pamyu Pamyu, that kind of crazy thing”. Kyary Pamyu 
Pamyu is a Japanese gothic pop star singing techno-sounding songs with amusing 
dance. Likewise, the vast majority of HSMs raised that the western people have the 
kind of geeky image originating from manga (Japanese cartoon), computer games, or 
cosplay (dressing in a costume like a manga character). These outdated and crazy 
images are attributed to the unbalanced propaganda of the western media like picking 
up a bizarre thing and exaggerating it. There are lots of things about Japan misreported 
in western society but also there are more things unreported there. The image is not 
limited to craziness; Japan is not a place for the westerners to live peacefully. A 
western migration expert explained: 
 
Informant: The image is still aged. They think it’s very expensive. Right? 
You know, they have all sorts of strange images. Like pollution, which is not 
right.  
Q: Do some people have the image of pollution in Japan? 
Informant: Well, I think, Wakisaka-san (author’s name), what you are 
dealing with is not reality or knowledge. It’s image. Right? Again, if you are 
talking to(…)Americans(…)they couldn't really tell the differences among 
Beijing, Tokyo and Hong Kong. It’s all in the same part of the world and it’s 
all crowded and all polluted (to them), right? I still heard people saying to 
me about Tokyo being a dangerous place because of the nuclear disaster 
in 2011. Right? People still think it’s a dangerous place, radiation. There are 
a lot of very strange perceptions out there. 
(Executive of international recruiting agency) 
 
Asian HSMs also have a stereotypical image of Japan, however, they regard Japan as 
innovative, high quality, and polite. Strikingly, the image of Japan has stark contrasts 
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between the western and the Asian migrants. The former thinks it is crazy but the latter 
takes it as innovative; similarly, pricey versus high quality; closed versus polite. 
 
Table 6-1 Contrasted perception on Japan 
 For Western migrants For Asian migrants 
Japanese culture is… crazy innovative 
The life in Japan is … pricey high quality 
Japanese people are… closed polite 
Source: the fieldwork 
 
Although these images seem to be contradictory, they just take out one aspect from 
the same phenomena. In other words, the western takes it negative or strange but the 
Asian considers it constructively. More interestingly, the western migrants normalise 
their stereotypical images about Japan as they adapt to Japan but the Asians tend to 
retain the image. For example, a Singaporean migrant put it: “My image on Japan has 
not changed greatly. Before coming here, I thought Japan is a country where people 
are polite and industrious. I still have the same impression” (Junjie). On the contrary, 
a UK migrant said: 
 
Many British people do not realise the attraction of Japan cos a lot of people 
have never been to Japan. I told a lot of friends that I am coming to live in 
Japan, their image of Japan is Akiharaba. So you know, like anime. But you 
know, if we travel like one hour away from Tokyo, there is a lot of 
like(…)rural culture of Japan and very respectful of their past also. So when 
you are able to show more history of Japan, not just a crazy side, there is a 
lot more to Japan. I think it’s great. 
(Alastair) 
 
Akihabara is the area filled with electronics and geeky shops which range from Japan’s 
animation to costume play. There are myriads of guidebooks catering for non-
Japanese and without exception, they emphasise the ‘craziness’ of Akihabara (e.g. 
Zatko, 2014; JMS Books, 2015; Rowthorn et al, 2015; Milner and Richmond, 2015) 
which, as Alastair noted, represents Japan. As an exemplar, Lonely Planet Tokyo, an 
influential book for the western nomads (Bowen and Clarke, 2009), describes 
Akihabara: 
 
Experiencing blazing neon, the maid cafés, the latest electronic gadgets and 
otaku (geek) vibe…Akihabara is today more synonymous with otaku and 
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their love of anime, manga and J-pop culture…you are sure to encounter 
cosplay (costume play) maids enticing customers into maid cafes. Electric 
town is across the street, and holds a dense concentration of electronics 
shops, comic and DVD retailers and figurine sellers. (Milner and Richmond, 
2015:147-178) 
 
More precisely, “otaku” signifies “addicts of video games, manga, and anime” (JMB 
Books, 2014: 64). This citation on Akihabara clearly defines the westerners’ image of 
crazy Japan that the western media like to play out as Cyrille also pointed out. However, 
as Alastair alluded, they gradually normalise their unbalanced image after residing in 
Japan. In sum, the western and Asian migrants have different images at the initial point 
when they enter Japan but they eventually appreciate the positive side of Japanese 
culture. 
 
6.8 Attraction to work: water and safety are free  
This dissertation has thus far attempted to illuminate the ills HSMs suffer in Japan; 
however, it should also examine which points HSMs are attracted to when they decide 
to keep residing in Japan since enhancing the attraction is equally important to remove 
the barriers in critically examining how Japan can attract more HSMs. As this research 
includes informants having stayed in Japan relatively longer—half have lived in Japan 
more than 5 years in total, which is the condition of obtaining a permanent residency 
in many developed countries as shown already—, they had enough experiences in 
explaining the advantages of working in Japan as well as the disadvantages. In 
addition, considering that they chose to spend a good length of time in Japan, it is 
reasonably expected that they find more attraction than dissatisfaction; exploring these 
reasons also offer valuable insights. 
 
Among others, they all admire the highest standard of public safety in the world. 
Without doubt, public safety takes the greatest priority for HSMs especially with family. 
The experienced visa lawyer, who unveiled the income-tax-avoiders, recalled 
interesting cases he found: some of the migrants who shunned away from Japan 
voluntarily returned to Tokyo, reconsidering the merits to live there at the expense of 
heavier income taxes. 
 
I asked them why they returned to Tokyo. Their answer was safety. For 
example, one of the clients moving back from Hong Kong told me that the 
safety issue made him decide. But I wondered that Hong Kong is not too 
bad in terms of safety. The crime rate is not much higher than Japan. When 
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I asked him so, he asserted that it is only Tokyo where he can leave his 
children alone to commute by train. There’s no capital city other than Tokyo 
where he can let his children by themselves go for any lessons (e.g. piano 
or swimming). It’s unimaginable in Hong Kong. He needs to hire a maid or 
driver who takes his children to the lessons or school. Otherwise, it will be 
regarded as child abuse (to leave children). In the US, for instance, it will be 
child abuse if you make your kid go alone to school miles away, right? 
However, in Japan, it’s normal that small kids alone ride on the train to go 
to school. Japan is such a safe country, he insisted. 
(Migration Expert 9) 
 
This high-salary migrant realised that the safety surrounding his family is more 
important than money. If he spent money to rent a luxury apartment like a fortified 
castle boasting cutting edge security measures to monitor the building 24 hours and 
hire people to accompany his children, he could secure their safety. However, it is 
nothing but confining his children in the ‘fort’. He finally chose not to segregate his 
children from the outside world and he thinks only Tokyo can offer the environment. 
An Australian migrant also marvelled at the fact that there was no riot or violence when 
Japan was hit by the Great Earthquake in 2011, saying 
 
I like Japan because it’s always stable even in the event of emergency. 
People behave well and steadily even in the chains of great earthquakes. 
At that time, they queued to get water in order. There’s no country like Japan 
where people keep order and society stable in such a tremendously hard 
time. They are really reliable. 
(Luke) 
 
There is a well-cited Japanese proverb to describe what it offers: Water and safety are 
free. In fact, Japan enjoys abundant clear water and public security; however, they are 
not free in reality—people pay bills for water and taxes for security—. Still this proverb 
shows the fact that people benefit from what they take for granted while in other 
countries regardless of developed or not, these are not equally available. HSMs also 
realise that the saying hits the point. However, it is not only water and safety that are 
offered at low cost. 
 
HSMs, whether they are western or Asian, also appreciate the high standard of life for 
the price. For example, although Chinese migrants indicated that the salary level is 
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now quite similar to mainland China, they think it is much cheaper to lead a high 
standard of life in Japan. 
 
In fact, I could get more salary if I worked in Beijing or Shanghai, but it’s 
more expensive to live there. So in this sense, it’s more value for money to 
work in Japan. Not only housing but also food or other things I would like to 
buy are cheaper in Japan. So, ah, I think it’s Japan where I can get things I 
want in my daily life, by that I mean… the quality of life. I can get them from 
my own effort (without my parents’ support) as long as I work in Japan. 
(Yang) 
 
As she put, a lot of HSMs indicated instead of earning less salary they gain a fairly 
affordable high quality of life in Japan. Foods are great. They can always pop in a 
convenience store scattered around and open 24 hours. There are well organised 
public transportations which are always reliable so they do not need to keep a car. A 
western executive asserted that Tokyo offers incredibly affordable housing for the 
location. 
 
You can have a great lifestyle. Right? You can’t walk to work (in any other 
capital abroad). Right? There are a whole bunch of people living in Ebisu 
(posh area like Chelsea in London) or you know, erm, Shibuya (commercial 
area like Oxford Circus in London) or whatever. These days in cities like 
Sydney or London or New York, walking to work? No way! You can’t afford 
to rent the apartment. If your office is in Times Square, how do you afford 
the apartment anywhere near that? Right? Likewise, if your office is in 
Covent Garden, only the rich can afford the apartment near there. Right? 
Whereas in Tokyo, I know a lot of people who live near the office. They are 
not top ranking managers in a company. They are a regular, you know, and 
consultant. 
(Executive of international recruiting agency) 
 
Due to deflation and shrinking demography, the housing price in Japan has not seen 
a drastic surge for the last two decades (Izuhara, 2015) unlike in other large global 
cities80. Ironically, HSMs had a preconception that it is very expensive to live in Japan 
before migrating, but they soon recognise it is incredibly affordable to enjoy the high 
standard of living. Interestingly, many of the informants, even those who spoke English 
                                            
80 There are no restrictions on foreigners’ house/land ownership. 
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during the interview, depicted this in a Japanese phrase: 住みやすい sumiyasui (it’s 
easy to live). 
 
Another reason why Japan can offer an easy-to-live lifestyle is its unique traditions 
deeply rooted in community. As already discussed, Asian people think Japanese 
friendship is rather more western style—business like—than theirs. This means 
Japanese culture is somewhere between Asia and the western countries (Rowthorn et 
al, 2015). For the western migrants especially, Japanese society strikes the best 
balance between the two. For example, Japan still keeps a closely knit community—
Asian character—while it boasts a modern lifestyle based on the cutting-edge 
technologies—western character. Scott raised an example talking about Japan’s 
traditions in school: Undokai (sports day). Every school has a sports-day once every 
year holding various sports competitions for both children and their families. It takes a 
whole day and they have a picnic style lunch break in the field at the school. That is an 
event when family confirms the strong tie with community. 
 
I like the sports day. Because everybody gets involved and sits there, and 
eating together, and watching the kids. We don't get that so much in Europe. 
It’s again trying to bring the family and social things together. As a modern 
country with a lot to offer, er, it(Japan)’s just a fantastic place. I’m constantly 
enthusing to people about why (Japan) is good…And you have a lovely 
balance between old and new. You know, in America, all, or something is 
maybe 80 years old. Or 100 years old. In Germany, you know, very old 




Like this account represents, Japan is a unique country where foreigners can find the 
best mix of new and old things —not only physical things such as castles and buildings 
but also people’s behaviour in keeping a strong community. Eric describes the well-
balanced philosophy focusing on the business practices. 
 
I believe with all my heart that Japan is leading the world in terms of a kind 
of wisdom, a type of life vision, that probably the whole world can learn from. 
And so that’s what I would say to someone coming to live in Japan because 
this kind of not equal-centric, this kind of more thinking about others, 
thinking about the environment and thinking about the community. Japan is 
a good place in that way and I think that’s why people come and live in 
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Japan for that reason…there are so many business practices that probably 
we have to update in Japan. On the other hand, we have some great 
strengths. Ah, for example, we don't just focus on stock holders, we also 
focus on the wide varieties of stakeholders. You know, we think about 
customers, of course we do that in north America but also think about our 
business partners, we think about our employees and we think about people 
in the community. And we are always balancing the needs of stakeholders. 
And we’re also taking long term, which is very powerful for business. That’s 
Japan’s great strength, I think. 
(Eric) 
 
In the western countries, making profits is an important mission for private companies. 
However, Japanese companies are more balanced between profits and public 
interests. This is because Japan still keeps a tradition of “thinking about others” and 
“thinking about community”. This balanced view still attracts some of the HSMs even 
though there are many business practices to update. 
 
6.9 Discussion 
This chapter has highlighted Japan’s unique labour market and employment relations 
from the antithetic perspectives of Asian and Western migrants. Tokyo is arguably one 
of the largest global cities in the world (Sassen, 2001; Florida, 2008); however, this 
research revealed the workplace there, even the transnational large enterprises or 
foreign-affiliated firms, is far from cosmopolitan. Drawing on the analysis, Table 6-2 
compares how the informants perceive employment and business practices between 
Japanese and Anglo-American firms. 
 
Table 6-2 Comparison between Japanese and Anglo-American firms on skilled labour 
 Japanese Anglo-American 








contractual / job hopping 
expertise as prerequisite 
Business practices long-term profit pursued 
wider stakeholder 
short-term profit pursued 
shareholder-centric 




Reflecting the contrasted employment systems, it might be intriguing to conclude 
Japan should take the Anglo-American approach to attract more HSMs as the literature 
has suggested (Oishi, 2012; Tsukasaki, 2008). Admitting it is one of the options, my 
findings call for more scrupulous discussion about the implications. Of significance is 
each component in employment and business practices is firmly and organically 
interlocking each other. It is this dynamism that should not be neglected. It follows that 
merely adopting the Anglo-American model may not always bring the best solution for 
both employees and companies, and even for local communities. 
 
For instance, lifetime employment requires a generalist career since if an employee 
has only a specific skill, they have no option to be transferred when the company gives 
up the related business. US companies exploit lay-off in this case, but a Japanese 
company tries to keep the employment by transferring employees to another business 
area all due to lifetime employment and for the sake of wider stakeholders like the local 
community (Wiltshire, 1992). This generalist career making requires a lot more 
investment than employing a specialist—who is available on the market—such as rich 
training system which all the informants admired and Qian called “second university”. 
She was surprised to be encouraged to keep a diary during office hours even though 
it does not create any direct profit for the company. This shows Japanese firms’ HR 
management training the employees long-term (Kumano, 2017) without short-term 
tangible profit. If the Japanese employment systems lack only one of the elements, 
lifetime employment or long-term management practices cannot be maintained; for 
instance, when an employee is autonomous in career making and only specialised in 
what they want, how can the company protect the employment when the business 
segment has no further concern? Fluidity, in other words generalist career, plays the 
crucial role in securing lifetime employment and long-term vision. 
 
Nonetheless, some may contest the necessity of lifetime employment and long-term 
vision which do not serve the investors’ interests. Considering even more expanding 
cross-border business and the war for talent (Chambers et al., 1998; Beechler and 
Woodward, 2009), Japanese firms may pave the ‘third’ path of employment practices 
so as to cater for ‘global’ talent. As evidence, the findings indicated the few emerging 
trends such as international internship for IT specialists—Alastair’s case. Pursuing 
work-life balance and hiring non-Japanese-speaking-staff also connotes the incipient 
shift. In this sense, even though Japan still keeps numerous endemic employment 
relations, some of the corporations including traditional ones are seeking to reform the 
practices little by little. More research is needed to confirm whether this embryo turns 




Rather than the distinctive employment relations, what is more striking in this research 
is the lack of diversity which constitutes more fundamental and formidable obstacles 
for HSMs. It is true that the Shinsotsusaiyo scheme is attached to a core element of 
lifetime employment and generalist career; however, it should not be an excuse to keep 
the notion ‘everyone should be the same’ like wearing a uniform-like-recruit-suit or 
excluding characterful personalities. The characterless recruit-suit is a proxy for 
‘coerced harmonisation’ in the workforce, aiming to debar the organisational outcasts. 
This is also represented in implicit peer-pressure from Japanese colleagues to HSMs 
to be Japanized like demanding Japanese skills to perfection. Japanese firms should 
appreciate the diversified values and behaviours, which eventually innovate the 
workplace. 
 
Another implication is invisible but influential powers of images/imagination tying to 
‘otherness’ discourses. The findings manifested that Westerners held unbalanced 
images of Japan, which sometimes become radicalised (e.g. geeky Japan and 
pollution) widely spread over, thereby keeping potential HSMs from Japan. This 
provides detailed evidence of the concept of otherness where ‘self’ is always superior 
to ‘others’ in ethnic encounters (Said, 1978, 1993; Eagleton, 2000; Sakai, 2000; Mouer 
and Sugimoto, 2002; Urry and Larsen, 2011). Said (1978) claimed the ‘West’ has 
relentlessly devised the stigmatised images of the ‘East’ to construct the advanced 
Western self-image81. However, this research has also revealed it is not only the 
Westerners but also some Asians who held the otherness imagery of Japan—like the 
case of Qian whose Chinese friends assume long working hours. 
 
In the study of ‘otherness’ discourses of Singaporean and British HSMs in China, Yeoh 
and Willis (2005: 282) indicated “the uneven nature of the power relations” between 
the HSMs and their local counterparts invoked by “the transnational (migrant) elites 
who, by dint of superior economic resources as well as geographical mobility, are in a 
strong position to construct spatial, temporal and psychological ‘limits’ ”. Disentangling 
their argument from the ‘physical’ territories where migrants have existed, my findings 
suggest “the uneven nature of power relations” are also at play between the ‘potential’ 
skilled migrants and the host economy. Here, ‘potential’ means the HSMs who would 
work in Japan if the stereotypical imagery did not limit their decisions. It is reasonably 
expected there are certain ‘potential’ cohorts as many informants felt incongruence 
with the initial images of Japan when they gradually accustomed locally. They even 
                                            
81 Said’s concept of ‘East’ principally referred to Arabia, however, it has later developed to encompass Asia. 
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enjoy positive surprise when they discover a new aspect of Japan rebalancing their 
‘self’ and ‘others’ images. 
 
This in turn may hint at a question continually posed by transnationalism researchers 
(Sakai, 2000; Yeoh and Willis, 2005): how can we create a multi-identitied workplace 
where ‘self’ and ‘others’ can merge and even heighten each other? As the respondents 
voiced, one of the Japanese virtues is the well-balanced idea of traditional/cutting-edge 
or shareholders/stakeholders. Striking a critical balance will eventually mediate the 
point(s) where ‘self’ and ‘others’ become ‘us’ peacefully like these informants 




Chapter 7 Wrecked Migration Governance: Absent Captain 
and Unconcerted Crews (Findings 3) 
 
It’s the reality that we have made up for  
a weakness (of the policy) using a makeshift.  
(former policy maker 3) 
 
Imagine, you are on a big ship. 
 
One morning, when you wake up, the ship is wrecked. The crews are unconcerted and 
the passengers are confused. People onshore seem to be indifferent to the ship. What 
is worse, no one can ‘identify’ the captain albeit there are several people who claim to 
steer the ship. In a wrecked ship, the captain generally takes the primary responsibility 
to save the passengers by mobilising concerted crews. Nevertheless, we need to start 
to identify who the captain is. 
 
—This is an analogy created by the author to describe the core problems of migration 
governance in Japan: the crews are bureaucrats; passengers are migrants; and people 
onshore are Japanese citizens. Then, who is the captain? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the context of the world’s fastest ageing and declining population, together with 
severe global economic competition, the need to accept large numbers of migrants 
has been pointed out in Japan (e.g. Liberal Democratic Party, 2008; Keidanren, 2015). 
Nonetheless, migration policies have not been drastically reformed and such a 
discussion has yet to emerge. The Prime Minister declared in the Parliament that 
Japan will never become an immigration state82 (Abe, 2015). The lack of urgency in 
the government to such an urgent social change has remained a mystery.  
 
This chapter therefore examines how migration policies are designed and implemented 
in Japan and clarifies the issues underlying migration governance, via the conceptual 
framework of the Kasumigaseki bureaucracy not studied in migration literature. This 
dissertation has so far cast light on migrants’ individual trajectories and decisions 
through their perceptions (i.e. it draws on micro/meso analysis). However, to unfold the 
labyrinth, we should also possess a wider point of view to comprehensively look at the 
                                            
82 In the context of his speech, immigration state refers to ‘settlers’ state’ (c.f. Okamura, 2018), meaning Japan 
would not become a settlers’ state such as USA, Canada and Australia. 
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overall picture, especially, through the macro perspective foregrounding the 
governmental and political behaviour affecting the life of migrants. 
 
First, this chapter illustrates three policy backgrounds outlined in this chapter to 
describe policy failures and its causes brought by bureaucrats and politicians. Then it 
indicates the compartmentalised governance structure and the main actors in the 
policy making process: Ministry of Justice (MOJ); Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare (MOL); and, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industries (METI). Labour 
migration policies are designed through the egalitarian consultation process joined by 
several Ministries; however, as no Ministries display leadership in a negotiation 
process, there is no driving force to conclude the negotiation. In addition, the 
bureaucrats tend to eschew the controversial policy areas which are tremendously 
arduous in reforming although they are well aware of the necessity to amend them. 
This research illustrates why the administrative elites deliberately choose the band-aid 
solutions in lieu of fundamental policy reform. 
 
Another main topic in this chapter is unique bureaucracy in MOJ where the immigration 
bureaucrats face different career tracks from the mainstream, thereby driving them to 
be passive and domestic-oriented. Yet, the policy failures are not only attributed to the 
bureaucrats: the next section describes why politicians do not exert their leadership in 
reforming the policies and shows how formidable it is to arrive at conclusive political 
decisions. Finally, to counter these issues, the way in which a cross-ministerial 
leadership works is examined based on the empirical data. The author ultimately 
accentuates the necessity to introduce a new negotiation scheme instead of the current 
system to expedite the policy debates in the decision-making process. 
 
7.2 Three policy backgrounds of the research 
As is written in the method chapter, the findings here are drawn from the three 
qualitative data sets: (1) the textual context from various documents such as the 
minutes of government meetings and newspapers, (2) the interviews with migration 
experts, and (3) interviews with HSMs. The reason why the multi-faceted data were 
employed is primarily to assess the migration policies, from which barriers in migration 
governance are analysed. Evaluating policies is somehow difficult because it depends 
on the (personal) normative measures. For example, some people may think multi-
lingual policies in a local community are good but some insist only the nationally 
prevailing language—Japanese in Japan—should be spoken. Deciding which policy to 
take is due to local voters’ values on whether they appreciate diversity or homogeneity. 
Politicians—whether in Japan or the UK—usually exploit a rhetoric to discuss 
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controversial policies that the decision is entirely left to voters’ choice and they are 
loyal to the decision. This voters’ choice itself is formed from normative values which 
are hard to observe concisely. Another issue with policy evaluation is it is often 
premature to judge a policy outcome when researching the latest policy changes. The 
researchers do not always have enough data to make a judgement on whether the 
shift of policies is in line with the purpose and national interests. 
 
To overcome these hurdles, the scope of the data collection was narrowed to obvious 
policy failures. It thus focused particularly on the three policy-related areas to assess 
the migration policies. One is the Points-based System (PBS). Another is the policies 
on permanent residency and the other is ‘neglected policies’ on unskilled labour 
scheme. These three policy areas are clear policy failures through which this research 
points to the unique migration policy making process. 
 
7.2.1 Points-based system 
As detailed in Chapter 3, Japan launched the PBS in 2012 to attract HSMs. The 
number of HSMs who benefitted from the scheme for the first 11 months was merely 
434, far fewer than the government expected. The figure remained extraordinary low, 
only 0.2 % of all the HSMs (Oishi, 2014). This is why the initial programme83 is deemed 
a policy failure as MOJ (2015b) admits. Subsequently, the qualitative research 
revolved around this policy failure in examining the policy making process. 
 
7.2.2 Permanent residency 
PBS was a proactive reform by the government; however, policy failures do not occur 
only when the government changes something. They can also occur when the 
government fails to change the policies. On this point, the research also followed the 
discussions on permanent residency to attract and retain HSMs, which had been one 
of the main focuses in the government’s economic policies (Japanese Government, 
2015). As is revealed in the previous Chapter, some of the HSMs wish to access 
permanent residency to stabilise their life in Japan long-term. The requisite conditions 
for permanent residency, however, have remained stricter than other industrialised 
countries. This is also an apparent policy failure. Although the government clearly 
seeks to retain HSMs, they have failed to implement the policy HSMs call for, and 
subsequently, some of the HSMs consider leaving the country due to the stringent 
conditions. Therefore, the interviewed policy makers were asked about policies on 
                                            
83 Given the policy failure, the programme has been amended several times since the second year. Accordingly, 
the number of PBS users increased to 8,515 as of June 2017 (Immigration Bureau, 2017b). 
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permanent residency to check how far they understand the situations HSMs face 
during the interviews. 
 
7.2.3 Neglected policies on unskilled labour scheme 
The research also casts light on another neglected policy, a ‘golden rule’ which has 
been unchanged for decades. This rule is the principle of migration policy underpinning 
the idea ‘accepting HSMs but not unskilled workers’. This fundamental principle was 
first agreed in 1988 in the Cabinet decision and it has since been firmly unchanged 
with this principle found almost everywhere in the government’s basic documents on 
foreign labour (e.g. Japanese Government, 1999; MOJ, 2015b; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2004). 
 
Having said that, it is an open secret that part of this invariable rule has been a dead 
letter since there exist many ‘back doors’ to bringing in unskilled migrants such as 
technical trainees and Nikkeijin (Tsuda and Cornelius, 2004; Oishi, 1995; Liu-Farrer, 
2011a). It has been fiercely criticised that the policy (not accepting unskilled labour 
migrants) and the reality (creating several back doors to accept unskilled migrants) are 
inconsistent and the policy should be updated to accommodate the reality (Sellek, 
2001). Nonetheless, the fundamental solution to clear up the contradiction has not 
been shown by the policy makers yet. This is why this dissertation calls it neglected 
policy. Through the interviews, policy makers were asked a question on whether or not 
this golden rule can be changed in the near future. 
  
7.2.4 Multi-faceted approach 
To carve out these policy failures, the interviews with various interest group were 
conducted. Among others, the HSMs, the important stakeholder in migration policies, 
were interviewed to evaluate the policies as already mentioned. In short, the policies 
are assessed by the users (HSMs) to find out to what extent the sellers (policy makers) 
understand HSMs’ practical needs and how efficient their marketing strategies (the 
relative attractiveness of policies) are. This ‘marketing’ orientated idea is not really 
common amongst Japanese policy makers84; however, it should be reiterated that 
attracting HSMs is one of the top priorities in the national economic strategy initiated 
by Prime Minister Abe (Japanese Government, 2015) and the ‘marketing’ is a 
fundamental tool to attract customers (HSMs). In other words, the analysis here is 
                                            
84 In the UK visa process, an applicant is asked to answer questionnaires on whether they are satisfied with the 
process or not and the aggregated data is made public. However, this kind of customer feed-back does not exist in 




supported by the data from HSMs who witnessed the Japanese government’s ill-
designed marketing. 
 
It is also significant to clarify who ‘policy makers’ are. In this research, they are defined 
as either Kasumigaseki bureaucrats or politicians in the national Parliament which is 
the sole legislative institution in Japan. Although the municipalities have been playing 
the central role in supporting migrants especially in the policy area of social cohesion 
(Yamawaki, 2002; Aiden 2011), they are ruled out in this study. This is simply because 
they are not given authority to control immigration; this paper attempts to reveal the 
migration policy making process in the central government which is exclusively 
conferred the power to decide who can work in Japan. 
 
Nonetheless, it is also important to recognise that the policy makers may include some 
migration experts if they are in a position to influence the policy discourse. Concretely 
speaking, each Ministry has a consultation meeting with experts (usually called 
Shingikai in Japanese) where the bureaucrats or Ministers listen to experts’ views in 
deciding the direction of policies. A good example is Shutsunyukoku kanri seisaku 
kondankai (Advisory board for Minister of Justice on migration policies) organised by 
the Minister. When a Minister tries to change a policy, s/he usually consults expert 
members of the meeting and the members compile a report on possible reforms. As 
this proposal becomes the basis of policy debate in the government and Parliament, 
the migration experts who join this meeting could be a quasi-policy-maker or indirect-
policy-maker. They are chosen from academics, business sectors, municipalities, 
labour unions and lawyers85. In this research, they are referred to as migration experts 
as distinct from the ‘professional’ policy makers. 
 
Table 7-1 The composition of expert members in Advisory Board for Minister of Justice  
Background Number of Members 
(The 7th Board: 2017 onward) 
Number of Members 
(The 6th Board: 2014-2016) 
Academics 11 11 (10)* 
Business Sectors 2 3 
Municipalities 2 2 
Labour Unions 1 1 
Lawyers 1 1 
* One member died during the term.      As of April 1st, 2017 
  Source: compiled from MOJ (2017) 
                                            
85 In this sense, municipalities can be an indirect policy maker, however, their representation in the Board is much 
lower than academics as seen from the composition of the Board. 
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7.3 Migration policy governance structure in Japan 
Labour migration policies in Japan are controlled by multi-actors in the central 
government. Especially, this research identified the following three Ministries as main 
actors: MOJ governing immigration control/residential permits; MOL in charge of 
migration labour policies, social welfare, securities and healthcare; and, METI in 
charge of industrial competitiveness. 
 
These three Ministries have different missions, consequently sometimes holding 
different stances on the direction of migration policies. MOJ positions itself as ‘neutral’ 
in terms of labour migration while MOL is restrictionist and METI is eager to accept 
foreign labour as the industries require them. 
 
Table 7-2 Main actors in the central government 
Ministry Mission Features 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
Immigration Control, 
in charge of the Immigration 
Act 
Neutral, calling themselves 
‘moderator’ 
Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare (MOL) 
Labour Policies, Social 
Welfare, Social Security, 
Healthcare 
Restrictionist, 
backed by labour union and 
local communities 
Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industries (METI) 
Microeconomic Policies, 
Industrial Competitiveness 
Admissionist, backed by 
industries 
Source: the fieldwork 
 
This chapter will focus on the agency of the above three principal actors since they 
have primarily played main roles in recent labour migration policies for the last decade 
when Japan reformed its policies including launching the PBS. There are, however, 
some more policy actors including the Cabinet Ministry/Secretariat86  dealing with 
policy coordination for Nikkeijin; the MIC in charge of policies of local communities and 
resident registration; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of visa issuance and 
international treaties; the MEXT in charge of education and Japanese language 
training; the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism in charge of 
technical interns in construction industries; the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries in charge of technical interns in the primary industry. Thus, it is a remarkable 
fact that many Ministries are involved in labour migration policies in Japan. 
                                            
86 Although Cabinet Ministry and Cabinet Secretariat are two different governmental bodies, they are interwoven 
since the staff normally hold two posts in both bodies concurrently.  
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7.4 Compartmentalised governance structure 
7.4.1 Non-existent leadership 
According to the Immigration Act, the primary authority in charge of labour immigration 
control is MOJ. However, the Act prescribes a consultation process among the 
Ministries. This means that the main players equally or horizontally join the decision-
making process and even if one of the players rejects a policy change, the policy 
cannot be implemented. This is stipulated in the Immigration Act Article 7 (3), declaring 
“The Minister of Justice shall consult with the heads of the relevant administrative 
organs in prescribing the Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice”. Actually, this briefly 
encapsulates the intricacy of the labour migration governance structure: the main 
actors (the heads of the relevant administrative organs) should reach a consensus to 
change policies (the Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice). 
 
One of the biggest issues here is that there is no driving force or leadership in the 
consultation process. Therefore, it requires long debates to reach a consensus. For 
instance, the PBS was firstly proposed in 2009 by the governmental council and finally 
launched in 2012. To make matters worse, the bureaucrats take it for granted that it 
must take time to negotiate and conclude the decision. In a sense, it is de-rigueur that 
they hold full discussions at the expense of time and costs. The data from a former 
policy maker showed they are addicted to time-consuming negotiations. 
 
There are necessary discussions, indeed. So it is unfair to give it up just to 
save time. METI considers policies from business perspectives and MOL 
does from workers’ perspectives. MOJ reflects on their opinions as a 
moderator. I can’t say that’s good or bad. But it is significant to find a point 
of compromise through consultation even if it takes time and is inefficient. 
(former policy maker 1) 
 
Indeed, labour migration policies can influence all the areas where people live and 
work. Therefore, the central government needs to consider a policy from every aspect 
such as society, industry, labour market, social securities and welfare. As MOJ only 
covers immigration control, the above mentioned influenced areas are beyond their 
mandate. In this regard, it is plausible and necessary to examine a policy from various 
aspects with other Ministries. Perhaps, the consultations across authorities are not rare 
in other industrialised countries; Nonetheless, in Japan’s case, it takes too long to 
reach a consensus as the respondent admitted (it is significant to find a point of 




Would this situation make policy makers properly respond to the challenges when the 
country faces severe international competition and rapid social changes in 
demography? When asked this question, all the policy makers pointed to the necessity 
of expediting the consultation process but still there was no concrete solutions shown. 
This is because there is no one taking up leadership in the consultation process due 
to equally distributed vetoes as is clarified in the Immigration Act Article 7 (3) conferring 
authorities to all the relevant Ministries. 
 
Another identified issue arising from the absence of leadership among Ministries is the 
deficiency of strategies. Both business and public sectors have long called for national 
strategies across Ministries to attract skilled labour migrants (Keidanren, 2004, 2008; 
Kodo jinzai ukeire suishin kaigi. 2009), for designing migration policies requires a long-
term broad perspective which is based on cross ministerial policies to address various 
issues such as visa screening and social cohesion. Former policy maker 2 said it 
should be something beyond the immigration control because the strategies should 
involve the whole packages that the government and business sectors can provide 
them with such as special treatments of tax, labour condition, or child education for 
their family and so forth87. Obviously, the strategies will bring fundamental reform to 
the current policies if such special treatments are given to HSMs. In general, no 
Ministries will pose strong objections to these strategies, but it is also true that no 
Ministries will initiate the debate inviting all the relevant Ministries simply because this 
leadership itself is beyond their role: administrative laws endow each Ministry with 
detailed authority except for cross ministerial leadership. 
 
The fact that the driving force to coordinate the direction of policies is non-existent 
demonstrates challenging reforms have always been left untouched for decades. A 
good example is the ‘golden rule’ which was earlier described as neglected policy. The 
principle is quite unique even in Asia since other industrialised economies like South 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong have a formal programme to accept 
unskilled workers (c.f. Chapter 3). It has been the root cause of numerous 
contradictions leading to ‘back doors’ through which unskilled migrants enter the 
country. With regard to the possibility to abolish this controversial golden rule, the 
preponderance of policy makers suggests it is unlikely. Take, for example, the case of 
a former policy maker. 
                                            




Changing it (the golden rule) takes lots of energy, in my view. So I think we 
can take another measure without changing it. We have actually taken a lot 
of measures. For example, (unskilled foreign) people work in the 
construction industry. It is not well-deserved to discuss the principle even 
though it takes lots more energy than tackling individual policy issues 
because there are various opinions. For instance, in the Liberal Democratic 
Party (the ruling party), there are politicians who are cautious (in accepting 
unskilled migrants) while some politicians insist we cannot manage without 
foreign workers in the declining population. It is difficult to coordinate these 
views into one. It’s the reality that we have made up for a weakness (of the 
policy) using a makeshift.  
(former policy maker 3) 
 
This testimony comprehensively couches their difficult position and consequent (but 
easy) counter-measures that the interviewed policy makers share. On the whole, there 
are two main reasons not to change the golden rule. First, it is possible to keep the 
status quo without amending this golden rule. As a matter of fact, Japan recently 
launched a new policy to accept foreign builders who are categorised as unskilled 
workers so as to alleviate the tight labour market for the Tokyo Olympics in 2020 
reconstruction from the 2011 Great Earthquake in the construction industries. The 
government did not need to change the golden rule to launch this programme 
accepting unskilled workers since it is deemed as exceptional in that the foreign 
builders are not allowed to reside beyond 2020. This indicates they are not settlers but 
guest workers who are to leave Japan within the limited period. The thrust of what the 
policy makers insist is it is an emergent measure—the informant calls it makeshift—in 
an exceptional case such as the Tokyo Olympics and the Great Earthquake, therefore, 
the golden rule is not applicable. 
 
However, this is just an excuse to put off the reform of the golden rule. Creating 
exceptional cases has aggregated the ‘back doors’ and finally made the golden rule a 
dead letter; many exceptional cases have already abolished the principle in reality—
they still stick to the mock principle. Moreover, it should be reiterated that the 
makeshift(s) will never bring a fundamental solution. What is particularly striking is that 
they believe amending the golden rule is not indispensable but necessary (an 
informant agreed that they have done a makeshift to manage a policy deficiency). In 
other words, they realise that the golden rule should be changed but think it is not 
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indispensable. As evidence, there is no policy makers who think the status quo is 
adequate. They just think changing the rule is not realistic. 
 
This contradictory behaviour shows the situation they are facing and relates to the 
second reason why the rule is unlikely to be changed in the near future. The informant 
used the expression ‘energy’ twice—for instance, changing it (the golden rule) takes 
lots of energy. This means reforming the rule is incredibly arduous. The rule prescribes 
a nation-wide consensus when Japan decides to accept unskilled immigrants, saying 
“it is essential to cope with this issue (accepting unskilled labour) thorough deliberation 
based on a consensus among the Japanese people” (Japanese Government, 1999). 
The key here is “thorough deliberation based on a consensus”. Reaching a consensus 
is quite difficult even in a government which is compartmentalised. However, this time, 
it requires a nation-wide consensus which is a lot more challenging considering there 
are various views from positive to negative even in the ruling party88. On this point, 
changing the golden rule demands effort (energy as described in the quotation) for the 
bureaucrats while creating a back door looks far easier. 
 
The policy makers also boast that it is the fastest and most flexible solution to respond 
to the needs. In sum, creating and maintaining back doors is a practical solution they 
finally found. Their main concept is to repair it little by little in line with the necessity 
(we have made up for a weakness using a makeshift). They hold the golden rule while 
the faults are covered temporarily when necessary. Therefore, the overall picture of 
the migration policy is distorted and filled with contradictions (e.g. Nikkeijin and 
technical interns). However, the policy makers still believe that it is the best (but 
temporary) solution. Although it is nothing but a makeshift, they are proud of 
incrementalism. That’s why the reform of immigration policies is so incremental. 
 
7.4.2 Risk averse and homogeneous society 
The unique culture of the bureaucrats can be also spotted in their perfectionism and 
homogeneity. The government always seeks a no-fail system; in other words, a perfect 
policy rendering everyone happy, which is unfortunately an account of a dream. A 
migration expert who served as a member of the Advisory Board for the Minister of 
Justice looked back to their debate stating that there is no such thing as a perfect 
system. 
 
                                            
88 It is actually the same in the UK. Within the conservative party, the view on immigration control (e.g. EU’s 
free movement) is widely divided. 
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People (in the government) are always asking me “OK, if we have a free 
change of immigration system, what about the risk?” They say there are 
gonna be risks involved. Anything is gonna have risks, and migration will 
never be 100 % successful whether it’s US or Europe, or wherever you are 
looking at. I don't know any cases always successful and everybody has a 
happy time and nobody has any problems. 
(migration expert 1) 
 
While the risk averse behaviour is a typical characteristic of the Japanese bureaucrats, 
it is also worth looking at the unbalanced composition of their closed society. No 
foreigners can be bureaucrats working in the policy making process and only 3 % of 
management positions were filled by females in 2013 although the rate is gradually 
increasing (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Ministry, 2013). This fact indicates 
Kasumigaseki is quite domestic and male-dominated. What is worse is that it is based 
on the life-time employment system within each Ministry so less labour mobility which 
leads to an unbalanced structure of human resources. In more mobile economies such 
as Anglo-American, it is not rare that the high officials in civil service have gained 
professional experience in the private sector like political-appointees in the USA. On 
the contrary, the Japanese elite bureaucracy nurtures their human resources 
exclusively. As evidence, there are few political appointees or mid-career recruitments: 
the vast majority of the bureaucrats were recruited through the Tier 1 recruiting 
examination which is considered one of the three most strenuous national 
examinations. In addition, they are occupied by graduates from a handful of top tertiary 
institutions like Tokyo University (Colignon and Usui, 2003). As a consequence, they 
share a special sense of belonging-to-elite (Koh, 1989). In this way, the elite circle in 
Kasumigaseki village is not open widely due to its HR practices making a super 
homogeneous environment where the innovative idea stemming from diversity is 
almost absent. It is thus no wonder that the drastic reform of migration does not emerge 
in such a monoculture. 
 
7.5 Unique bureaucracy in MOJ 
Considering the whole bureaucratic system in Japan, the data pointed to the more 
unique features in MOJ, which could account for other inherent issues in the migration 




7.5.1 Segregated career track 
First, even within the Ministry, the MOJ is multi-
divided. It is compartmentalised into eight Bureaus, 
one of which is Immigration Bureau. Normally, a 
Japanese elite bureaucrat is employed by each 
Ministry and works for various Bureaus in the Ministry 
by being transferred; this system nurtures generalists 
rather than specialists (Mabuchi, 2010; Nishio 2001) 
so they possess wider perspectives (Soga, 2016) and 
prevent corruption at the same time. The HR 
strategies are also designed to give them 
opportunities to study abroad and be a diplomat. 
Nonetheless, MOJ is one of the exceptions of this 
general personnel system. 
 
MOJ is quite a unique organisation in that it is not dominated by bureaucrats who 
passed Tier 1 examination but public prosecutors who passed the Bar Examination 
(Johnson, 2002)89. As a good example, the Vice-Minister of Justice, the supreme MOJ 
administrative official, is always a civil servant chosen from experienced prosecutors. 
In addition, all the Directorate posts in the eight Bureaus are generally occupied by 
prosecutors. The bureaucrats working for Immigration Bureau—henceforth, 
immigration bureaucrats—, however, are not prosecutors but general civil servants 
passing Tier 1 examination. This means they cannot be a Director-General in any 
Bureau. In other words, the career path of the immigration bureaucrats is segregated 
within MOJ from the mainstream. Furthermore, the immigration bureaucrats do not 
have wider choices in their career tracks because the prosecutors occupy significant 
official positions in the hegemony. The only choice left for the immigration bureaucrat 
is to work for immigration control for life. Although Tier 1 examination is designed to 
produce a handful of elites in Kasumigaseki by nurturing generalists, the immigration 
bureaucrat is ironically limited to work for immigration control even though they are 
nominally employed as a generalist. This specific feature of their segregated career 
path eventually affects their behaviour. 
 
They have a special sense of ownership of ‘immigration’ policies which are confined to 
the authority given to the Immigration Bureau. This means that they are not interested 
                                            
89  In Japan, people who pass the Bar examination have three choices: attorney-at-law; judge; and, public 
prosecutor. The prosecutors’ office is under the Ministry of Justice while judges are belonging to the Supreme 
Court and attorney-at-law is in the private sector. 




in other issues which are not dealt with in the Immigration Bureau, for instance, 
citizenship. MOJ also manages citizenship policy deciding which immigrant can be 
naturalised. However, citizenship is controlled by another Bureau, the Civil Affairs 
Bureau, which rules on civil legislation. Therefore, it is a kind of taboo for the 
immigration bureaucrats to go into citizenship even though it is closely related to 
immigration policies. When it comes to naturalisation in the interviews, all of the 
informants from MOJ suggested that it is a matter for Civil Affairs Bureau. For example, 
an incumbent manager in the Immigration Bureau articulated: “it is Civil Affairs Bureau 
that is in charge of citizenship” (current policy maker 1). This statement can be 
interpreted: “it’s beyond our mandate”. Encountering this reaction was quite strange 
because they are first and foremost a member of MOJ that is the very authority on 
citizenship policy, but they deem it beyond their issue. This signifies MOJ is fiercely 
compartmentalised.  
 
The unique personnel system is also linked with their parochial attitude. As the 
immigration bureaucrats cannot transfer their expertise to the other fields in MOJ, the 
Immigration Bureau becomes the only ‘home’ for them and this strong sense of 
belongingness to the Immigration Bureau leads to self-preservation. As a matter of 
course, most of the bureaucrats are defensive when their powers are in peril. However, 
this tendency is more remarkable in MOJ, for they are trained as a specialist unlike 
generalists in other Ministries; they can’t lose their sole homeland—the Immigration 
Bureau. One of the informants who worked with MOJ puts it. 
 
In my Ministry (MOL), there are many Bureaus so we would not be seriously 
concerned when one was abolished. But they (immigration bureaucrats) 
have only one Bureau. As their sense of self-preservation is so strong they 
wouldn't like to bear the brunt of a bashing. As a result, they pull other 
Ministries in (discussions with politicians) so that they don't look prominent. 
In order to protect their organisation, I would say, they are even ready to 
change their own stances. In a sense, they always observe what politicians 
have more powers to find out up to whom to snuggle. I felt so in my two-
year negotiation with them. 
(former policy maker 3) 
 
This policy maker observed that immigration bureaucrats changed their stance little by 
little about the views of vocal politicians (they always observe what politicians have 
more powers to find out up to whom to snuggle). In short, to bureaucrats in other 
Ministries, Immigration bureaucrats seem to make greater efforts to protect their 
178 
 
organisation rather than to adhere to their convictions. This is because they put greater 
store on protecting the Immigration Bureau, their sole homeland, than insisting on their 
stance. Such behaviour is fiercely criticised by bureaucrats in other Ministries, for 
‘purpose’ and ‘measure’ are averse. Normally, the government creates a Bureau to 
realise and implement policies—this is purpose. For this purpose, a governmental 
organisation exists—this is measure. However, for the immigration bureaucrats, to 
perpetuate the Immigration Bureau (purpose), they discuss policies (measure).  
 
Ironically, it is said that they venture for fundamental reforms in the Immigration Act 
when their jurisdiction is threatened. The 1990s amendment in the Immigration Act is 
arguably a turning point on the migration policy in Japan (Sellek, 2001, Iguchi, 2007) 
doubling the number of visa types to encourage skilled migrants to enter. It also made 
the penalties for illegal employment of foreign nationals more severe. Some 
researchers point out that the drastic reforms are the result of a ‘turf war’ with the MOL 
(Shimizu, 2008; Okamura, 2018). In 1988, the MOL proposed a new regulation called 
Employment Licence90 to control migration labour properly. As the licence is supposed 
to be given by MOL to the employers of migrants, the proposed system was likely to 
evade the jurisdiction of MOJ. It accordingly menaced the MOJ, stirring a furious 
debate between them (Iguchi, 2007), resulting in drastic reform to the new Immigration 
Act cracking down on irregular migrant employment. 
 
Through the interviews, it is also clarified that most of the immigration bureaucrats are 
void of global perspectives. For example, when asked whether there were any rival 
countries in their mind in designing the PBS, a former high official in Immigration 
Bureau suggested that “the system was not made consciously referring to any other 
country” (former policy maker 4). While other informants such as immigration lawyers 
and HSMs pointed out that Japan needs to update its policies benchmarking other rival 
countries like Singapore and Hong Kong as the competition for talent becomes more 
severe, the policy makers were not really aware of it. Another former immigration 
bureaucrat showed that they have fewer opportunities to be seconded to Japanese 
Embassies as a diplomat compared to other Ministries: 
 
The Embassies that we can be seconded to are the USA, South Korea, 
Thailand and so on. There is no one (from Immigration Bureau) based in 
London (Japanese Embassy in the UK)91. There aren’t so many (positions 
in Embassies) for us since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like to keep 
                                            
90 MOL proposed that the employer of the foreign nationals should apply for the Employment Licence to decrease 
the number of irregular labour migrants.  
91 In contrast, the staff members from MOL and METI are seconded to the Embassy in the UK. 
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significant positions in their hands so would not like to offer many positions 
to us. 
(former policy maker 5) 
 
This ex-bureaucrat underlined they have chances to study abroad instead of being 
seconded as a diplomat. However, it is still true that they have fewer opportunities to 
gain international experience than the other bureaucrats, consequently affecting their 
international perspectives. Considering the circumstances surrounding them—that is 
lifetime employed, less mobile, only specialised in immigration control and fewer 
positions to be internationally transferred—, it sounds only natural that they have such 
parochial behaviours.  
 
7.5.2 Passive policy makers in a fragile position 
Another issue comes from their ‘neutral’ position. The informants from MOJ whether 
they are in-office or not, indicated that MOJ is neutral in that it is not backed by any 
interest parties while METI is supported by industrial sectors and MOL by labour unions. 
They insist this is why they can coordinate different interests neutrally and the MOJ is 
given the authority to control immigration. Indeed, it appears plausible, however, this 
also indicates the deficiency of hands-on knowledge on how migrants work and live in 
Japan. For instance, the interviewed HSMs called for relaxing the conditions of 
permanent residency to stabilise their residential status; the MOJ bureaucrats do not 
understand this point fully. Also, their discourses often showed passiveness—waiting 
for indications from other Ministries. One MOJ bureaucrat said: 
 
In the PBS, a new programme where the spouse of highly skilled migrants 
can work without special permits was made as we were told to create it. We 
wondered if it’s necessary, but there are actually some using the 
programme. So I think it is good [underlined by the author]. 
(current policy maker 1) 
 
Here, they made the programme not because they thought it was needed but they 
were suggested to (as we were told to create it). Moreover, they were sceptical about 
the programme, which later has been proved to have some demands (We wondered 
if it’s necessary). A similar discourse appeared in the topic on why the number of Asian 
HSMs is constantly increasing. Their preliminary remarks always began with 
something like, “it may not be the pure issues of immigration control”. It is interpreted: 
“it’s rather from other reasons than our job”. An informant from MOL explained their 




They (MOJ) are in a fragile position (among Ministries). Because they do 
not have any supporters. For example, we (MOL) are backed by local 
governments who eventually take care of foreigners in their communities. 
But they do not have that kind of supporter. Policy makers basically should 
have practical knowledge to carry out policies. But they do not have the 
hands-on knowledge either since they are not down-to-earth. There are a 
few politicians backing them but these politicians are significantly low key 
compared to other policies. 
(former policy maker 3) 
 
Usually each ministry has its interested parties whose political power influences the 
direction of policy making. For example, MOL is backed by labour unions since they 
are concerned with labour conditions and METI is supported by business sectors that 
suffer from labour shortage. Both MOL and METI are in close contact with these 
backbench supporters; consequently, they are well aware of actual issues in the labour 
market—the informant described it down-to-earth. This means MOL and METI are 
hands-on since they are offered sufficient information from their supporters; however, 
MOJ does not have those kinds of supporters with specific interests: remember they 
position themselves as neutral. This also means they have no interest parties—they 
do not have any information sources, thereby lacking practical knowledge in labour 
migration. 
 
In addition, having no one to rely on or supporters indicate they are isolated. As a 
former member of the Advisory Board for the Minister of Justice pointed out (see the 
previous quote made by Migration Expert 1), whether they open the doors to foreigners 
or not there is no single policy approved by everyone. This is also why they can’t be 
proactive in migration policies because they are destined to be criticised whatever they 
do. Here, the only solution is doing nothing. 
 
In an interview, with regard to reforming the current policy, one of the former high 
officials in MOJ dared propose a visa without employment contracts like UK’s Tier 1 
General which was completely abolished in 2015. HSMs in Japan should have an 
employment contract prior to obtaining a visa, so this would be a drastic reform if it was 
realised. But he said: “Well, if I was an incumbent officer, I would hesitate to propose 
it. It wouldn’t come true” (former policy maker 4). An officer from an international 




If some incidents happen, like a lot of migrants became unemployed and 
stayed over in Japan, it is MOJ who will be first criticised that they got them 
in. They simply don't like that situation. They don’t like to be criticised for 
changing the policy. So they don’t change the system or it’s slow to reform 
the system. 
(migration expert 2) 
 
As already discussed, the Kasumigaseki bureaucrats tend to be risk-averse partly 
because they would like to eschew being accused for policy failures. This is also true 
for immigration. In this research, immigration bureaucrats refuted the criticism that 
MOJ arbitrarily changed the policies to accept Nikkeijin in 1990 even though it was off 
track from the questions asked in the interviews. This means although the author did 
not ask a question about 1990 policy change, the immigration officers interviewed 
voluntarily raised this topic to explain their ‘innocence’ over the criticism. Accepting 
Nikkeijin brought tremendous conflicts in local communities where they were 
concentrated (e.g. Yamawaki, 2002) and MOJ was strongly blamed for accepting them 
without any measures for social cohesion. Their behaviour—making excuses for the 
Nikkeijin policy—suggests the 1990 policy reform still remains a scar on them and may 
hinder their challenges. 
 
It is true that the immigration bureaucrats show parochial deeds causing the migration 
policies to be less progressive; however, it might not be justifiable to only attribute 
policy failures to them. The fact that they are the first target to be blamed signifies the 
chief responsibility for immigration is borne to them. Notwithstanding this heavy 
responsibility, they are not allowed a free hand in the policy. Administrative 
responsibility is ideally inseparable from administrative power. However, the 
immigration bureaucrats only bear the heavy burden without power. This unbalanced 
structure of administration burden and power may well have distorted the healthy policy 
making. Then, how can this conflicting situation be sorted out? One of the possible 
answers might be a strong political leadership that holds both power and responsibility.  
 
7.6 Absence of political will 
This chapter thus far has elucidated the maze of immigration bureaucracy. 
Nonetheless, there is definitely one perspective lacking: policy makers include not only 
the bureaucrats but also politicians who should play an important role in deciding 
policies especially when the administrative organs do not function. Even though the 
bureaucrats are still the main players in designing and implementing the policies 
(Johnson, 1982; Bartram, 2000), the fundamental reform cannot be exerted without 
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political will since it requires legislative process by Parliament. However, when the PBS 
was initially proposed and designed, the Japanese political situation was in turmoil. 
Japan experienced a hung Parliament and regime change. 
 
It was 2009 when the PBS was firstly proposed by the government. At this stage, the 
proposal was given by the Council led by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, not by MOJ. A 
key official involved in this Council said in the interview that MOJ agreed to the PBS 
unless it led to amending the legislation. MOJ made such a conditional approval 
perhaps because the Parliament at that time was hung and it was not easy to pass the 
law gaining consent from both Houses. This fact shows even if the bureaucracy is 
functional, when the political situation is not stable, no drastic reforms are possible. 
 
Table 7-3 The two biggest political parties in Japan 
















No massive influx of 
settlers*1 
f PBS in 2009, 
Amended the Act 














Launched PBS in 
2012 
*1: Liberal Democratic Party (2014), *2: Democratic Party (1998) 
Source: the fieldwork 
 
The PBS was finally launched in 2012 after the political regime changed from Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) to Democratic Party (DP)92. It was a positive surprise for  
most bureaucrats and migration experts because DP was backed by labour unions 
which strongly oppose importing foreign labour, whereas LDP has long been supported 
by the business sectors calling for accepting more migrants. DP had usually denied 
what the previous regime (i.e. LDP) did. So it was assumed among people involved in 
designing PBS that the PBS would be withdrawn. In fact, DP was widely divided into 
                                            
92 DP was divided into two different political parties in 2017: Constitutional Democratic Party (Rikken minshuto) 
and Democratic Party (Minshinto). This study was administered before the division. 
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positive and negative sides. The informants suggested there were emotional 
arguments like the hawkish economist (the positive group) versus the conservative 
domestic-oriented (the negative group). However, such an intra-party conflict can also 
be easily spotted in the LDP. A former policy maker witnessed the inconclusive political 
discourse: 
 
The biggest difficulty (in the migration political debate) is politicians are 
poles apart in their opinions. It doesn’t matter whether they are from LDP or 
DP. Regardless of a ruling party or opposition party, each politician has 
totally different views (on migration policies). They have different 
experiences that form their opinions. That’s really puzzling, isn’t it? There is 
no difference between LDP and DP in that the ayes and noes are equally 
divided. As evidence, the current situation (ruled by LDP) is almost the same 
as when it was governed by DP. 
(former policy maker 3) 
 
As is often the case, the view of migration is shaped by personal experiences rather 
than political ideology. For example, a politician from a constituency where Nikkeijin 
live densely is keen for social cohesion while someone familiar with industries pays 
greater attention to the recourse to migration labour regardless of the political party 
they belong to; therefore, each politician has a different view and it impedes the united 
direction for the policy. In sum, Japanese political history signifies migration policies 
that have not seen a drastic reform even in a regime change. This simply means that 
the voters do not have any valid choices in migration policies: this leads to what this 
study terms ‘no choice democracy’. 
 
The fact that opinions on migration completely vary depending on personal 
experiences can be applicable to the general public. The public discourse is also poles 
apart. In a symposium, Masaharu Nakagawa, a DP politician with a rich political career, 
revealed the difficulty in debating migration issues (Nakagawa, 2017: 14). 
 
Under the DP regime, I held Ministerial posts such as Minister of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and Minister of State for policies 
for foreign residents 93 …I tried to move forward the policies like the 
settlement of Nikkeijin from Brazil, education for children of foreign 
background and social cohesion. After I proposed to legislate a new Act to 
accept immigrants in the Ministerial inauguration press conference, there 
                                            
93 This post only covered Nikkeijin not all the foreign residents in Japan. 
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was a flood of complaints by telephone or fax to my constituency office and 
Ministries, thereby paralysing the administrative works. Under the 
circumstance, I was suggested by my Ministerial staff and so on not to stir 
the arguments and to be low key. It was not easy to discuss migration 
policies straightforwardly. 
 
His plan to legislate a new Act miscarried at the start primarily by the flood of 
complaints by the general public but also suggestions from the Ministerial staff. As he 
is from the constituency of Mie-prefecture (near Nagoya), where Nikkeijin is densely 
populated, he had strongly wished to reform the policies. His failed attempt attests to 
the hard reality to bring about migration debate even for the well-experienced 
politicians. It is too hard to present choices to the voters.  
 
This might be one of the reasons for the absence of political leadership. There used to 
be vocal political leaders also in LDP such as Hidenao Nakagawa (former Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, who proposed letting 10 million migrants in) and Jinei Nagase 
(former Minister of Justice, who made public his personal proposals on migration 
policies as a Minister) even though their stances are not in line94. However, every 
bureaucrat interviewed agreed that there are no proactive leaders in this field whether 
they are positive or negative. All the migration experts pointed to the importance of 
political leadership for better migration policies, but it seems beyond reality. 
 
We do not know how many politicians there are who shall tackle the issues 
earnestly. The bureaucrats always observe the politicians and their 
directions. If there are any politicians taking initiatives in migration policies, 
it is easier for the bureaucrats to move forward. In reality, the negative party 
will never propose open policies. So the politicians should ideally exert their 
own leadership to encourage them but (…). 
(former policy maker 2) 
 
As already revealed, in the compartmentalised government structure, someone needs 
to be at the helm of a negotiation and make a final decision in their leadership to move 
forward the reform. However, MOJ cannot be a leader. Then, a politician elected 
democratically should be the leader. This would be a breakthrough if it came true. 
Nonetheless, the current migration policy is designed without any strong political 
engagement and this partly results in incremental reform. Then, how can we improve 
                                            
94 Nakagawa was for opening borders by offering permanent residency to migrants. On the contrary, Nagase tried 
to restrict migrants’ settlement by creating a new residential category. Whilst their claim is inconclusive, they were 
both experienced politicians of the LDP. 
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the compartmentalised governance and its slow decision-making process? The key is 
in a cross ministerial leadership. 
 
7.7 Cross Ministerial leadership 
As described above, the problems with Japan’s migration administrations are inherent 
in (1) compartmentalised government where different Ministries have different 
authorities regarding migration policies, (2) each Ministry equally having powers in 
deciding the direction of future migration schemes—therefore the consultations among 
Ministries are endless—, and (3) no political or administrative leaders to coordinate the 
policies or discussions among Ministries. 
 
To counter the issues, a so-called ‘Migration Agency’ (Gaikokujin-cho in Japanese)95 
has been proposed by local governments, researchers and business sectors 
(Gaikokujin shuju toshi kaigi [Council of Municipalities of Concentrated Foreign 
Residents], 2009; Yamawaki, 2002; Keidanren, 2004). Although there is no universal 
definition on Migration Agency, it is regarded as a governmental body, like a Ministry 
“comprehensively planning and governing all the policy areas concerning foreign 
residents with a strong cross Ministerial leadership” (Gaikokujin shuju toshi kaigi 
[Council of Municipalities of Concentrated Foreign Residents], 2009: 1). 
 
It seems indeed a good idea to solve the issues but the detailed design for the Agency 
is not shared by people who propose it. For example, it is not clear whether the 
migration policies become the remit of the new Agency and the existing Ministries have 
no further responsibility or not: in the former case, the Agency becomes a very big 
organisation ruling the various policies from immigration control to education of 
migrants’ children; in the latter case, the Agency is just a policy coordinator and each 
Ministry retains their authority. The former idea is unrealistic since it will eventually 
categorise a policy by nationalities and lead to further compartmentalised governance 
(e.g. the education for Migrants’ children is governed by the Migration Agency and that 
for Japanese citizens is by MEXT). Therefore, the latter idea—Agency as a policy 
coordinator—is more realistic.  
 
Among the policy makers interviewed, the opinions on creating the Agency were 
divided markedly; this difference does not come from their ideology but from their 
stance whether they keep the status quo or not. The group for the Agency suggests 
                                            
95 Translating the Japanese term ‘Gaikokujin (foreigner) cho (administrative Agency)’ into an English phrase is 




that on the condition that Japan will proactively take admissionist migration policies, 
something like the Agency will be a sine qua non for coordinating and leading the policy 
reforms. Especially, they approved its advantage of promoting social cohesion whose 
policies are dispersed across Ministries such as local communities and labour practice. 
On the contrary, the negative party insists that as long as Japan maintains its current 
policies (inter alia, keeping the golden rule), creating such an agency is not an urgent 
matter, let alone it being against streamlined administration. A more significant claim 
they made is that the coordinator is just a coordinator, not a practitioner. As long as 
the Agency is confined to the central government as a coordinator, they are not able 
to engage with practice. This claim is plausible because the current MOJ is just a 
moderator who lags far behind MOL or METI in that they are not practitioners in labour 
or industrial affairs as already elucidated. Establishing a new agency will create just 
another MOJ. Such an agency, then, will not have any influential powers to move 
forward the policies, thereby leading to a similar situation as now. 
 
Unfortunately, this criticism has turned out to be right. The government created an 
administrative division96 coordinating policies for Nikkeijin in 2009 within the Cabinet 
Ministry. Although its role focuses on only Nikkeijin, it is expected to coordinate policies. 
Nonetheless, it is far from the organisation taking a leadership role and their activities 
seem to be stagnant from the fact that the Orientation Guide Book on their website has 
not been updated leaving the explanation for an outdated system unchanged 97 
(Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, 2012). Considering this fact, 
even if the Migration Agency is established, it is questionable if they can be a driving 
force for reforming cross Ministerial policies. 
 
One of the intrinsic issues with Migration Agency is that ‘establishing a new 
organisation’ has too much focus. In other words, how the Agency functions should be 
examined rather than creating it. In fact, the Agency should be given superior authority 
to direct the reforms to other ministries to lead the discussions: otherwise, the 
Ministries and Agency would repeat the ‘horizontal’ consultations. The key is to make 
the consultation process from horizontal to vertical so that someone can lead and 
coordinate the negotiations among Ministries. 
 
                                            
96 Teiju gaikokujin shisaku suishin shitsu (Division promoting policies for foreigners of Japanese descents). It 
should be noted that this Division only handles policies for Nikkeijin. 
97 This is a booklet for migrants describing various topics such as visa restriction, administrative procedures in 
local government and rules for putting out garbage in Japanese, English, Portuguese and Spanish. It was compiled 
by the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations so that migrants can easily follow the local rules in 
Japan and is linked to the Division’s web site. 
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However, this requires the appropriate direction from politicians because bureaucrats 
cannot discuss the issues without any appropriate direction. A policy expert who had 
been involved in the Advisory Board for Minister of Justice stated: 
 
Basically, the problems with the decision-making arise because there’s no 
political direction. Since MOJ consults other Ministries without any direction, 
it takes time to reach a consensus with all the Ministries. As all the Ministries 
have equal power to decide the policies, they can’t conclude the 
consultations. So someone with superior power, if any, will make a 
difference. 
(migration expert 3) 
 
Then, who is someone with ‘superior power’ leading the discussion and giving an 
appropriate direction? Here, all the informants share the answer: a politician who is 
given a mandate to direct migration policies hopefully from the Cabinet, the supreme 
administrative organ. 
 
In this sense, this survey identified that the government strategies to promote tourism 
can be a best practice to refer to. Until the 2000s Japan had been low key in attracting 
foreign tourists. However, as the tourism industry was recognised as one of the 
potential measures to boost the economy, Japan began to work seriously to attract 
foreign tourists. In 2013, the government launched the Ministerial Council98, which is 
hosted by the Prime Minister, comprising all the Ministers (Japanese Government, 
2013), and devising cross ministerial strategies (Kanko rikkoku suishin kakuryo kaigi, 
2013) to boost the number of foreign tourists 99 . The strategies stretched from 
enhancing tourism infrastructures in local communities to relaxing visa conditions 
carried out by multi actors in the public sector. As a result, the number of foreign 
tourists has been more than doubled from 8.37 million in 2012 to 19.74 million in 2015 
since the Council was established (Japanese Government, 2015). 
 
This gives us a useful lesson in functioning cross Ministerial negotiations. The tourism 
Ministerial Council suggests it is worth establishing a cross-cutting body for better 
                                            
98 Its formal name is Kanko rikkoku suishin kakuryo kaigi (the Ministerial Council on the Promotion of Japan as 
a Tourism-Oriented Country). 
99 Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO) estimates the number of foreign visitors (it is equal to foreign 
tourists according to JNTO) from the statistical data of MOJ; the data shown here is based on JNTO’s estimation. 
They are defined as foreigners entering Japan (usually at an airport or port) fulfilling the following conditions: (1) 
given a short-stay status of residence (up to 90, 30 or 15 days depending on the person) or (2) foreigners who do 
not have permanent residency. It should be noted that (2) includes the long-term residents since the statistics 




migration policies headed by the Prime Minister with all the Ministers involved. In this 
Council, the necessary directions of migration policies are to be decided and one of 
the members in the Council is endowed with the authority to enforce the reforms as 
Minister for Migration. If the Minister needs administrative support such as holding 
meetings and so forth, a division in the Cabinet Ministry can be established. In sum, 
there are three significant points: (1) it is led by the Prime Minister. By this, strong 
political will is shown; (2) all the Ministers are involved so that all the Ministers pledge 
the direction of the policies; and (3) the Minister for Migration is assigned to clarify who 
is responsible for realising the directions agreed. 
 
In fact, the fieldwork identified a successful case using a similar scheme. In 2009, Kodo 
jinzai ukeire suishin kaigi (the Council for the Promotion of Acceptance of Highly Skilled 
Professionals) proposed the PBS. This council was hosted by the Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, who is generally in the second most important position after Prime Minister, 
and was joined by all the relevant Ministries. An informant who was engaged in the 
Council articulated that this structure made the Council function to negotiate the PBS. 
 
The council was not under the Cabinet Ministry. Precisely speaking, it was 
designed to be established by the Chief Cabinet Secretary…If it was under 
the Cabinet Ministry, there may be some ministries which did not join the 
Council. But the important point is it was hosted by the Chief Cabinet 
Secretary. Therefore, there was no Ministry which did not participate in the 
Council. All the Ministries agreed to join it and the high officials such as 
Deputy Director General of a Bureau from each Ministry came to the 
meetings.  
(former policy maker 2) 
 
Normally, this kind of meeting is headed by the Cabinet Ministry. However, if it is led 
by the Cabinet Ministry, other Ministries may interrupt the policy reforms exploiting their 
vetoes. Therefore, it was agreed that the Chief Cabinet Secretary, who has superior 
authority compared to other politicians, hosted the Council. Consequently, it achieved 
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This chapter has identified several intrinsic barriers in migration governance through 
two policy-making actors, namely, bureaucrats and politicians. As revealed in the 
previous chapters, HSMs face institutional hurdles (e.g. access to permanent 
residency) in paving the way for their future life in Japan; however, the fundamental 
solution has not been offered although the government enthusiastically tries to attract 
more HSMs. The existing research into HSMs in Japan (Oishi, 2012; Tsukasaki, 2008) 
has not dealt with the process of policy making and only focused on the micro aspect 
of HSMs; neither has it shown the way to improve the policy discussions so as to 
eliminate the institutional barriers. Aiming to fill the research gap, this chapter 
presented a few significant theoretical contributions by unearthing the unknown policy 
making process in obscure migration governance, and consequently offered a solution 
for cross Ministerial leadership. 
 
First, the research clarified the egalitarian slow consultation process among Ministries, 
all of which are equally given a veto. The veto makes only the minimal reforms possible. 
In this compartmentalised governance structure, the bureaucrats go through the 
endless ‘horizontal negotiation’ without any driving force concluding the discussion. 
Accelerated by their risk averse nature, no bureaucrats would initiate the discussion 
since the administrative laws do not endow each Ministry with leadership but 
compartmentalised authority. This problematic governance structure becomes 
pronounced in neglected policy. Even though the golden rule was a dead letter with 
numerous backdoors created, the bureaucrats still stick to the unrealistic principle and 
would not update it. What is worse, whereas they are well aware of the necessity of 
reforming the principle, no action will be taken in the near future. This is because the 
golden rule requires a national consensus to accept unskilled labour, but the 
bureaucrats have already given up reforming it due to the potential difficulty in creating 
a national consensus. 
 
Second, the unique male-dominant and domestic-oriented bureaucracy impedes the 
progressive migration governance. Among others, the immigration bureaucrats are 
confined within the closed and segregated administrative community and this affects 
the innovative policies. These issues can be improved by bringing more diversity in the 
policy making process by assigning a policy maker from non-government sectors. This 
research offers counter-arguments to the extant literature by evaluating the Japanese 
systematic bureaucracy (Johnson 1982; Bartram 2000, 2004, 2005) and solid 
epistemological background to the non-empirical debate made by migration scholars 
(e.g. Yamawaki, 2002; Cornelius and Tsuda, 2008). This chapter therefore contributes 
191 
 
to further illuminating bureaucratic barriers in detail and advancing evidence-based 
governance analysis. 
 
Third, the chapter examined the role of politicians and clarified there has recently been 
less political engagement, which eventually reduces the migration governance. The 
key here is policy ideologies on migration are poles apart. More seriously, the views of 
politicians do not represent the political party so each political party consists of mixed 
groups of pro/anti-migrants. This consequently leads to ‘no choice democracy’ since 
the voters do not have any valid choices on migration: there is no difference in policy 
outcome even though the voters choose another party. The far-reaching suggestion is 
that migration has become a de-traditionalised debate—in the traditional political 
debate, the (centre-)right and (centre-)left party may have opposite dichotomic views; 
however, this has not been observed in the political discourse on labour migration. In 
sum, migration seems to be a highly political ideology but it is in fact shaped by 
personal view rather than political ideology and this impedes the united direction of 
migration policies. It also shows that a national consensus is difficult to reach, keeping 
migration policies from being updated.  
 
To avoid this situation, the research pointed to the significance of the cross Ministerial 
leadership as a mechanism to progress with migration policies. Looking at successful 
cases, the better policy making process involving politicians should be figured out. In 
this sense, creating the Ministerial Council/Minister for Migration will offer a practical 
solution to exert a political leadership and promote negotiations across Ministries. 
However, it must be reiterated if there is no strong political will to update the policies, 
this new institution ends up as just a meeting. Therefore, political leadership is 
indispensable to changing the status quo. It is politicians who are ultimately 
responsible for forming the policies and making bureaucrats work.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion: Towards a More Diversified and 
Accommodating Society 
 
Everyone is different, that makes a difference 
—Misuzu Kaneko (1920s) 
8.1 Labyrinth unfolded? 
This last chapter presents the comprehensive portrayal of highly skilled migration in 
Japan and ‘beyond’, by offering a bigger picture weaving out the threads in each 
chapter. The dissertation so far has explored the labyrinth through the three mazes (i.e. 
society, labour and policies) predicated on specific research questions and analytical 
lenses. The initial part of this chapter maps out how the findings of each analytical 
chapter have addressed the research questions, consequently contributing to 
advancing the academic debate with new concepts such as ‘coerced harmonisation’ 
and ‘no choice democracy’. Then, these findings will be synthesised to examine overall 
policy implications which will finally address ‘who migration policies are for’, followed 
by future research directions to conclude the discussion. 
 
Now, it’s time to see the labyrinth unfold. 
 
8.2 Academic contribution: questions, findings and uniqueness 
8.2.1 Research aims and questions 
This study aimed to identify how Japan should tackle the issues confronting HSMs 
while the country faces unprecedented challenges such as severe global competition, 
rapid ageing, and a declining population. It has uncovered multi-scale issues—micro, 
meso and macro.  
 
The overarching research question was “what are the significant agencies and 
actors in attracting highly skilled migrants in Japan?” To pursue this topic, the 
study explored the perception of HSMs and the policy making process of migration 
governance in Japan: the two arguments being lack of empirical research so far. This 
qualitative inquiry has especially focused on three dimensions, namely, migrants’ 
social life, labour issues (micro/meso), and migration governance in Japan (macro) 





RQ1 (Backgrounds of HSMs in Japan):  
What are motivations for HSMs to work in Japan? Are there any distinguished 
differences in motivations or trajectories among migrants from different 
countries/regions?  
RQ2 (Policies and social issues):  
 What factors may prevent HSMs from living in Japan? Specifically, how do 
public policies or social issues affect the life of HSMs? 
RQ3 (Labour Issues): 
 What kind of problems do HSMs face in their workplace? How do they evaluate 
the distinctive Japanese employment relations?  
RQ4 (Attraction of working in Japan):  
 Are there any distinctive advantages that attract HSMs?  
RQ5 (Migration governance):  
 How are migration policies designed in Japan? What issues are underlying the 
policy making process to update policies?  
 
Based on these five research questions, this dissertation has teased out the findings 
and discussed their implications in the three chapters (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). 
 
8.2.2 Conceptualising highly skilled migration in Japan 
Chapter 5 (findings 1) addressed RQ1&2 predicated on transnational elite geographies 
(Salt, 1983, 1988; Findlay et al., 1996; Beaverstock, 2002, 2005; Beaverstock and 
Broadwell, 2000). In particular, it unpacked the contrasting migration patterns between 
Asian and Western HSMs. The former is still conditioned by Asian traditional values 
such as senior family recommendations or the unique socio-economic push factors as 
observed by mainland Chinese whose migratory motivation was driven by the desire 
for being autonomous in their life—the chapter called it ‘ownership of their life course’. 
Conversely, the latter happened to end up working in Japan through nomadic 
adventures. Despite the different backgrounds in reaching Japan, they were affected 
by the communal obstacles in migration policies such as tough regulations to gain 
permanent residency, which requires a ‘continuous 10-year’ residence in Japan. This 
stringent condition does not match with the life course of HSMs—both Asian and 
western—, thereby giving them an alternative migration choice—leaving Japan. In this 
way, RQ1&2 have brought a policy implication into the migration debate by liaising life 
course (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1992; Findlay et al., 2015; Izuhara, 2015) with 




Another insight clarified through RQ1&2 is the lack of diversity in Japanese society. 
Most of all, the fundamental problem in the Japanese educational system is not the 
level of teaching nor Japanese language that Oishi (2012) suggested but pressures of 
conformity, which stifles the expanded world views that Third Culture Kids are 
supposed to enjoy (Pollock and Van Reken, 2009). What is more insightful is the 
migration regime that implicitly prevents diversity in school by stigmatising some HSMs. 
The study unearthed the case of Lydia, a Filipina nursery teacher, who was once 
rejected renewing the visa although her job can potentially alleviate the homogeneous 
nature of early childhood education. There are a lot of Japanese parents who wish to 
nurture cosmopolitan views of their children, subsequently the applicants of the school 
are increasing and highly competitive. The obscurity of immigration control 
nonetheless precludes the schools’ efforts to innovate the educational system. 
Alongside these insights, the findings of these two research questions have formed the 
basis of the rest of the research providing the basic information on the life and 
trajectories of HSMs.  
 
Chapter 6 (findings 2) has answered RQ3&4 shedding light on the issues that HSMs 
face in their office via the theoretical lenses of transnational elite geographies, and 
Japanese employment relations (Tsukasaki, 2008; Oishi, 2012) which are strongly 
associated with lifetime employment and seniority. This chapter offered detailed and 
lively evidence on how Japanese employment relations affected the career making and 
work style of HSMs. However, the uniqueness of this study compared to the past 
scholarly works (e.g. Tsukasaki, 2008; Liu-Farrer, 2011a, 2011b; Oishi, 2012; Holbrow 
and Nagahoshi, 2016) lies in RQ4 which also identified the advantages of Japanese 
employment relations such as rich training systems (linked with lifetime employment) 
and wider-stakeholders-views (stemming from community-orientated management). It 
was particularly noticeable that the respondents valued the distinctive long-term 
management philosophy whilst acknowledging many business practices need to be 
updated such as long hours. This could suggest Japanese corporations had better 
seek a ‘third’ path which is not the conventional Japanese or the simple Anglo-
American model in attracting HSMs. The analysis may be warning against merely 
adopting the so-called global model—which is in reality Anglo-American—without 
evaluating intricate and dynamic relations among employers, employees and even the 
local community.  
 
Rather than Japanese employment relations, the findings problematised homogeneity 
in the workplace. HSMs are specifically exposed to peer-pressure to be ‘Japanized’ (to 
be like Japanese), which ultimately suppresses their distinctive talents, cultural 
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backgrounds, and diversified values. Norms embedded in characterless recruit-suits 
also attest to an obsession with conformity. Conceptualising the implicit peer pressures 
emanating from the lack of diversity, the study coined ‘coerced harmonisation’ that 
afflicts transnational talent in the insular workplace of global city (Sassen, 2001), Tokyo. 
 
More significantly, RQ3&4 have revealed that the perception of Japan is formed 
differently between the western and Asian migrants. The western migrants tend to 
have radical imagery of Japan such as crazy, pricey and closed, that can be conversely 
but respectively translated into innovative, high quality and polite by Asian migrants. 
The stigmatised images prevent the potential HSMs from immigrating to Japan, which 
might partly explain the nucleus of the labyrinth: why the number of western HSMs is 
constantly stagnant whilst that of Asian is steadily surging. In fact, it is easy to attribute 
the stigmatised images to their home media’s exaggerations; however, my analysis 
also indicates what Japan—both the government and people—should do to overcome 
the stigmatisation. The collective voice of western informants pointed to the necessity 
to reconsider Japan’s branding strategies of unbalanced ‘cool Japan’ (McLelland, 
2017) foregrounding geeky anime or otaku-culture (Milner and Richmond, 2015). As 
Alastair described: 
 
If we travel like one hour away from Tokyo, there is a lot of like (…) rural 
culture of Japan and very respectful of their past also. So, when you are 
able to show more history of Japan, not just a crazy side, there is a lot more 
to Japan. 
(Alastair, cited in Chapter 6) 
 
Alastair’s narrative reminds us that the biggest attraction might be discovered in the 
daily life of Japanese people, that could be easily overlooked. HSMs reveal their 
everyday life deeply rooted in Japanese history and culture—one of the examples is 
the firmly-knitted community as Scott loves sports day—, instead of just emphasising 
a particular but ostensible ‘show’.  
 
Based on the perceptions of HSMs discussed in the above research questions, RQ5 
examined in chapter 7 (findings 3) has brought a macro perspective to the debate of 
HSMs in Japan by examining the role of state (Hollifield et al., 2014; Aiden, 2011), 
especially, the issues in the policy making process based on interviews with migration 
policy experts. Revealing how the migration policies are actually formed in Japan and 
what kind of issues there are to bring about recommendable policies, RQ5 addressed 
three aspects: compartmentalised government (negotiating process in the central 
197 
 
government); insular bureaucracy in Ministry of Justice (bureaucratic barriers); and, 
the lack of political will (political barriers). 
 
The findings elicited the egalitarian policy making process among Ministries, whose 
bureaucrats are risk averse and quite homogeneous creating a male dominated closed 
society based on life time employment. To bring innovation to the elite guild, it is 
advisable to adopt more political appointees and mobilise bureaucratic inter-Ministries 
or municipalities which actually provide migrants with public services. Also, we should 
change the current ‘horizontal negotiation’ to ‘vertical negotiation’ where political 
leadership can direct migration policies. Yet, vertical negotiation will not function unless 
there is strong political leadership. 
 
RQ5 also helped illuminate the enigma of the politician, another fundamental actor in 
the labyrinth of skilled migration. It was notable that the major two parties—LDP and 
DP— do not have explicit and long-term stances on accepting migrants; instead, the 
political arguments are shaped by personal experience of each politician regardless of 
their political positions (i.e. left or right wing). As evidence, even though Japan 
underwent regime changes in 2009 and 2012, there were no drastic changes in 
migration policies. Whether the ruling party is (centre-)right or (centre-)left, Japanese 
voters have no choice in migration policies since political discourse is in limbo. This 
lack of political concern results in what the study termed ‘no choice democracy’. 
There is no choice, not even one. Even though Japan is a mature democratic state, no 
alternative is proposed by politicians. What is left to voters is just accepting the status 
quo with minimal changes. Japan has to date kept and will henceforth hold the golden 
rule with the ‘back doors’ open for unskilled migrants (Oishi, 1995; Sellek, 2001; Tsuda, 
2004). 
 
8.2.3 Regional competition in Asia 
One question still remaining is which countries are in competition with Japan for HSMs. 
Answering this question is crucial in contextualising this research within cross-border 
policy debates and globalisation. Given the severe global competition for brains, the 
Japanese government has devoted itself to attract HSMs by introducing various 
measures like the PBS, which did not fulfil the initial expectations. This research so far 
examined the policy failures from the points of societal, labour and governance barriers. 
In addition, it is imperative to discuss the issue within the Asian regional competition. 
 
The findings have unpacked the contrasting migration patterns between the Western 
and Asian HSMs; one of the clear distinctions between them is motivations to reach 
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Japan. The Westerners did not choose Japan by clear preference but happened to 
come through ‘Walkabout’. This signifies that Japan is not on the top list for the 
Westerners and the country does not fare well in the global competition for talents. On 
the other hand, the findings showed that Japan is generally appealing for Asian HSMs 
due to its cutting-edge technologies, economic opportunities, and cultural 
attractiveness. This echoes in the growing number of Asian HSMs with the stark 
contrast with the Westerners. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that Japan 
will remain competitive for attracting Asian talents in the region. 
 
The economic landscape in Asia has drastically changed over the past few years. 
Japan handed over the position as the second largest economy in the world to China, 
and now Singapore boasts the highest GDP per capita in Asia; Japanese economy is  
no longer dominant in Asia in terms of the scale and quality. The data also suggests 
that HSMs in Japan are likely to move to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai as is 
discussed in Chapter 5. In this regard, the research calls for benchmarking these 
competitors in updating the public policies including taxation, given the geographical 
proximity that makes migrants easily move.  
 
From the macro perspectives, the role of FDI should not missed. As shown, the figure 
of intracompany transferees accounts for only six percent of all the HSMs in Japan. 
The low level of intracompany transfer implies that TNCs do not share their talent pools 
with Japan. This is partly because Japan is less attractive as a new investee. As 
evidence, the level of FDI to Japan remains low compared to Singapore and Hong 
Kong with the figure of the FDI US$ 39,323 million (Japan), US$ 74,253 million 
(Singapore) and US$ 133,259 million (Hong Kong)100 in 2016 (World Bank, 2018). The 
fieldwork also identified a tendency that the existing foreign TNCs in Japan relocate 
their Asian headquarters to these global cities. Although the intracompany transfer is 
not the focus of this research, it will be meaningful to further discuss the ways to 
improve the business environment for foreign affiliates within the context of Asian 
regional competition for not only HSMs but also investment. 
 
8.2.4 Academic contributions 
To sum up, this dissertation has brought four sets of academic contributions (the bold 
signifies important contributions). First, it underscored the role of government. In 
transnational elite geographies, the scholarly debate revolves around the career 
making/organisational management, and the policy issues have been underestimated 
                                            
100 Regarding the percentage of GDP, it accounts for 0.8%, 24%, and 41.5% respectively (ibid.). 
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as the corporate elites generally enjoy the ‘privilege’ of borderless mobility 
(Beaverstock, 2002; 2005). Nonetheless, this transient elite is a handful of cases of 
HSMs. This research, on the other hand, has unearthed HSMs with intention of 
settlement. For them, gaining the stabilised status (e.g. accessing permanent 
residency and mortgage) is more important than for the highly-mobile elites. This also 
suggests the policy design should be in line with the life-course of migrants to 
facilitate their settlement. 
 
Second, within Japanese employment relations, this study has presented ‘coerced 
harmonisation’. The extant literature has suggested the unique employment practices 
such as seniority salary and life-time employment can be barriers for HSMs (Tsukasaki, 
2008; Oishi, 2012). Although this research also identified these issues, it further 
advanced the theory by emphasising the peer pressure to be Japanized. This peer 
pressure is driven by the institutionalised mechanism to exclude the organisational 
outcasts. This study clarified that not only employment rules but also the implicit 
mechanism plays an important role in shaping the ‘barrier free’ office to attract more 
HSMs. 
 
Third, from the macro perspectives, the research has conceptualised ‘no choice 
democracy’. Kasumigaseki bureaucracy posits systematic bureaucracy which has 
long led the policy making in Japan (Johnson, 1982; Imamura, 2006). However, in 
terms of migration policies, the bureaucrats are not given the leading role to move 
forward with the reforms, nor politicians. As a result, the voters have no choice in 
migration policies, thereby just keep the status quo with the drastic reforms untouched.  
 
Fourth, empirically, this study has offered a novel gaze of the skilled migration studies 
by ‘decentring’ them from the Anglo-American dominance. As Walsh (2014) claims, 
the scholarly debate should be more balanced and widened to share variations and its 
lessons. The empirics therefore should not be limited to Anglo-American perspectives. 
Sharing variations and policy implications will subsequently prompt policy debates in 
migration (Vertovec, 2007) and result in better policy making (Massey et al., 1993; 
Hollifield, 1992) in the world: echoing the calls, this study has brought Asian 
perspectives to the debates. 
 
Besides, this dissertation has provided another empirical approach in qualitative 
research: no snowballing. As the extant literature on HSMs has relied on snowballing 
(e.g. Beaverstock, 2002, 2005; Scott, 2006, 2007; Ho, 2007; Leonard, 2008; Harvey, 
2008; Oishi, 2012; Ryan, 2015), this study distinctively heightened the quality of data 
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by abandoning snowballing. In so doing, this research was successful in unravelling 
the hidden cohorts such as precarious HSMs (e.g. the nursery teacher). Also, it opened 
up a way to assess the migration policy: the research gleaned the data both from the 
HSMs (i.e. clients) and policy makers (i.e. policy providers) to review the policies; this 
enabled sketching out more dynamic micro-macro interplays to offer policy proposals.  
 
8.2.5 Synthesising threads of the three findings-chapters 
This section has thus far discussed how the research questions and empirical analysis 
have clarified issues to be addressed in attracting HSMs. Figure 8-1 sums up how the 
three threads of the findings-chapters were spun out of each research question to 
present academic contributions. Nevertheless, I would like to carry out one more task 







As argued in the theoretical framework, one of the current limitations of migration 
literature is that there are few studies bridging disciplines and scales even though the 
myriads of scholars advocate its necessity (Urry, 2007; King, 2012a; Castles et al. 
2014; Brettel and Hollifield, 2015). In fact, the findings of this research are still divided 



























Figure 8-1 Research questions and findings in analytical chapter 
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driven by geographical and sociological theories and (2) macro analysis (Chapter 7) 
based on political sciences. Therefore, these three findings-chapters may well be 
converged into one tapestry to bring overall coherence. Also, it would be an important 
contribution if this research can successfully build up theories remodelling the three 
threads which focused on distinct aspects and scales. 
 
Now let me address this formidable task: weaving out the threads across chapters into 
the complete tapestry. 
 
8.3 Final discussion: Weaving out the complete tapestry 
To present a more dynamic landscape synthesising the three threads (i.e. three sets 
of core findings of chapter 5, 6 & 7), this section underlines three cross-cutting themes 
which are substantially at play in attracting HSMs: (1) stigmatisation, (2) diversity, and 
(3) public policies. 
 
8.3.1 Stigmatisation 
Throughout the dissertation, the study has highlighted stigma attached to migrants, 
state, and policies. First, as seen in the case of Lydia, stigmatised cohorts face 
difficulties in obtaining a visa even though they are well sought-after migrants such as 
teachers of international background and entrepreneurs with new business ideas, all 
of whom will bring innovation to Japan. Although the Japanese government 
emphasises the importance of innovation brought by HSMs (Kodo jinzai ukeire suishin 
kaigi, 2009; Japanese government, 2016), stigmatisation grounded on gender, 
ethnicity, nationality and occupation may preclude desirable HSMs from Japan. 
 
It is worth noting that stigmatisation is not only limited to immigration control but also 
afflicts HSMs even in their everyday life. Especially, this research identified two 
stigmatised groups: Korean and mainland Chinese. Examples include ‘unconscious 
segregation’ that Jihye occasionally touched upon when her fellow mothers look down 
on Korean traits, or hostility specifically directed to the mainland Chinese like non-
mainland Chinese (e.g. Tom and Guanlin—Australian and Taiwanese—) reporting 
radical cases. 
 
The macro analysis also unearthed stigmatised policies: ‘golden rule’, what this study 
termed and foregrounded. This is the principle of Japanese migration policy 
underpinning the idea of letting HSMs in but not unskilled migrants. It is an unrealistic 
principle and has to date caused numerous backdoors (Sellek, 2001; Tsuda and 
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Cornelius, 2004). Despite the problematic nature of this disguised rule, no bureaucrats 
expect the reform of rule primarily because they should go through an arduous process, 
which they have already dismissed. In other words, it is a taboo for bureaucrats to 
discuss the golden rule, which is heavily stigmatised as a Pandora’s box. This 
inviolable label is used as an excuse not to change the unrealistic principle and create 
back doors one after another. It follows that the bureaucrats are also haunted by their 
own created stigmatisation obstructing policy reform. 
 
Ironically, it is not only migrants who are sacrificed to stigmatisation but also Japan, 
which potentially loses substantive cohorts of HSMs who might migrate if their image 
of Japan was normalised. The Western people still hold the image of a crazy, pricey 
and closed Japan due to unbalanced propaganda the respondents’ everyday life 
cannot shake off. The research framed the process of stigmatisation within otherness 
discourses (Eagleton, 2000; Sakai, 2000; Mouer and Sugimoto, 2002; Yeoh and Willis, 
2005; Urry and Larsen, 2011) particularly developed by Said (1978, 1993) who 
underlined the problematic Westernised view to the Orient. However, this study has 
also revealed otherness discourses are not confined within the ‘western’ culture as it 
is certainly applicable to Japanese people and its government. It tells us how difficult 
it is to stave off stigmatisation which has no panacea and can pervade anywhere (King 
and Mai, 2009; Collyer and King, 2015). Still, of note is how some HSMs skilfully 
overcome the stigma and successfully redrew the impression as Jiawei revealed: 
 
I have been told that “I don't like Chinese people, but you are an exception”. 
I am currently engaged with a project in H (Japanese countryside) and at 
the outset, people there were a bit cautious of me. I could list as many things 
like discrimination, but I don't mind. I can make them open minded. It’s 
personality rather than nationality that counts finally. The governor now calls 
me “Mr Y (his Chinese family name), Mr Y” intimately. 
(Jiawei, cited in Chapter 5) 
 
Jiawei’s remarks embody an English proverb ‘it's better to light a candle than curse the 
darkness’. As a matter of course, the stigmatisation that the host society holds should 
be removed as much as possible. However, as it is unrealistic to eliminate all the 
stigmas as long as human beings have subjectivity, the migrants themselves can also 
play important roles in redrawing their new images. Along with Jiawei, some other 
respondents in the study proactively, tactfully and successfully attend to the stigmas 
(e.g. Jihye who engineers unconscious segregation of her fellow mothers). This 
demonstrates a good example for HSMs who wish to accommodate themselves with 
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new encounters, but also points to the fundamental advantage (as opposed to mere 
economic effects) in accepting HSMs. The HSMs are a catalyst to ‘innovate’ Japanese 
society insomuch as their positive presence can constitute a driving force in updating 
Japanese people’s perceptions insinuating how significant it is to acknowledge 
differences in the minds of Japanese. In this sense, bringing more diversity into 
Japanese society is also beneficial for the Japanese native population itself. 
 
8.3.2 Diversity 
Diversity is thus another important implication this research highlighted throughout the 
multi-scale analysis. Diversity is brought by not only migration but also various forms 
of social attributions including gender, disability and personal philosophy (Vertovec, 
2012, 2017). In short, diversity makes differences to everyone whether Japanese or 
not. Although it is vital to acknowledge the differences which make everyone proud of 
their distinctiveness, the fundamental barriers for HSMs are prone to emanate from the 
lack of diversity such as coerced harmonisation in the workplace or pressure to 
conform in education. 
 
The lack of diversity sometimes turns to be excessive demands for being Japanized. 
Remember how Qian used the metaphor to describe implicit collegiate pressures to be 
Japanized: “If there are more foreigners doing strange things (in my office), the office 
will be warmer or more frank, I suppose” (Qian, cited in Chapter 6). It should be noted 
that Qian is not doing any “strange things” but her Japanese colleagues or hierarchy 
require the HSMs to behave like Japanese, which should be “strange things” 
considering the company advertises themselves as a ‘global’ firm. Simultaneously, 
Qian’s narrative is quite telling on how the workplace should be so that HSMs can 
attain their potential. Japanese companies should be more accommodating by 
acknowledging the differences of views, values and backgrounds until “strange things” 
can become marked individuality that will ultimately be the strength of the innovative 
company. 
 
The necessity of diversity can also be said of the policy making process. As indicated, 
Japanese bureaucracy represents quite a homogeneous closed society: males 
dominate representing 97% of the managers, no foreigners, based on life time 
employment with very few political appointees. The study has revealed how this closed 
guild constitutes risk averse and conservative policy making, stifling the international 
benchmarking and challenging spirits. It is only natural that the policy makers who have 
hardly ever worked with foreigners cannot implement efficient policies to attract HSMs. 




8.3.3 Public policies 
The findings have suggested various public policies to be reformed such as the 
necessity to incorporate life-course dimension into designing permanent residency, for 
which HSMs are required more stringent conditions compared to other advanced 
industrial states. On this point, benchmarking the Japanese policies internationally is 
quite important in not only migration regimes but also other influential policies like 
income tax. In the even more globalised world, it is easy for high-income HSMs to gain 
residency in lower-tax economy and ‘commute’ to Japan from there. As the migration 
experts in the study reiterated, the Japanese government should recognise with which 
economies it competes for HSMs and then update the public policies accordingly (or 
work for international harmonisation if necessary). Social issues for migrants also 
revealed the significance of public safety, over which Japan still has a competitive edge. 
The case of migrants who decided to return to Tokyo for the safety and ‘freedom’ of 
their children represents the human face (Favell et al., 2007; Beaverstock, 2005) of the 
privileged elite HSMs. 
 
Policy implications the study indicated are not only confined within individual public 
policies but how the policy making process itself can be improved. It has been 
proposed that the vertical negotiation is better than the egalitarian horizontal 
negotiation to exert the political leadership to move forward with the appropriate 
policies. 
 
This research has thus drawn together the distinct levels (macro, meso and micro) of 
threads of the plot mapping out the role of the state on skilled migration. This section 
especially highlighted the dynamism of how the core findings and its implications are 
organically interlinked. The following figure is the tapestry woven out of the multi 












8.3.4 Who are migration policies for? 
In concluding the final discussion on policy implications, I would like to pose a crucial 
proposition which is not limited to skilled migration but related to the whole migration 
research agenda: Who are migration policies for?  
 
Conventionally and narrowly, migration policies, inter alia immigration control, are for 
a state which would like to control the flow of migrants and it is designed to limit the 
movement of persons (Collyer and King, 2015; Findlay and Cranston, 2015). It is 
therefore the ‘general’ understanding of a conventional migration regime that all the 
decisions on immigration control are solely left to a state (Tuduka, 2005; Tagaya and 
Takaya, 2015; Sato, 2017). The state usually only accepts foreigners who are 
(economically) ‘beneficial’ to the country as embodied in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). The Japanese government, for example, declares in 
Immigration Act Article 7 (1) (ii) that “the activities (of a foreign national who would like 
to work in Japan) shall conform to the conditions provided for by Ordinance of the 
Ministry of Justice which shall be provided for in consideration of factors including but 
not limited to the effects on Japanese industry and public welfare101” (emphasised by 
the author). It means that the government keeps restrictions on immigration partly for 
the reason of “industry and welfare” for their citizens (Shutsunyukokukanri horei 
kenkyukai, 2016). In sum, migration policies may exist primarily for a state that wishes 
                                            
101 This provision is not applicable to some foreigners such as on family reunification (including Nikkeijin) and 
diplomats. 





































to draw the boundaries on the ground to protect its citizens but not for immigrants. Yet, 
the overall picture addressed in this section hints at a more constructive answer. 
 
In fact, it may be partly true that the migration policies are something to regulate the 
flow of migrants—above all, the research indicated the Japanese policy makers were 
more interested in immigrants than emigrants as is often the case with advanced 
industrial states (Skeldon, 2009). However, it should be also noted that migration 
policies can be a useful tool to ‘encourage’ migrants in rather than merely stifling their 
inflow (Florida, 2005). Unfortunately, the ‘affirmative measure’ has been given less 
priority than the ‘negative measure’ (i.e. restricting the flow) in the policy spheres as 
seen in the series of cases revealed by Lydia, Jiawei’s Chinese mother and permanent 
residency (and the golden rule if we can expand the arguments to unskilled migrants). 
Especially, the case of Lydia reiterated that the migration policies hindered innovative 
education, which is tremendously important for the country that aims to lead innovation 
in the world (Keidanren, 2015). This case represents a good example in that the 
affirmative measure can benefit the Japanese citizens and will remind the policy 
makers that the migration policies are for them—Japanese citizens, among others, the 
next generation who is to fashion out future Japan. In this sense, the policies are not 
only for people of today but also for their future generation, that do not currently have 
a voting right. 
 
This point is crucial in debating migration policies but is not shared widely even among 
policy makers. As evidence, if the policy makers subscribed to this view, they could not 
keep the ‘golden rule’ and boast the makeshifts that are unable to solve the prevailing 
problems fundamentally. Constantly producing a makeshift—in sum, exploiting easy 
band-aid solutions—means fundamental problems are just handed out to the 
generation with the unsolved issues snowballing. If the politicians really understood 
who migration policies are for, Japanese people would not face no choice democracy. 
The issues this research unearthed stem from the void of the taken-for-granted vision 
that policy makers hold. 
 
This is nonetheless only a partial dimension in considering the ramification of migration 
dynamism. The study pointed to the importance of diversity so that HSMs can exhibit 
their faculties to the fullest. Their colleagues, for example, should be more tolerant to 
unperfect Japanese and place greater store on their unique expertise. At the same 
time, it may well be acknowledged bringing diversity also benefits their Japanese 
colleagues through alleviating coerced harmonisation, that also stifles the Japanese 
co-workers. By way of illustration, the research corroborated the long working tradition 
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is due to peer pressure to stay at the office until late although it is gradually improving. 
Diversity will disentangle the mind of Japanese workers from the peer pressure and 
bring better work-life balance as the HSMs practice. As a result, insular Japanese 
offices will be more open and innovated, benefitting both Japanese and non-Japanese 
workers. It is only natural that an ‘open’ office is comfortable and welcoming not only 
for foreigners but also for Japanese workers. Coerced harmonisation therefore must 
be modified for the sake of everyone irrespective of the backgrounds. In so doing, we 
will witness the dynamic positive reform, which ultimately attracts more HSMs. 
 
This also gives us an important implication that migration should not be discussed one 
way but interactively. Moreover, the argument can be applicable to the overall 
migration agenda and the current pressing policy issues. An example includes the so-
called refugee crisis102: Refugee Convention (the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees) is in fact primarily for refugees who need humanitarian aid, but it is also for 
the international community including the host country in that peace making will directly 
or indirectly benefit all the people regardless of where they live, which is unfortunately 
likely to be neglected in the public and political discourses when migration is discussed 
one way. Under the circumstances, what has been discussed here could amplify a far-
reaching message: migration policies are for everyone, including the host citizens, their 
future generations and the migrants. This is actually the point where ‘self’ and ‘others’ 
become ‘us’ as outlined throughout the research. 
 
8.4 Future research directions 
Now we are nearly at the exit of the labyrinth. Yet, as is often the case with academic 
research, this might be another entrance of the labyrinth. Since all the research has 
limitations, I should admit there are some areas this research could not answer or even 
generate. Being reflexive, a question resolved in the fieldwork indeed triggered multiple 
other questions although this process itself has deepened the inquiry. Therefore, it is 
indispensable to critically examine what was not unfolded. There are mainly three 
areas left for future research: (1) generalisation, (2) longitude perspective, and (3) the 
contested concept of ‘Westerners’. 
 
                                            
102 Since the early 2010s, the unstable geopolitical conditions around Syria has produced over 5.4 million Syrian 
refugees in the area. In addition to this number, 996,204 Syrians have applied for asylum in Europe between April 
2011 and October 2017 (UNHCR, 2018). The influx of asylum seekers to the EU member states has intensified 




Because of its nature, qualitative research usually entails some intrinsic issues to 
address validity, reliability and generalisability as set out in Chapter 4. With validity, 
this study clarified the recruiting process and the attributions of respondents 
(LeCompte and Goetz, 1982) as much as possible so that the research ensures the 
ability to replicate. Also, ‘rich, thick description’ (Creswell, 2014:252, original italics) 
was shown to address the strong linkage between the data and the theory to establish 
certain reliability. However, it is challenging to generalise the findings only by this 
research. 
 
This study has a limited sample of 45 participants although it is relatively larger than 
the standard PhD dissertation, which stands at around 30 (Bryman, 2012). The small 
sample size is due to the constraints in the fieldwork resources, specifically given that 
the dissertation should be submitted within a restricted time frame. In completing the 
fieldwork in Japan, I indeed faced a trade-off between the achievements in the 
fieldwork and limited resources (Bryman, 2014), which a PhD student should negotiate 
throughout the learning process to be an independent researcher. Therefore, the next 
step I would like to take after the PhD is to strengthen and test the generalisability of 
the findings by (1) increasing the qualitative sampling, (2) using the quantitative survey, 
or (3) employing the mixed-methods approach. 
 
8.4.2 Longitudinal perspectives 
Another methodological weakness is the cross sectional approach. Reflexively, I 
gradually came to realise its weakness during the analysis much more than the sample 
size that I had already recognised as a challenge before doing the fieldwork. That is to 
say, time series connote fundamental factors in the research. 
 
Based on the analysis of migratory trajectories, this study brings life-course 
perspectives to the fore in discussing policy design. Fortunately, the samples included 
a reasonable number of HSMs who have lived relatively long and I could grasp how 
their perceptions and life had changed over the course of their long-term residence (7 
out of 26 respondents had lived in Japan over 10 years). However, since the fieldwork 
was cross sectional, it did not fully engage with the longitudinal examination. For 
instance, John’s case partially accentuated the need to reconsider the conditions of 
permanent residency. In fact, he allegedly left Tokyo after one and a half years of the 
interview as he predicted, but I could not interview him again to know why he made the 
decision. This simply means my analysis can only explain the supposition he posed at 
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the time of interview; however, I cannot corroborate his actual decision. There may be 
another significant reason that made him leave Tokyo and this may contribute more to 
academic and policy debate. 
 
Migration should not be understood cross sectionally but longitudinally as it is the life 
history of each migrant (Sakai, 2000). It also signifies that even if the ‘mobility’ is 
sedentary, the migration history itself impinges on their entire life decision whether it is 
directly or indirectly (Yamashiro, 2017). Throughout the analytical process, the 
respondents implicitly taught me how important it is to listen to and draw out their entire 
life story without only picking up on the migratory periods. This is why biographical 
methods (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001) are indispensable for future migration 
research (Findlay et al., 2015). 
 
8.4.3 The concept of ‘Westerners’ 
Analytically, I must admit the contested feature of the concept of ‘westerners’. A 
uniqueness of the study is the analytical strategy contrasting perceptions between 
Western and Asian migrants. As a result, it has brought illuminative findings such as 
antithetical migration trajectories and otherness discourses. Still, we should be critical 
of how to define the Western and the risks lying in dichotomy. 
 
Chapter 1 defined important terminology and that of ‘western’ was primarily referred to 
Europe and North America (Turnbull et al., 2010; Liu-Farrer, 2017). My research 
additionally included Australian in Western people as their social practice is influenced 
by Western (or Anglophone) culture103. In this sense, ‘West’ is not merely geographical 
(i.e. Europe and North America) but a more nuanced and contested indicator in terms 
of race, ethnicity, culture and so forth. In particular, ‘Western’ is clearly associated with 
whiteness (Leonard, 2008; Walsh, 2014). While the myriads of skilled migration 
research mention the term ‘west’, most of them do not show a clear definition on who 
westerners are (e.g. Ho, 2007; Findlay et al., 2015; Holbrow, 2017; Harvey and 
Beaverstock, 2017). This suggests the definition of ‘Western’ is not necessarily shared 
among researchers and it might be conveniently interpreted by researchers depending 
on the contexts or research outcome the researcher would like to present. 
 
Indeed, it might be true that there are some clear cohorts such as the UK or US 
nationals (especially Caucasian) who can be easily categorised as Western, but 
numerous cases are ambiguous. For instance, is Polish western? A novel “Under 
                                            
103 In fact, the two Australian informants had UK citizenship as well although they identified themselves as 
Australian. There were no New Zealand respondents. 
210 
 
Western Eyes” (1911) written by Joseph Conrad (1857-1924)104, who was originally 
Polish and later became a renowned novelist in the UK, delineated his struggles in 
the Western society as a non-Westerner through the optics of the ‘non-western’ 
protagonist Razumov. However, many people now might include Polish as 
Westerners considering they are EU citizens. It suggests the concept of ‘Western’ can 
be redefined with time. Then, is an Albanian a westerner? They are Muslim Caucasian 
in Europe but non-EU citizens and crave Western culture (King and Mai, 2009).  
 
Fortunately, the respondents in this research did not encompass the contested 
countries due to the limited sample size. However, it should be also noted that the 
concept of Asia might be contested as the study has indicated different perspectives 
the mainland-Chinese and other Chinese ethnics (from Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong) hold. The issue of definition calls for more intricate research focusing on 
specific nationalities and perhaps occupations as Ryan (2015) narrowly selected Irish 
teachers living in England as her informants to pinpoint their distinctive identities from 
that of the English. In essence, the research findings can potentially be further 
expanded or detailed throughout the refining process of the definitions and informants. 
 
8.5 Reflexivity 
To be reflexive, this PhD project has provided me with a valuable chance to reflect on 
who I am. As discussed in the Methodology, a researcher’s identities play out 
throughout the whole research process; the findings and conclusion are entirely 
contingent on how the investigator collect the data and analyse it based on their values 
and position. Thus, positionality makes the great difference. 
 
My social position (Japanese, male, working for a employers’ organisation) is so 
different from all the HSMs interviewed, thereby making me an ‘outsider’ who does not 
share their background. This might have entailed difficulties in retrieving the data from 
them. On the other hand, I gradually realized the advantages to be an ‘outsider’ through 
the writing-up stage. This was particularly evident in critically reading the extant 
literature and linking it with my analysis. The literature was mainly elaborated by an 
‘insider’ who has a migrant background in Japan (e.g., Liu-Farrer, 2011b) or belongs 
to migrants’ side (e.g., Oishi, 2012). They have presented fascinating findings to 
unpack the unknown life of migrants, however, it is only one dimension cut out from 
the dynamic migration realities. For instance, it seems to me that the insiders’ views 
are confined within the insiders’ like-minded perspectives. One of the strengths of the 
                                            
104 Edward Said, whose concept of otherness discourses (Said, 1978, 1993) framed this study, was an academic 
researching into Joseph Conrad. 
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‘outsider’ is that it is relatively possible to have a more balanced approach in examining 
the data thanks to the ‘detached’ position (Ow Yong, 2018). Outsiders’ views are also 
useful in persuading the policy makers, who are the apparent outsiders. 
 
In addition, an insider-outsider encounter can sometimes benefit both sides unlike the 
case in which the research is confined within the like-minded community. As a 
Japanese citizen who understands the culture and legislation, it was easier for me to 
explain to the migrants how their problems (such as contributions of social security) 
can be solved as these were often due to their misunderstanding or the lack of multi-
lingual administrations. If the qualities/sorts of knowledge are different between the 
interviewees and investigator, they can complement each other. This is also one of the 
advantages for the outsider (and the informants as well). 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the sheer dichotomy of insider-outsider is risky for 
knowledge production (Ganga and Scott, 2006). Since the identities are multi-faceted, 
one can potentially be both insider and outsider. For instance, I was also an insider in 
the interviews with HSMs since I had a migrant background to be based in the UK 
during the research. At that time, I was struggling with the unfamiliar environment as a 
foreign student, which put myself in a minority position. Therefore, in conducting the 
fieldwork, I was well aware of how challenging it can be to work and live abroad. In this 
way, a researcher’s identities might partly overlap with that of the interviewees. The 
boundaries of insider/outsider are in fact elusive and movable. In other words, it is the 
researcher themselves who limits the boundaries. Reflecting on my positionality was 




8.6 Concluding the journey of the labyrinth 
— Me, a songbird, and a bell (私と小鳥と鈴と)— 
 
Even if I spread my arms, I could never fly 
Yet, a songbird can’t run across the field as I can 
 
Even if I swayed myself, I could never create a charming sound 
Yet, a small bell doesn’t know as many songs as I do 
 
The bell, the songbird, and me 




This research has set out the issues that HSMs in Japan face via multi-scale analysis, 
subsequently producing academic and policy implications such as coerced 
harmonisation and no choice democracy. Specifically, the study has identified 
stigmatisation and diversity as two interlinking agencies which should be fundamentally 
improved to attract more HSMs. The findings have also demonstrated the distinctive 
features of Japanese society, employment relations and policy making process 
affecting the life of HSMs. As a result, it has added new variations to the migration 
debate, where empirical studies on Japan have been insufficient making Japanese 
migration policies academically mysterious (Massey et al., 1998; Sato, 2017). This 
dissertation has also ‘decentred’ the extant debates on highly skilled migration from 
Anglo-American dominance in theory and empirics. It is nevertheless inappropriate to 
conclude that the implications highlighted here are only applicable to Japan and 
representing the idiosyncrasy of the country. 
 
In fact, some problems revealed throughout the study can be found in other countries. 
It is indeed the issues ‘out here’ not ‘out there’. See, for instance, Rhodes (2011) for 
insular bureaucracy and Kofman (2013) for stigmatisation and discrimination in the UK. 
Perhaps, coerced harmonisation and no choice democracy might be observed outside 
Japan as well. In sum, what I have discussed should not be regarded as unique 
extreme-oriental cases but some of the variations in the migration debate (Hollifield, 
1992; Massey, et al., 1993), from where we may be able to find lessons and 
constructive solutions in dealing with pervasive migration matters as seen in the 




In addressing this proposition, I pointed to the dynamism of migration. The effects of 
immigrants can spill over to the host society and will gain ripple effects by updating the 
perceptions of the local people. If society becomes more diversified and open, it is not 
only migrants but also the hosts who can enjoy a better life. Japanese Third Culture 
Kids —Kikokushijo (returnees’ children)—who are crammed into “the prescribed boxes” 
(Pollock and Van Reken, 2009: 56) in Japanese schools encapsulate the good 
example. Needless to say, any workplace or society which is not kind to migrants can 
never be kind to the host nationals either. More significantly, this is not confined to the 
migration argument: if it is not easy to work for a female worker, then it is not easy for 
the male counterpart either; if a public space is not friendly for a disabled person, then 
it is not friendly for others either. Thus, altruism is not necessarily only geared towards 
different ‘others’ but ultimately for everyone including ‘us’. In deciphering the labyrinth, 
this is the most critical clue that our respondents gave us via their everyday accounts: 
policies should not be discussed one way but interactively (Skeldon, 2009). 
 
A century ago, we could locate a similar message from a young Japanese woman still 
providing us with altruistic inspiration. The aforementioned poem, which all the children 
now touch upon in Japanese primary school, was made by a short-lived poet Misuzu 
Kaneko (1903-1930) in the 1920s. She composed diverse poems that still urge us to 
contemplate what we have forgotten or neglected in our busy daily life. Among others, 
she always kept her eyes on the weak and marginalised life until she took her own life 
at the age of 26. Note that the word order of the title and second last sentence are 
intentionally transformed from “Me, a songbird, and a bell” to “The bell, the songbird, 
and me”. Misuzu Kaneko might encourage us to shift our gaze from ‘me, first’ to ‘others, 
first’, then ‘everyone, first’ in the last sentence, by which ‘self’ and ‘others’ become ‘us’. 
 
In so doing, we acknowledge ‘our’ lively personalities and create a more vibrant society, 
where 
 
Everyone is different, that makes a difference. 
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Appendix 1 List of Participants 
List of HSMs interviewed 
Range Asian: 15, Western:11 (total 26 people) 
Age:20’s-50’s (youngest: 25, oldest: 58)/ gender M:18, F:8 
Gatekeeper (Keidanren) introduced 15 informants. Other informants are found through the personal 
network. No snowballing in either case. 
 
 





1  Sarvesh IT engineer India M 30’s Eng * 
2  Sing Research Thailand M 30’s Eng * 
3  Minji HR Korea F 20’s Jp * 
4  Junjie Global strategy Singapore M 20’s Jp * 
5 G Ting Global strategy China F 20’s Jp * 
6  Renhao Sales Taiwan M 40’s Jp * 
7  Raj Sales India M 50’s Eng * 
8  Eric External Affairs Canada M 50’s Eng+Jp * 
9  Scott Marketing UK M 40’s Eng * 
10 P Yang HR China F 20’s Jp * 
11  Qian Logistics China F 20’s Jp * 
12  Yu Services 
planning 
Hong Kong F 30’s Jp * 
13  Jiawei Services 
planning 
China M 40’s Jp * 
14  Junyoung Finance Korea M 20’s Jp * 
15  Alastair IT engineer UK M 20’s Eng * 
16  John Administrative 
staff 
Ireland M 20’s Eng  
17  Tom Researcher Australia M 30’s Eng  
18  Jack Translator 
(Self-employed) 
USA M 50’s Jp  
19  Guanlin Administrative 
staff 
Taiwan M 30’s Jp  
20  Brandon Accountant UK M 40’s Jp  
21  Lydia Teacher Philippines F 20’s Eng  
22  Jake Teacher UK M 30’s Eng  
23  Jihye Interpreter 
(Self-employed) 
Korea F 40’s Jp  
24  Luke IT engineer Australia M 20’s Jp  
25  Marie External Affairs France F 40’s Eng  
26  Cyrille Entrepreneur 
(Web design) 
France M 30’s Eng  
 












1  Current policy maker 1 MOJ Higher than Director level 
2  Former policy maker 1 MOL Higher than Director level 
3  Former policy maker 2 Cabinet Ministry Higher than Director level 
4  Former policy maker 3 MOL Higher than Director level 
5  Former policy maker 4 MOJ Higher than Director level 
6  Former policy maker 5 MOJ Higher than Director level 
7  Migration expert 1 Former Advisory board 
member for the Minister of 
Justice 
 
8  Migration expert 2 International Organisation  
9  Migration expert 3 Japanese Employers’ 
organisation 
 
10  Migration expert 4 European Employers’ 
organisation  
 
11  Migration expert 5 North American Employers’ 
organisation 
 
12  Migration expert 6 Non-profit organisation 
officer (Supporting foreign 
entrepreneurs) 
 
13  Migration expert 7 Researcher  
14  Migration expert 8 Researcher  
15  Migration expert 9 Immigration lawyer  
16  Migration expert 10 Career consultant  
17  Executive of international 
recruiting agency 
 Running recruiting agency 
for bilingual professionals 
18  Employer of migrants 1  Running International 
school 






Appendix 2 Topic Guide 
 
Topic guide for HSMs (Bold is the main questions to ask) 
 
1. Introduction: introducing myself, explaining the research and getting the consent 
in line with the participant sheet previously sent. Check any questions. 
2. Check basic information: age, educational background, professional career, 
status of residence, family composition, job, working experience (including in 
other countries), previous experience in Japan, length of stay in Japan 
3. Background information: How have you ended up working in Japan? 
What came to your mind when you first realized your opportunity to work in 
Japan (happy, eager, excited, puzzled)? What was the reaction of your 
family? 
(if s/he has been eager to work in Japan) since when have you been longing 
for working in Japan and why? 
Would you like to work in Japan longer than expected (intention of 
settlement)? (whether the initial plan has changed or not) 
4. After coming to Japan: how has your impression of Japan changed since 
you came to Japan (both downside and good points)? 
Is your standard of life in Japan better than in your previously resided (or 
home) country? 
5. Improving the situation: 
1) Policy 
What would you like the Japanese government to reform in terms of 
policies affecting your life (immigration control/ visa issues; pension, tax; 
settlement & naturalization; being accompanied by domestic servant and 
parents)? 
2) Social 
Do you find any difficulties for your family (spouse, education)? 
How about housing or cultural events which enrich your private life? 
Have you ever had any unpleasant incidents where you have felt 
excluded (discrimination)? 
Do you have any network with your compatriots (social club, embassy event, 
mutual support system)? 
Do you sometimes hang out with your Japanese friends when you are off 






Did you find anything you were surprised with when you started working 
in Japan? 
Do you have any systems or customs you would like to improve in your 
office or labour contract? 
Do you prefer the Japanese traditional employment system such as lifetime 
employment or seniority salary? 
Other issues: work-life-balance, language barrier, cultural differences, 
personnel evaluation, relations with boss or colleagues 
What kinds of support does your company provide, for example, welfare 
or training, that you find useful? (housing, health support, schooling, 
networking event, language lessons?) Do you have any other forms of 
support that you wish your company would provide? 
Overall, are you satisfied with your current work in Japan? 
4) Others 
6. Comparison: Do you recommend working in Japan to your friends in your 
country (relative attractiveness of Japan)? 
It is said that advanced countries are competing with each other to attract 
skilled migrants: with which countries does Japan compete for talent like 
you (in other words, in which countries would you like to work in future)? 
In the next decades, which countries will attract more talent than now? 
The number of HSMs in Japan is increasing gradually, however, it shows an 
interesting trend: the number of HSMs from western countries like 
Europe/America is constantly decreasing while that from Asia is 
steadily growing. Do you have any idea to explain this? 
7. Last: Overall, what is the biggest attraction of working in Japan? (career, 
remuneration, culture, standard of life?) 
How can we Japanese people further develop it? 
Any comments you would like to mention? Any questions to me? 






Topic guide for migration experts 
 
1. Introduction: introducing myself, explaining the research and getting the consent 
in line with the participant sheet previously sent. Check any questions. 
2. The Japanese government has the ground rule to encourage HSMs coming in 
but not to allow unskilled immigrants. What do you think about this? 
3. The government is sometimes criticized for demarcation (sectionalism) and 
bureaucracy. What do you think about this? 
4. What do we need to improve to encourage more HSMs working in Japan?  
a. Policy: immigration control, naturalisation/settlement, bringing domestic 
servant/parents, transparency (enough information on government web 
site in foreign language) 
b. Social: housing, family, cultural attractiveness, language, exclusiveness 
c. Labour: traditional employment practice, exclusiveness 
d. others 
5. What do you think about the Point-based system? Is it attractive to HSMs? 
6. Are there any strengths (weaknesses) in Japanese immigration policies? 
7. It is said that advanced countries are competing with each other to attract skilled 
migrants: with which countries does Japan compete for talent? Do you think 
this global competition will get more severe in the future? 
Which countries can be a potential source of HSMs for Japan? 
(to migration researcher/policy maker:) which country’s policy seems to be 
the best in attracting HSMs? (it may be different in sectors) 
(to migration researcher/ policy maker:) especially regarding HSMs, what do 
you think about negative views such as brain drain? 
8. The number of HSMs in Japan is increasing gradually, however, it shows an 
interesting trend: the number of HSMs from western countries like 
Europe/America is constantly decreasing while that from Asia is steadily 
growing. Why is this happening? 
9. What is the biggest attraction of working in Japan for HSMs? 
How can we Japanese people further develop it? 
Any comments you would like to mention? Any questions to me? 
10. Sending thank you email after the interview 
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Appendix 4 Definition of Asia, Europe, and North 
America in e-stat (2017) 
 
Chapter 3 demonstrated the number of HSMs in Japan. The definition of each area is 
defined as follows in the statistical data (e-stat, 2017). 
 
Asia  
Afghanistan, UAE, Myanmar, Bahrain, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, 
Sri Lanka, China, Taiwan, Cyprus, East Timor, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, South Korea, North Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mongolia, Oman, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Singapore, 
Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, Yemen, Palestine 
 
Europe 
Albania, Austria. Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,  Iceland, Ireland, Italy,  
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Monaco, Malta, 
Moldova, Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San 
Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, UK, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Andorra, Georgia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia. Kosovo 
 
North America  
Barbados, The Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, St Lucia, 
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